Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/10–953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington,] October 9, 1953.

Participants:

• Ambassador Bonnet
• Mr. MacArthur

Ambassador Bonnet called on me this afternoon at his request. He said he had been instructed by his government to raise the following problem with the Department:

French intelligence has had a number of disquieting reports indicating that the Chinese Communists may support the Vietminh forces in Indochina with jet planes. Ambassador Bonnet made reference to the following three specific reports:

1. From an “absolutely sure” source, it was certain that the Chinese were training Vietminh pilots for both conventional and jet aircraft at the Chinese Communist training center at Nanning in Kwangsi province (which is the province adjacent to the northern Indochinese frontier).

2. A “good” source has reported that Chinese-trained Vietminh jet pilots have recently returned from China to Tongking, a province in northern Indochina. One assumption is that a Vietminh airfield which can take jets might be constructed in Tongking and particular reference was made to a road near Langson, which is capable of being improved into a jet airstrip. However, the sources of this report believed Vietminh jets would probably be based in China with any field that might be constructed in Tongking for emergency use.

3. A report of doubtful reliability from Taipei indicates that recently a substantial number of Soviet manufactured MIGs have been flown to southern China where they are now based near the Indo-Chinese frontier.

French High Commissioner Dejean and General Navarre have made the point to Paris that if a Vietminh offensive is in prospect and if Vietminh are able to employ jet aircraft, the French must be in a position to meet enemy jets with jet aircraft. At the present time the French have no jet aircraft in Indochina and rely entirely on conventional propeller driven aircraft.

Ambassador Bonnet then made reference to the “Honolulu Conference”¹ where military officials of the five powers (U.S., U.K., France, Australia and New Zealand) had made a study of what should be done if the Chinese stepped up substantially their assistance to Indochina and also if they intervened directly. Ambassador Bonnet said that the “Honolulu agreement” was not too precise and that the French Government would like to have further discussions with us as to what should be done in the event that China threw jet aircraft into the Indochina fighting on the side of the Vietminh. This could be done either directly by China or through employing Vietminh pilots flying from Chinese bases or even using strips in Vietminh-held territory in Indochina.

Ambassador Bonnet said that he would hope to discuss this question with Secretary Dulles next week and in the meantime would be grateful if I would pass along the substance of his conversation with me to the Secretary.

I said to Ambassador Bonnet that I would be glad to pass along to the Secretary what he had told me but that I was not in a position to comment on his request. I reminded him that in his American Legion speech in St. Louis the Secretary had made certain pointed references to the situation in Indochina designed to make the Chinese Communist think very carefully before they intervened in Indochina.

Douglas Macarthur II

1. Reference is to the military staff conference held in Hawaii from Sept. 21 to Oct. 2, 1953. For documentation on the frequent meetings of U.S. and allied military representatives concerning the defense of East and Southeast Asia, see volume xii.