S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

top secret

Subject:

  • Special Annex on Indochina appended to NSC 177, “US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia” to be considered by NSC on January 8, 1954.2

Summary

This special annex, which is being given a very limited distribution, refers to courses of action open to the US in contingencies not covered by NSC 177, i.e., (a) a determination that in the absence of an offer of US military participation the French might seek to conclude the struggle in Indochina on unacceptable terms and (b) a French refusal to continue any participation in the war in Indochina despite offers of US participation. The alternatives open to the US are that the US should refuse to commit US forces in either of these contingencies, accepting the probable consequences, or that the US should commit US forces to supplement or replace the French.

[Page 945]

It is believed that you will wish to read this annex or at least pages 1 through 9 inclusive.

Recommendations

It is assumed the NSC will not reach a final decision at its January 8 meeting on the alternatives set forth in this special annex. In the course of any discussion, the following points might be made:

(a)
Every effort should be made to insure the success of the Laniel–Navarre plan including emergency end-item assistance granted rapidly and generously and including if necessary additional financial assistance. All concerned must have a top level directive to give highest priorities to General Navarre’s requests. We cannot afford to lose time or quibble over items which the French believe they require and which we are in a position to supply. If more funds are needed, they should be forthcoming.
(b)
Any commitment of US forces in Indochina may lead to the eventual necessity for making progressively larger commitments.
(c)
Such commitment would require drastic revisions upward in US budgetary, mobilization and manpower plans and appropriations, since existing plans and appropriations probably preclude the engagement of US forces in operations of the Indochina type.
(d)
Public opinion in the US is not now ready for a decision to send US troops to Indochina and in all probability will not support such a decision unless convinced that such action is necessary to save Southeast Asia from Communist domination.
(e)
Withdrawal of the French forces plus refusal to commit US forces would weaken the free-world position throughout Asia and probably influence the neutralist nations toward the Communist bloc.

  1. Drafted by Assistant Secretary Robertson and Bonsal of PSA.
  2. The Special Annex, drafted by the Planning Board of the National Security Council, was recalled pursuant to decisions taken at the 179th Meeting of the NSC, Jan. 8. It was subsequently reissued on Mar. 29; for text, see p. 1183. For the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the NSC Meeting of Jan. 8, see p. 947.

    NSC 177, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” Dec. 30. 1953, was adopted as amended by the NSC on Jan. 14, 1954, and subsequently approved by the President. The amended report was issued as NSC 5405, Jan. 16, 1954. For extracts from NSC 5405, see p. 971. A copy of NSC 177 is in S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 177 Series.