033.1100 NI/11–253: Despatch
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
No. 181
Subject:
- Conversations of Vice President Nixon with Bao Dai1
I presented the Vice President of the United States to the Vietnamese Chief of State on the afternoon of November 1. Accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. McClintock, we had more than an hour’s conversation with Bao Dai, followed by later talks after the official dinner which His Majesty tendered the Vice President at his villa in Dalat. Three members of the official press party attended the dinner, which was felicitous not only in terms of Bao Dai’s toast to the Vice President, but in the latter’s response. Copies of both speeches form the sole enclosures to this despatch.2
In conversation before dinner, Bao Dai steadfastly refused to meet the Vice President’s questions as to the possibility of greater personal activity on his part in assuming the functions of Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The Chief of State blandly insisted that he was already Commander-in-Chief, but wound deviously around the point of whether or not he should get into a uniform and stand in front of his soldiers.
On other subjects Bao Dai was more explicit. He said that the Vietnamese knew the French Constitution by heart; in fact, the Vietnamese were more current with the provisions of the French Constitution as they applied to the structure of the French Union than were most people in France itself. As now written, the French Constitution by definition makes membership in the French Union not compatible with absolute sovereignty. Therefore the present framework of the French Union is not satisfactory to Vietnam and must be changed if [Page 856] the Vietnamese are to be expected to attain complete independence and at the same time maintain ties with France.
Bao Dai readily conceded that there was no thought in his mind or that of any other responsible Vietnamese statesman to oust the French from Vietnam at the present time. He was fully aware of the fact that without French military assistance Vietnam would be an immediate prey to the Communist enemy.
Bao Dai did not feel that negotiations with the Vietminh were a practical possibility, nor did he anticipate that on the Communist side there would be an attempt to negotiate an armistice.
The Chief of State expressed gratification at the aid given by the United States in the past and particularly the making available of additional budgetary support to France to the extent of 385 million dollars in the current fiscal year. He said this had afforded his Government immense relief and gave the guarantee that his program of strengthening the National Army would be carried on without a halt. He said that he had asked the French Government for credits totaling 150 billion francs to substantiate this year’s military program and was now assured by the prospect of American budgetary support for France in the amount of 385 million dollars that these credits would be forthcoming from the French Government.
- Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Indochina from Oct. 30 to Nov. 4 during the course of a tour of the Far East, South Asia, and the Near East. For a summary account of the Nixon visit to Indochina, see telegram 804 from Saigon, Nov. 6, p. 857. For the pertinent portion of Nixon’s report to the National Security Council on Dec. 23 regarding his trip, see p. 929. Additional information on the Nixon visit to Indochina was transmitted to Washington in despatch 195 from Saigon, Nov. 7. (033.1100 NI/11–753)↩
- The enclosures are not printed.↩