Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “S/P Papers”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington, March 27, 1952.]

Draft—Indochina Section of NSC Paper²

Problem: To determine the policy of the United States toward the countries of Southeast Asia, and in particular, the courses of action which may be taken by the United States to strengthen and coordinate resistance to communism on the part of the governments and peoples of the area.

Assumption: That identifiable Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia does not take place.

Analysis:

importance of indochina

The strategic importance of Indochina derives from its geographical position as a key to the defense of mainland Southeast Asia; its economic value as a potential large scale exporter of rice; and its political importance as an example of Western resistance to Communist expansion.

a. It is generally accepted that should Indochina fall to Communist control, Thailand and Burma could be expected soon to make their own accommodations with the Communist bloc. It is also generally accepted that in case of Communist occupation of Tonkin there is no other militarily defensible position for the West north of the Isthmus of Kra.

The relationship of Indochina to the defense or orientation of Malaya and Indonesia is somewhat more debatable. It appears possible that Malaya could be defended against whatever forces the Communists might bring to bear, provided the West maintained control of the sea and provided the local situation in Malaya did not deteriorate too greatly by reason of Communist proximity to the Malayan border. On the other hand it is obvious that Communist successes in Indochina, Thailand and Burma would stimulate bandwagon jumping among the already cautious Chinese population of Malaya, and would tend to add strength to anti-Western elements in precariously neutralist Indonesia. It is possible therefore that in spite of the theoretical military defensibility of Malaya at the Kra, the loss of Indochina would in fact lead to the loss to the Communist bloc of the entire Southeast Asia mainland, and eventually Indonesia as well.

b. The problem of whether or not the loss of Indochina would be followed by the loss of Malaya and Indonesia as well as of Thailand and Burma is of major importance in assessing the economic importance of maintaining the Western position in Indochina. If Indochina’s loss to the Communists were accompanied by the loss of Thailand and Burma alone, Western losses would consist primarily of the loss of valuable sources of exportable rice surpluses. The loss of these rice exporting areas would impose a two fold pressure on Japan by removing simultaneously a source of food and a potential field for Japanese export development. The loss of the three rice surplus countries would thus create real difficulties for the continued maintenance of a Western oriented Japan. Finally, the control of the three rice surplus countries by the Communists would provide them with an economic advantage of far greater importance to them than the loss of the area may be to the free world.

If however, the loss of Indochina were accompanied by the loss of Malaya and Indonesia as well, the West would suffer economic losses of major importance, and the Western orientation of Japan would be seriously jeopardized. Malaya and Indonesia are major sources of tin and rubber. Malaya is an important source of dollar earnings for the UK. Indonesia is an important secondary source of oil for the West. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would remove the chief potential area for Japanese commercial development, and would so add to the already powerful mainland pulls upon Japan as to make it dubious that Japan could refrain from reaching an accommodation with the Communist bloc.

c. Communist successes in Indochina would, in any event, have major political and psychological consequences for the West. Southeast Asia and South Asia certainly, and possibly important areas of the Middle East would be influenced toward alignment with the Communist bloc. Japan, economic pressures aside, would be more disposed to accommodate itself to the Communist bloc by reason of its altered evaluation of the relative balance of power. Western European confidence in the strength and future of the West would be further undermined.

present situation in indochina

5. In the long run, the security of Indochina against communism will depend upon the development of native governments able to command the support of the masses of the people and national armed forces capable of relieving the French of the major burden of maintaining internal security. The Vietnamese Government has been slow to assume its responsibilities and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and “fence-sitting” attitude of the bulk of the people; (b) the difficulty, common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; (c) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort; and (d) the relatively ineffective character of Bao Dai’s administration.

Efforts to create a National Vietnamese Army—an essential prerequisite to growth in the political stature of the Vietnam government and to an ultimate non-Communist solution in Indochina—have made some progress, and Vietnamese units have performed creditably in recent engagements. Plans call for the expansion of the army from its present strength of 120,000 to 150,000. However, it will take considerable time before the planned forces are organized, trained, and equipped in battalion units, and even longer before effective divisional units can be put into the field. Progress in the formation of the army is retarded by lack of capable officers at all levels of command, French budgetary difficulties, shortages of equipment, and the apathetic attitude of the population. At the same time, differences of opinion between the Vietnamese leaders and the French, particularly over who will exercise control over the Vietnam Army, have prevented in the past full cooperation and maximum progress in the army’s development. Delay in establishing a Vietnam Army under Vietnamese control has been a contributing factor in limiting popular support of the Vietnamese regime.

The military situation in Indochina continues to be one of stalemate. Increased U.S. aid to the Franco-Vietnamese forces has been one important factor in enabling them to withstand recent communist attacks. However, Chinese aid to the Viet Minh in the form of logistic support, training, and technical advisors is increasing at a comparable rate. In the absence of intervention by important forces other than those presently engaged, and provided French will and effort remain undiminished, the prospect is for, a continuation of the present stalemate.

possibilities of diminution of french will or effort

The French Government is increasingly concerned over France’s ability to maintain its position in Indochina. There is a growing official feeling in France that it cannot simultaneously support presently projected military efforts in both Europe and Asia without greater U.S. aid. If the French were unable, by remaining in Indochina, to secure financial assistance for both their European and Indochinese operations, and were forced to choose between the two, they would probably view their Indochinese commitment as of lesser importance. Moreover, there has been a growing popular feeling that the distant and costly Indochinese war offers few rewards even if won. This feeling is increasing political pressure for some alleviation of the French burden in Indochina.

Strong factors, however, still hold the French to their present commitments. These include: (a) the intangible but powerful factor of prestige; (b) the knowledge that withdrawal from Indochina would have repercussions elsewhere in the French Union; (c) the concern over the fate of French nationals and investments in Indochina; (d) the official feeling that no settlement with the VietMinh or with Communist China could be achieved that would reserve any French interests in Indochina; and (e) the physical and technical difficulties of a withdrawal operation.

On balance it appears probable that the French will continue the effort to maintain their position in Indochina, but will attempt to alleviate their burden by insisting that the U.S. undertake an increased share of financial responsibility for the defense of the area. The French may, in due course, also press for U.S. armed assistance, either directly, or through the UN, and may also press for U.S. or international support. The French will probably attempt to convince the U.S. that the alternatives to U.S. assumption of an important share of at least financial support for the Indochina operation will be either French withdrawal, or a negotiated settlement with the VietMinh which would be tantamount to acceptance of a Communist Indochina. It is, however, quite possible that if the French are unsuccessful in securing greater U.S. financial assistance they will in fact seriously consider withdrawal from Indochina, or, as a more likely alternative, will explore the possibilities of extricating themselves as gracefully as possible from their Indochina entanglement through a negotiated settlement with the Communists, following an achievement of a truce similar to that now being sought in Korea.

considerations affecting u.s. assumption of increased responsibility for indochina

Important as the maintenance and development of an anticommunist position in Indochina is to the interests of the U.S., a U.S. decision to undertake greater responsibility in Indochina should be made only in the light of (a) the possibility that any U.S. course of action, short of actual employment of U.S. armed forces, may in the long run prove inefficacious; (b) the possibility that a marked improvement in the anti-communist position in Indochina which threatened to eliminate the VietMinh might occasion Chinese Communist intervention; (c) the possibility that U.S. assumption of responsibility in Indochina might occasion a rapid and extensive loss of interest in the situation on the part of the French; and (d) U.S. ability to assume increased burdens in Indochina in view of its present world-wide commitments.

The present situation in Burma and Indonesia illustrates the difficulties which the newly independent countries of Southeast Asia face in developing stable and effective governments even in the absence of Communist military activity. Under the best of circumstances the Associated States of Indochina would encounter major problems in establishing themselves. The presence of a well organized, dynamic, and militarily powerful VietMinh opposition greatly complicates these problems. It is possible that with substantial French and U.S. assistance the new states may eventually succeed. But there can be no guarantee that increased U.S. assistance to and responsibility for Indochina will necessarily stabilize the situation or prevent such deterioration as to eventually face the U.S. with a choice of either employing its own armed forces or accepting Communist domination of the area. On the other hand achievement of stability by the Associated States would mean, in effect, the elimination of the VietMinh and the establishment of anti-communist and Western oriented states on the southern border of Communist China and might also face the U.S. with a choice between use of its own armed forces or abandonment of the area to Communist control. It is doubtful whether the Chinese Communists would believe that they could afford to permit such a development. There would therefore be continuing real danger of Chinese Communist armed intervention in the event that U.S. courses of action in Indochina appeared to be leading to defeat of the VietMinh.

There is also the danger that U.S. assumption of increased responsibility for Indochina might lead directly to French abandonment of responsibility for the area. It is probably accurate to estimate that the main thing which inspires the French to hang on in Indochina is concern for French prestige, and the inability to devise any method for relinquishing Indochina without loss of prestige. To the degree that Indochina were to be accepted as a U.S. responsibility the French might feel that their own prestige was disengaged. A falling off of French will and effort would probably follow almost automatically.

u.s. objectives

In the light of the considerations described above, U.S. courses of action with regard to Indochina should be designed to:

(a) Enable the French to continue to fulfill French responsibilities for Indochina without sacrificing development of French strength under NATO;

(b) Supplement rather than supplant French efforts in Indochina, and minimize any increase of U.S. responsibility for the area;

(c) Assist in development of the fullest degree of political and military independence of the Associated States which may be consistent with continuation of French efforts in the area, and assist in the development of stable and competent indigenous governments, strong national armies, and sound economies.

(d) Minimize possibilities of Chinese Communist intervention.

possible u.s. courses of action

The courses of action which the U.S. might consider following to maintain the Franco-Vietnamese position in Indochina and to prevent deterioration of that position include: (a) increase of present types of U.S. assistance; (b) assumption of a portion of the French burden by financial assistance to metropolitan France, or by financial assistance to the national armies of Indochina; (c) exertion of U.S. influence for a broadening of the base of the governments of Indochina; (d) employment of U.S. forces in Indochina; and (e) stabilization of the present situation through the achievement of a truce which, inter alia, would secure anti-communist Indochinese control of territories now administered by them.

a. Present U.S. assistance to Indochina consists of both military and economic aid. U.S. military assistance in the form of U.S. military equipment and supplies has been an essential factor in the defense of Indochina. The economic program has been directed toward offsetting the military drain on the economy of the Associated States, improving the effectiveness of government services, and providing support for military activities. Both of these programs continue to be essential, and U.S. military and economic assistance of the present type should be continued and increased. Steps should be taken to strengthen the MAAG Mission. Increase of these programs will not, however, go far toward relieving the financial burden of Indochina on the French.

b. The current cost to France of the Indochina military operation is approximately U.S.$1,200,000,000 a year. U.S. assumption of a major portion of these costs might be undertaken either by provision of budgetary assistance to metropolitan France, or by U.S. underwriting of all or part of the costs of the development of the Indochinese national armies, which currently account for some $400,000,000 of French costs in Indochina. If it were estimated to be in U.S. interest to undertake responsibility for a portion of the French costs in Indochina, either of these methods could be used to good effect. Direct budgetary assistance to France would have the advantage of limiting direct U.S. responsibility for the Indochina situation and thus might be better calculated to preserve French will for continuing French efforts in Indochina. Assumption of part or all of the costs of the national Indochinese armies would increase U.S. involvement in Indochina, and would undoubtedly to some degree increase U.S. responsibility for the area. This course of action might, however, be more attractive to the U.S. domestically and thus make U.S. appropriations more feasible. It would five the U.S. a greater voice in a particularly useful sector of Indochinese political and military development, and might be so carried out as to minimize the danger of reducing French interest in Indochina.

c. French political concessions to Indochinese nationalism have been considerable and as of now the Associated States probably have more privileges than they can effectively exercise. The French have not offered the Associated States freedom of choice as to whether they wish to be in or out of the French Union. Such an offer might have some utility as a gesture to Indochinese nationalism but the desirability of such a French move, from the point of view of the U.S., depends almost completely on whether or not it would result in a slackening of French will to carry on the defense of Indochina. At present it appears inadvisable for the U.S. to exert its influence to secure such an offer from the French.

The U.S., however, might usefully exert its influence to induce the French and the new States to move towards a broadening of the present overly narrow base of the new governments. In the key area of Vietnam the present government represents primarily the members of a small, relatively pro-French, faction. Important political groups such as the Dai Viets, and Cao Daists, are not adequately represented in the cabinet or government. Without U.S. assumption of major responsibility for Indochina it must be estimated that U.S. influence in the political developments of the area will necessarily remain to some degree limited, but the considerable political influence that the U.S. does possess might well be directed toward the development of governments in Indochina which adequately represent all non-Communist groups.

d. The Chinese Communists have demonstrated in Korea their sensitivity to the presence of U.S. forces near their borders and their willingness to accept major risks and casualties to prevent the approach of U.S. forces to the Manchurian frontier. It must be estimated that the Chinese Communists have the same sensitivity about their southern border as they have demonstrated in the case of Manchuria and it is probable therefore that the intervention of U.S. armed forces in Indochina would occasion a full scale Chinese Communist military intervention. The employment of U.S. armed forces in Indochina, without a prior Chinese Communist intervention, would also have the disadvantage of tending to relieve the French of their basic military responsibility for Indochina and thus of providing the French with a possible means of exit from Indochina which might not too greatly involve French prestige. Aside from the dislocation which use of U.S. forces in Indochina would impose upon U.S. military dispositions elsewhere in the world, therefore, there is good reason to consider it inadvisable for the U.S. to employ its own armed forces in Indochina on the assumption, to which this paper is addressed, that Chinese Communist identifiable aggression does not take place.

e. If it is assumed that a truce in Indochina is ipso facto desirable it must also be recognized that none of the political prerequisites of a satisfactory truce are present in the situation. Unlike the situation in Korea, the opposing forces do not face each other across a line of battle; to the contrary large territories are only sporadically subjected to the administrative control of either force. As a practical matter it would be virtually impossible to secure agreement on a “cease fire line” and upon the territories which the opposing forces should control and regard as their own. Correlatively, in the circumstances it would be virtually impossible to set up safeguards for any truce, since observation commissions, neutral or otherwise, would have no “front” to patrol. A situation not unlike but even more unsatisfactory than that which obtained in Indonesia from 1947 to 1949 would doubtless develop. Finally, the concession on the part of Franco-Vietnamese forces of any important territory to the Communists would unquestionably be regarded by the Indochinese people as a confession of great weakness and would have a deleterious effect on the political climate of Indochina.

Recommendations

The U.S. should:

1. Continue and increase its military and economic assistance programs for Indochina;

2. Continue to provide substantial financial assistance for the French effort in Indochina either through direct budgetary assistance to France or through assumption of financial responsibility for the Indochinese national armies, or a combination of both.

3. Continue to exert its influence to promote constructive political developments in Indochina, and in particular to promote a broadening of the base of the governments of the Associated States.

4. Continue to stress French responsibility for Indochina and oppose any decrease of French efforts in Indochina.

5. The U.S. should not employ U.S. armed forces in Indochina.

6. The U.S. should not exert its influence for the achievement of a truce in Indochina.

1. This memorandum was drafted by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, pursuant to NSC Action No. 614 of Mar. 5, which called for the preparation of studies on various aspects and contingencies related to the Communist threat to Southeast Asia. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”) This memorandum reflected comments from within S/P and from other offices of the Department. By memorandum of Apr. 1, Philip H. Watts, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, transmitted it to H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor; Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large; and John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “S/P Papers”) According to a marginal notation on Watts’ memorandum of transmittal, a meeting regarding the paper was held the same day in Matthews’ office, at which S/P was represented by Paul H. Nitze, Director; John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director; and Stelle.

   According to the distribution list accompanying the source text, Stelle provided the Department of Defense with copies of this paper on Apr. 2.

2. This draft, prepared in connection with NSC Action No. 614, was intended as a contribution to a report in the NSC 124 series, which dealt with the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. Documentation on the NSC 124 series is presented in volume xii.