751G.00/10–2653: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
1639. Repeated information Saigon 168. Following is background of French request (Embtel 1626)1 not to use proposed statement for Secretary on Indochina:
[Page 847]Department’s text was handed Foreign Office and Matignon today as per instruction Deptel 1559.2 Parodi, Bidault, Vidal and Laniel all dealt with matter. From beginning they were disturbed with penultimate paragraph beginning “I should like also to emphasize”. As Department aware French are very sensitive on this score. No government official would dare condone anything being said on Indochina at this time which might be interpreted as discouraging possibilities of negotiated peace. Foreign Office understood differences between United States and French approach on this question but felt that if statement could even be willfully misinterpreted to lend credence to charge that United States aid had bought French acquiescence to policy unconditional surrender of Viet Minh and chances of negotiated peace therefore reduced, it would be best not make any statement.
Their concern with penultimate paragraph counterbalanced by pleasure with first three which they believe excellent and would have beneficial effect in Vietnam. They hope Department will agree to use them on another occasion.
Main reason request statement not be delivered this time not objections text, however, but widespread impression atmosphere now improved here on Indochina. Signature Franco-Laotian agreements, Tam’s salutary statement, announcement of Bao Dai’s return Saigon today, news King of Cambodia’s forthcoming return to Phnom Penh and relative calm of Friday’s Assembly debate have all served reduce tension. Mendes-France’s opinion that government would survive [Page 848] Indochina debate (Embtel 1584)3 now appears to be growing. That such was case repeatedly stated today during discussions by officials both Laniel’s and Reynaud’s Cabinet. Under these circumstances, “it would be foolish use heavy artillery (statement) now when it might be more acutely needed later (just before Vietnam negotiations, for example)”.
Foreign Office and Matignon took great pains to express their thanks for United States understanding and cooperation.4
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Telegram 1626 from Paris, Oct. 26, read as follows:
“Laniel phoned me shortly after noon today to tell me that while he felt proposed statement (Deptel 1556) would be very helpful for Bao Dai in Indochina, it would not be helpful to him in his forthcoming debate in the National Assembly. He said he had taken certain political samples, and that the phrase referring to ‘vigorous prosecution of the war’ would be badly received here as indicating we were trying to force France to fight even harder. He, therefore, asked that the statement be deferred until such time as the debate here is finished, and I receive his personal clearance to release the statement. He said he would let me know personally as soon as it was all right to release it. He made no suggestion that the statement itself should be amended as I presume he realizes that the phrase in question is necessary from our own political point of view, even though unpalatable in France at the moment. He ended by repeating that he thought the statement should be made and would be most useful in Indochina.” (751G.00/10–2653)
For telegram 1556 to Paris, Oct. 23, see p. 844.
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Telegram 1559 to Paris, Oct. 24, read as follows:
“Re Deptel 1556 French Embassy under instructions has delivered message that unless Secretary’s statement concerning Indochina adequately meets French suggestions regarding possible termination of hostilities, it would be better to have no statement at all.
“Planned release time statement is noon Washington time Monday. You are authorized show statement to French Sunday. Statement will not be released until clearance received from you. We hope statement which Secretary has edited will be fully satisfactory.” (751G.00/10–2453)
↩ - In telegram 1584 from Paris, Oct. 22, not printed, Ambassador Dillon reported that French Radical Socialist leader Pierre Mendès-France had expressed the opinion that the Laniel government would survive the debate on Indochina. Mendès-France also said that he hoped the government would not fall and would not himself participate in the debate. (751.00/10–2253)↩
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Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, informed Secretary Dulles of developments regarding the proposed statement in a memorandum of Oct. 26 which read as follows:
“We were informed this morning by Ambassador Dillon (Paris telegram 1626) that he has been in touch with Laniel concerning your proposed statement on Indochina and Laniel now feels that while the statement may be useful at an appropriate time, particularly in Indochina, he does not think it would be wise to release it today. In a telephone conversation with the Embassy this morning, Mr. Bonsal was informed further that this decision of Laniel’s does not arise from dissatisfaction over the text of the statement but rather reflects the greatly improved Parliamentary situation in Paris.
“In the circumstances we are transmitting to Paris a new paragraph to be added to the statement along the lines of Ambassador Bonnet’s request of last evening. This paragraph, which follows closely what you said in your St. Louis Legion speech, reads as follows:
‘We want peace in Indochina. The proposed political conference on Korea relates in the first instance to that problem. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development.’
“We will now await further word from the French as to when they think it desirable to release the statement. This will probably be at the conclusion of the Indochina debate in Paris.” (751G.00/10–2653)
The request from Ambassador Bonnet has not been more specifically identified.
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