651.51G/10–2653: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1
736. Repeated information Paris 222, Hanoi unnumbered. Re Deptel 695, October 21. It seems obvious that in this period of dangerous Franco–Vietnamese tension caused by the uncontrolled actions of the National Congress held in Saigon we should use every effort to persuade [Page 849] French authorities and public opinion to remain calm. Buu Loc’s recommendation to this effect (Paris 1593, October 23 to Department) is entirely valid. Discouraging as the incident of the Congress may be the French by no means need give up hope of obtaining all of their legitimate objectives in Vietnam, the principal one being its remaining in the French Union.
It is fortunately true that Vietnamese “leaders” have finally been somewhat alarmed by French reaction to resolutions of Congress. Members of Embassy and myself are taking advantage of every opportunity to increase that feeling of salutary alarm. In my speech on UN Day2 I took occasion to stress theme that only French military contribution can safeguard Vietnamese independence.
One of things that would lessen rabid irresponsible nationalism of Vietnamese “leaders” and “intellectuals” would be substantial victories by Navarre, but it is doubtful, unless unusual luck and opportunity attend his battalions, that we can expect such victories before first months of next year at earliest. To some degree this rabid nationalism and anti-French expression is due to a belief or a hope that French are weakening. It is unfortunately an ingrained Vietnamese tendency to respect and rally to strength and to pounce on weakness. There is also fear lest, after all, Viet Minh win or obtain ascendancy.
One of most useful restraints among more comprehending elements of Vietnamese “intelligentsia” is fear lest France conclude a face-saving armistice with Viet Minh. This possibility should very discreetly and very sparingly be held out by spokesman in French Government. However, it should be obvious to French Government that an armistice at this time would result in eventual victory for Viet Minh.
One of lessons from Congress is danger, certainly during next months, of reconvening Congress or setting up a National Assembly (which Tam seems determined to do.) Unless it can be disciplined, organized, and controlled by responsible elements in the Vietnamese body politic, which seems a very unlikely early development, there will be trouble. Among potential “responsible elements” at the present time are the Catholic hierarchy of Bishops (with possible exception of Bishop Thus [Tu]), the Dai Viet Party (if sensible elements represented by Sung, Governor Tri, and Quat can gain real control of and heal present divisions in party), the Cao Daists (which are in need of a strong control which Cao Daist Pope and leaders were unable to [Page 850] wield over their delegation in Congress), and last, and probably most important, Bao Dai himself. Vietnamese National Army might be a “responsible element” if Quat and Bao Dai could establish ascendency over officers corps. It is doubted that General Hinh will ever be able to impress his will and obtain ascendancy over officers corps but there is no Vietnamese higher officer clearly in sight to replace him and provide dynamic will and necessary ability. Colonel Vy is mentioned as a possible successor. He seems an intelligent and fine officer but I doubt that he combines requisite qualities.
There is theoretical possibility that replacing Tam by, say, Governor Tri, might incline rabid nationalists to support government and adopt a more cooperative and reasonable attitude toward France. It is by no means sure that Tri’s accession would be followed by popular acclaim and one must remember that Cochin Chinese leaders feel the presidency should be in Cochin Chinese hands. It would be regrettable to see unusual strength of will, courage and energy of President Tam disappear from Vietnamese administration. Perhaps a solution would be for Bao Dai, at least nominally, to assume Presidency of Council, retain both Tam and Tri and perhaps rally other elements of strength to government. To date, Bao Dai, both on principle and because he dislikes arduous labors of direct government, has rejected this solution.
Another telling weapon for rallying mass of Vietnamese behind legitimate government, use of meaningful propaganda, has been neglected by Vietnamese authorities. Propaganda against Viet Minh has made significant progress during past 3 years, but government has failed use best and incontrovertible argument that Viet Minh is agent for Communist China, preparing way for Chinese invasion. Only Bao Dai has publicly named Communist China as Vietnam’s enemy in his 1953 Tet speech. Other Vietnamese leaders have hung back, despite importuning of our information service, because they fear offending China. This is one more instance of Vietnamese personal insurance of keeping good graces of all sides. Vietnamese must be prevailed upon to hammer away at theme of Communist China, new version of traditional enemy of Vietnam, waiting for Viet Minh to open door.
Re proposal penultimate paragraph reference telegram we find certain objections to raising problem of postwar reconstruction at this time. Our reaction to this proposal will be contained in a separate telegram.3
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩
- Oct. 24.↩
- See footnote 2, p. 839.↩