033.1100 NI/11–853: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
815. Repeated information Paris 237, Taipei 11. Codel–Nixon. Bao Dai told Bonsal1 and me yesterday he was extremely glad, for various reasons, that Vice President had visited Vietnam. Vice President made an excellent impression. Greatest usefulness of visit from the particular viewpoint of Bao Dai was that in this moment of Vietnamese and French tension, Vice President had “opened the eyes” of Vietnamese to fact that without aid from, and association with France, Communists would win war.
Bao Dai went on to say he had received leaders and representatives of a number of political and religious groups and he invariably opened conversation with the question “Do you think you can beat Communists without any outside aid?”, thereupon adding, “If you do, I will be glad to be your interpreter to the French and ask them to withdraw their troops.”
Bao Dai said that without exception his callers had protested French military assistance must remain until victory was achieved. Bao Dai remarked that he was going to promote realistic understanding of situation. It was not important to gain any further concession from France at this time. After all, main thing was to maintain French military presence until victory had been gained. Thereafter, Vietnamese aspirations for independence and for concessions from France could easily be obtained.
- Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA, served on the U.S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, Nov. 6–15, 1953, headed by Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific. Bonsal’s observations based on his participation in the mission are set forth in his memorandum of Dec. 8, p. 903. For a summary of the major findings of General O’Daniel, see telegram RJ 68496 from O’Daniel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nov. 19, p. 879.↩