751G.00/9–853
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State
top secret
[Washington,] September 8, 1953.
Subject:
- Indochina.
It is recommended you make the following comments on Indochina to the NSC:
- 1.
- Following consultations with Defense, JCS, and FOA last week, I discussed the substance of the paper before the NSC with the President.1 He approved it with the understanding informal consultation with Congress take place immediately after NSC action.
- 2.
- The action which the NSC is considering is of great urgency. Laniel is the first Prime Minister to have both an aggressive military program designed to break the enemy’s back and a progressive political program in Indochina. Laniel has let us know that if he is to get his Indochina program through, it is of vital importance that some mutually satisfactory agreement be reached by middle of September. The program involves the sending of 9 battalions to Indochina with other supporting engineer, artillery, signals, and other specialist units. It also involves the raising of native troops by the end of 1953 by 68,300, and by the end of 1954 an additional increase of 71,500, to a grand total of 316,000 including forces already in being.
- 3.
- It is imperative that the French reinforcements arrive in Indochina soonest, and if agreement can be reached, they will be shipped in late September so that they will all arrive in Indochina by November 1. From both our viewpoint and Laniel’s it is important that reinforcements [Page 767] are en route before Parliament reconvenes early in October.
- 4.
- This program does not represent a guaranteed solution. However, the only visible alternative is a continued stalemate for a short while, following which the French will probably begin negotiations for a withdrawal.
- 5.
- Ambassador Dillon believes it imperative for political and other reasons that the French send us a note giving us the assurances we need, to which we would make an appropriate acknowledgement. The main points to be covered are set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the paper we have introduced to the NSC.
- 6.
- We do not plan to link specifically EDC ratification with our aid to Indochina in the note, but we will obtain firm oral assurances from both Laniel and Bidault that they will push forward with EDC. Although we do not intend for our exchange of notes with the French to be made public, they will doubtless be considered by French parliamentary committees, and if we specifically link Indochina and EDC, we will only cause opponents of both to unite in firm opposition to the additional French effort in Indochina and make it more difficult for Laniel to move forward with both Indochina and EDC.
- 7.
- We do not intend to mention possible French devaluation in our note since if the French decide on their own initiative to devalue, we may be accused of having forced them to do so. However, we plan to have a paragraph with a general escape clause in the event circumstances arise which negate the assumptions or understandings on which our aid is given. We will make it clear to Laniel and Bidault that in the event of devaluation, a new situation would arise which would require urgent consultation.