751H.00/11–1153: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
831. Repeated information Paris unnumbered. I attended at Phnom Penh November 9, ceremony of transfer of French military powers to King of Cambodia1 and review of departing French troops, regular ARK units and several of the new village and provincial troops mobilized by King during summer and autumn.
[Page 861]Chargé Montllor will report in detail return of King to Phnom Penh and military transfer ceremony.2 It is worth mentioning that transfer was graciously performed by French and General DeLanglade, speaking with obvious sincerity, paid tribute to soldierly qualities of Cambodian troops (but did not mention specifically Cambodian Officers Corps). In fact DeLanglade believes that some 20,000 to 30,000 of new village units could have their training completed and be used very effectively against Viet Minh in northern Vietnam. Catch would be whether Cambodian King would allow Cambodian troops to be used in fighting in what his proclamation of two months ago declared was a strictly Vietnamese war. I understand that DeLanglade broached this possibility to King who did not turn it down, and when asked about justifying to his people despatch of Cambodian troops to fight in Vietnam, King replied laughingly that he would describe it to them as necessary to a policy of “Pan-Khmerism.”
After transfer ceremonies, awards of decorations and parading of regular French and Khmer units, village defense units from provinces around Phnom Penh marched in review for nearly four hours when King finally called halt, although there were still between 10,000 and 20,000 villagers who had not paraded, and who would have taken three hours more to pass the reviewing stand.
The village troops paraded without their wooden rifles and only arms were some antique swords carried by officers and non-coms. As a general rule, they marched well with visible spirit and pride. It was evident that properly led, indoctrinated, equipped, and logistically supported they would make good soldiers. The problem, of course, of finding Cambodian officers above company level could not be solved for many months to come.
They would have to have French field officers. DeLanglade told me he would not have believed it possible for King and his government to have persuaded Cambodian peasants to take military training. It is a tribute to King’s personal authority over masses and obedience of latter. General Navarre said to me this morning that one must give credit to King for having created a national spirit and movement by his village mobilization measures.
- The transfer occurred pursuant to French—Cambodian accords of Nov. 8, 1953; for texts, see Royaume du Cambodge, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Conférences, Accords, Protocoles, Conventions et Echanges de Lettres relatifs au transfert de toutes les compétences par le Gouvernement de la République Francaise au Gouvernement Royal du Cambodge (Phnom Penh, Imprimerie Albert Portail, 1954), pp. 5–37.↩
- The ceremonies and the negotiations which culminated in the French–Cambodian accords were described by Chargé Joseph J. Montllor in despatch 40 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 16, not printed. (751H.5/11–1653)↩