751G.00/11–2153: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
897. Repeated information Paris 258, Hanoi unnumbered. General Navarre told me last night he was much encouraged over success of three-battalion parachute drop in Dien Bien Phu. He had absolute intelligence that Viet Minh planned to take Lai Chau. He must resist this not because of importance in itself of Lai Chau but because it was necessary case for expanding guerrilla operations which were harassing Viet Minh rear with increasing success. He could not defend Lai Chau itself by increasing garrison because by reason of its cuplike situation he would need 12 battalions to hold it. His battalions at Dien Bien Phu aided by guerrillas, should be able to thwart Viet Minh operations against Lai Chau.
Navarre told me that he had hesitated to make Dien Bien Phu parachute operation since with limited number of transport planes he could only drop two battalions at a time in an area where they would be opposed by two Viet Minh battalions. Fortunately latter had not reacted promptly and he had sent planes back for additional battalion. He had had some 40 casualties but Viet Minh had had double that number.
Navarre went on to say that it is utterly necessary that he be given an extra squadron of C–47’s. They are only planes suitable for use in this area. As a very bad second best he could have C–119 flown over from Manila but there would be delay and no possibility of surprise. Landing of C–119’s in Cat Bi would immediately tip off enemy. Furthermore, he would fly C–47’s with a single pilot whereas flying boxcars required co-pilots.