751G.5/11–1953: Telegram
The Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific (O’Daniel) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
RJ 68496. Purpose this msg to summarize major findings my mis Indochina 6 Nov to 15 Nov.2
Navarre concept as described to me last June in form finally approved by French Govt and included in United States-French exchange of notes is being generally applied to current operations and planning. So far Navarre has regained initiative lost last year and is continuing operations to maintain it. One of 5 enemy div available for offensive against delta rept to have lost ⅓ effectives as result French offensive south of delta (Operation Mouette) while large part effectives another div has been diverted to meet French Union operations including guerrilla, commandos and Maquis in Thai country. Enemy offensive potential however remains. Gen Navarre anticipates that enemy will in all probability attack. French state they would welcome an attack. Believe such an attack would be disastrous to enemy.
Navarre has made progress in building up cmbt res. He now has 13 groupes mobiles (each groupe mobile consists of 3 inf bn and 1 arty bn) compared with only 6 groupes mobiles last summer. By Jan there will be 16 groupes mobiles and this will be increased to 20 next summer.
The equivalent of 3 regt have arrived or will arrive soon from France and Korea. They have been or will be sta respectively in Tonkin, cen Annam and the south where they form basis 3 new groupes mobiles which will be used in early contemplated offensive operations.
Gen Navarre has 3 light div operational consisting of 3 groupes mobiles, each with divisional arty and eng units. (These 9 groupes mobiles are included in the 13 cited above). In addition he has grouped his 6 paratroop bns and other elements into an air command. He is convinced of value of divisional concept and intends continue along this line.
Navarre and I discussed possibility increasing effort to eliminate infiltration Tonkin delta. He stated that he had considered it but his surv disclosed that more troops and mat would be needed than he now [Page 880] has available and at same time carry out his offensive plans. Comment: With forces currently available Navarres reasoning appears sound.
Navarre plan for conduct of war involves (a) final clearing operation in south against 5 or 6 enemy regular bns to begin Jan; (b) similar clearing operation against 15 to 16 regular enemy bns in cen Annam to begin about Jan 15 and continue through Aug; (c) simultaneously vigorous action inside and outside Tonkin delta with existing forces designed throw enemy off balance and prevent development enemy offensive capabilities between now and end current dry season (no further reinforcements contemplated for Tonkin delta this period); (d) final offensive in Tonkin delta with battle corps reinforced with elements recovered other areas to begin 1 Oct 1954. Navarre was much concerned ref security and hoped we would appreciate his concern.
Navarres principal current problem has to do with recruiting, tng and use of Vietnamese Army. He believes recent experience shows Vietnamese command has been given too much autonomy too soon and that certain units, notably light bns in Buichu area, had been used for missions for which they were not prepared. Believe this impression shared by Bao Dai, Gen Hinh, Def Minister Quat, and Gov Tri, with result solution which will (a) strengthen Navarre’s control over operations Vietnamese Army and (b) restore Navarre’s control over tng activities of Vietnamese Army. Situation which has developed due partly to tech mil factors and partly to political factors. This problem not insoluble as evidenced by fact older regular Vietnamese units have proved themselves thoroughly cmbt-worthy. Navarre convinced progress this direction vital to success entire effort.
As result my conversation with Gen Navarre and others, have secured agreement to immediate assignment of 2 American Army officers to newly constituted French tng command for ground for. Have also secured agreement to early consideration of dispatch ln officers from United States Navy (including Marine) and AF for same purpose. Matter is being submitted to Paris.
With regard cmbt intel matter, Gen Navarre has submitted to Paris plan involving assignment this team as part mil attaches office Saigon with auth to send 1 officer when desired to Hanoi. This concept appears to me satisfactory in the sense it will get us what we want.
I found Gen Navarre, for both political and mil reasons, sensitive to establishment of In between French and United States mil except through existing MAAG and service attaché channels. Agree with this concept in view nature sensitivities and political factors especially in France.
Navarre also spoke concerning his urgent need for certain types of equipment. On my return to Wash DC 23 Nov will rept fully details [Page 881] these requests. In my judgment, we should fully support Gen Navarre, in whose success we have such large stake.
- This telegram specified that copies be transmitted for information to MAAG Saigon, MAAG Paris, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC (Pearl Harbor), the Department of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Ambassadors at Saigon and Paris.↩
- A copy of the full report of the mission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina as of 19 November 1953,” is in file 711.5851G/11–1953. A memoSrandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Dec. 31, 1953, transmitting a summary of the report, is in JCS Records, CCS.092 Asia (6–25–48), sec. 51.↩