Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Paris Correspondence”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in France (Gibson)

secret

[Paris,] October 12, 1953.

Participants:

• Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Relations with Associated States
• Senator Mike Mansfield¹
• Mr. Gibson

Senator Mansfield accompanied by Mr. Gibson called on M. Jacquet this morning. The Senator outlined his general impressions on Indochina as he had on Saturday to M. Reynaud.² On the whole he returned from Indochina more encouraged than discouraged largely because he felt the calibre of leadership in both military and civilian quarters in Indochina was now very high. Morale, too, had improved. On the other hand, he was very disturbed about the Vietnam military potential and the possibility of Franco-Vietnamese military reverses in the coming dry season.

The following main points were covered subsequently:

(1) Cambodia. After Jacquet [Mansfield] had recounted his unsatisfactory interview with Penh Nouth and his general pessimism regarding the outlook for Cambodia, he informed Jacquet that it is his opinion General Navarre would be justified in taking whatever military steps were necessary to assure the security of his forces in Cambodia and the success of any military operations involving Cambodian territory. The Senator elaborated later on this point with Mr. Gibson and remarked that a “get tough” policy by France with regard to Cambodia would now be entirely justified.

(2) Bao Dai. The Senator told Jacquet how he regretted Bao Dai’s failure to take a more active role in his country’s affairs, particularly in military aspects. Jacquet enlarged upon the subject of Bao Dai at some length. He had spent all day Saturday with him in Paris and emerged vastly encouraged. For one thing, Bao Dai was now aware of the fact that he could no longer get away with his failings on the basis that he was, after all, a French puppet and therefore could not take responsibility for anything that went wrong. The responsibility was now squarely on Bao Dai’s shoulders and he was aware of that fact. Jacquet reminded the Senator that Bao Dai was “the most intelligent Vietnamese” and that he must not judge his qualities on occidental standards. The qualities which we deplore in him were often those which are expected of an oriental potentate by the orientals. The wine-women-song aspects of his life are part of the picture expected of an oriental potentate by his people. Jacquet was certain that Bao Dai was now taking on a new mission in life. He had not observed events in Egypt for nothing and knew that his own position was now entering into a crucial period. He asked Jacquet point blank on Saturday whether in his opinion he should go back to Indochina immediately. Jacquet advised him not to, thinking it more important that he stay in Paris for the forthcoming negotiations and not disturb the workings of the present Vietnam congress. Bao Dai is interested. If he were not, he would chuck it all and go to Switzerland or the United States to “wallow in his millions.”

(3) Entry of Viet Minh Aviation into Indochina War. Jacquet told the Senator that he wished to make France’s position on the possibility of the intervention of Viet Minh or Chinese aircraft into the war. He stated that if any enemy aircraft were to enter into the war, the whole position of the loyalist forces would be jeopardized. Even if in the event the aircraft were entirely Viet Minh operated the French would regard such a development as a purely Chinese aggression and would take immediate steps in United Nations to make this position clear. Jacquet was asked whether he regarded this as an imminent possibility and said that, although there was no specific evidence of it at this time, the French were aware of the everpresent possibility and airfields were still being constructed and enlarged in the southern provinces of China.

(4) Five-Power Conference. Jacquet also wishes to make the following point clear: As the Senator was aware there had been a discussion in the Council of Ministers last week regarding the possibility of a five-power international conference including Communist China. He stated that although the Cabinet had voted down adopting such a proposal as official government policy there was a large and growing sentiment within the government and in French political circles generally, for the adoption of such a policy. He realized that this would present serious difficulties for the US but felt it was a reality which we could not afford to ignore any longer. If the government were to pursue any such policy they would do so on the “international plane” and only after due consultation with the US.

1. Following the completion of his study mission in Indochina, Senator Mansfield stopped at Paris before returning to the United States.
2. Gibson’s memorandum of the conversation between Senator Mansfield and Vice-Premier Paul Reynaud which occurred on Saturday, Oct. 10, is not printed. (PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Paris Correspondence”)