Office of the Historian

751.00/10–2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Secretary of State

confidential
Paris, October 28, 1953—8 p.m.

1667. Repeated information Saigon 174. Assembly Indochina debate resumed morning October 27. Remaining ten interpellations were heard during course of day followed by general debate which continued until Laniel made statement at midnight. This in turn followed by consideration orders du jour (motions) which ended in adoption government-accepted Kuehn (ARS) motion at 6:20 a.m. (Embtel 1662, repeated Saigon 172.)1

[Page 854]

During course debate Indochina problem was dissected by all sides from all sides. Government’s actions since 1945 subject to examination and criticism, much of it strongly biased, contradictory and unjust. There was great deal of individual enterprise in all groups but extreme left. It would now be difficult, if not impossible, define any party policy on Indochina other than those of Communists and Socialists. Examples of this Catroux’s (Gaullist) comment after King [Kir?] tirade, during which he was heckled by own party, that he spoke only for himself and Daladier’s (Radical) harangue which displeased many members his own party as well as others of center and right but was loudly applauded by Communists and Socialists. Little, if anything, constructive suggested and it became more and more evident that although Indochina was sorely painful subject for all and it was easy to talk for hours on how distressing it was, prescribing a treatment and cure was something else. Everyone was in favor of “negotiations” but only Communists said with whom, when and how (Ho Chi-Minh, immediately and “emissaries available here”—probably themselves).

Laniel’s intervention was well timed and effectively carried out. In a long (28 typed pages) speech, better delivered than his other recent Assembly statements, he faced issues squarely in a convincing and straightforward manner which appeared to gain him support as he proceeded. This later borne out by results. Speech’s weakest portion was that which attempted to belittle the significance of Vietnam National Congress resolution. Its strongest the forthright manner with which it dealt with “negotiations” and other controversial subjects. Laniel had in his favor recent signature Franco-Laotian treaty, Tam’s statement, recent French “note” to Bao Dai and Vietnam Government, and failure of his Assembly critics to build a constructive case. He used all these points.

Later corridor manipulations which resulted in innocuous motion accepted by government and voted by Assembly bore out thesis that no one can get majority approval today to Indochina policy which varies much from that present government.

As Herriot requested when debate was opened, it remained (relatively) [Page 855] dignified throughout. Laniel’s attitude remained faithful and substantial is somewhat varied from what it had been on other issues [sic]. Many leaders avoided subject entirely either by being absent (Mayer, Pinay and Mendes-France) or silent (Robert Schuman and Soustelle).

Detailed account, including Laniel’s speech will follow by pouch.

Dillon

  1. For the record of the debate on Indochina in the National Assembly, Oct. 2728, including the statement by Premier Laniel and the motion ultimately adopted, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, 1953, Débats, pp. 4560–4587 and 4594–4617. For a translation of extracts from the statement by Premier Laniel, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 209–214. Telegram 1662 from Paris, Oct. 28, contained a summary translation of the motion adopted by the National Assembly by a vote of 315 to 257. The summary read as follows:

    “Assembly addresses its confident respects and its admiring tribute to valiant troops of French Union who defend in SEA liberty and civilization and invites government define and apply a policy tending notably

    “(a) To develop armed forces of Associated States in order relieve progressively French military effort,

    “(b) To use every possible means in order lead to, through negotiation, a general pacification of Asia,

    “(c) To assure on international plane a just equilibrium of efforts and sacrifices of free nations on different points of globe.

    “And insists to government that defense and independence of Associated States be realized within framework of French Union.

    “And, rejecting all additions, passes to business of day.” (751.00/10–2853)

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