Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/3–2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Gibson)

top secret

[Washington,] March 28, 1952.

Subject:

• Interview with British Ambassador; Secretary’s Presentation of Preliminary Views Concerning British Memorandum of March 15th Regarding Indochina

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
• Mr. Gibson, PSA

After the customary amenities, the Secretary proceeded to give response to the British memorandum of March 15th, point by point, as outlined in Mr. Allison’s guidance memorandum of March 25th.…

. . . . . . .

The Ambassador referred to the increasing concern in London with Southeast Asia. H.M.G. is concerned not only with the present precarious situation in the area, a concern which has been greatly accentuated in recent weeks by their suspicions of French intentions in Indochina, but also with the snowballing effects of any action which might follow a further Chinese aggression. The question of Korea is of course related to their concern.

The Ambassador then noted that the last Ad Hoc Military Committee’s findings were a failure in that they resulted only in the presentation of three parallel sets of views which never met.¹ The time is now fitting, in the opinion of H.M.G., to make a serious effort to reconcile US and UK views. It is therefore requested that we give urgent thought to the following proposal. A politico-military conference be held as soon as possible in which a limited number of British and American military and Foreign Office officials should take part. He spoke of himself, Mr. Matthews, General Bradley and Marshal Elliot.² In answer to the Secretary’s question he replied that he did not propose that the Joint Chiefs or any other group be brought from London in order to participate. He believes that the conversations should be concerned with the hypothesis that the Chinese Communists would commit an overt aggression in Indochina, that we were resolved to oppose that aggression and that our objective was to combat the aggression itself and not necessarily to overthrow the Chinese Peoples Republic. On that basis we would concern ourselves with the following two considerations: (a) the kind of retaliatory action which we are able to take and its expected effectiveness, and (b) an assessment of what would be the results of the retaliatory action in bringing the Sino-Soviet pact into operation.

The Ambassador stated that H.M.G. believes that any Chinese aggression could be countered not only where it takes place but also, to a limited degree, at the base of the enemy’s operations in China without bringing the Sino-Soviet pact³ into operation. The question to be determined, however, arises out of the difference of opinion between the UK and the US as to where that limit is to be found.

The Ambassador emphasized that it is suggested these discussions were to be carried on without any commitment of any kind by either government.

In commenting on the Ambassador’s suggestion the Secretary noted that the studies of the last Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the Tripartite Military Conference had not achieved their purpose because the British participants were hampered by the fact that they gave first consideration to the policy questions behind any proposed military action while the American representatives thought only of the effectiveness of the action without considering policy at all. He said that there had not been enough advance thought concerning the subject on either side.

The Secretary stated in closing that he would make the British proposal known to the appropriate American officials on Monday, March 31st, and hoped to be able to give the Ambassador a prompt reply.

1. The report of the Ad Hoc Military Committee (appointed by the Tripartite Military Conference of Jan. 11), Feb. 5, is printed in volume xii.
2. Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, Chairman of the British Joint Supply Mission and British Representative on the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
3. For text of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic, signed at Moscow on Feb. 14, 1950. see United States Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 226, pp. 5–9 and 12–17, or American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. ii, pp. 2463–2465.