Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/9–953

Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Ogburn)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 8, 1953.

Subject:

• Alternatives in Indochina

In addition to the other contributions it makes to our understanding of the Indochina problem, Mr. Bonsal’s redraft of paragraphs 21 through 23 of the Far East section of Solarium² performs a valuable service in directing attention to the fact that the situation in Indochina “may in the near future become increasingly critical, in spite of U.S. willingness to increase material aid, because of political and military factors in France and in Indochina.” Mr. Bonsal points out that we may be confronted by a choice between witnessing a take-over of the area by the Communists, quite possibly as the result of a negotiated settlement, or sending American troops, which he suggests would probably lead to a full-scale war with Communist China. It seems to me that Mr. Bonsal’s estimate impels us to a further examination of the choices open to us in Indochina. For however devoutly we may hope that the currently projected French effort may with our very substantial support succeed in its objectives, we must note that several factors make its success uncertain. The French apparently will have to obtain fairly quick results. French public opinion seems unlikely to sustain indecisive operations for very much longer. In other words, if the Viet Minh can hold out, it will see the situation turn increasingly to its advantage. The French cannot terminate or even greatly reduce their present very costly efforts in Indochina until seven or eight Viet Minh divisions are largely eliminated.

I doubt that we should count altogether upon the French being able to accomplish that. The Viet Minh divisions have been proved in battle. They can be and presumably will be generously supplied from Communist China. When hard-pressed, they have excellent cover. They have not only mountainous, forested terrain for refuge, but a population well disposed to them in which to merge. They have a vast and friendly country at their back. Far from having lost the initiative since American military aid was begun three years ago, they have gained it. Their ability to march almost unimpeded through most of Laos last spring was a demonstration that they are far from defeated.

To repeat, if the Viet Minh can hold out. there is a significant possibility that the French will weary of the burden and unload it as best they may. This, I believe, is the Department’s estimate.

Unless we are to be caught short, I think we should consider what alternatives to the success of present plans are likely to offer. Mr. Bonsal has called attention to two of these alternatives:

1. As Mr. Bonsal has pointed out, there is the possibility of the Communists gaining control of Indochina either by military conquest as French forces are withdrawn or as the ultimate result of some sort of negotiation. This negotiation might take place between the French and the State of Vietnam on one side and the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” on the [other], or between the leading non-Communist Vietnamese and the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” If we continue to rely wholly upon the French being able to carry out their present plans and make no provision for their lack of success, then this would, I imagine be the most probable outcome of a failure of the present French effort.

2. A second possibility, as Mr. Bonsal has expressed it, is that the U.S. might undertake “far-reaching efforts to retrieve the situation including, if necessary, the employment of U.S. armed forces.” It is certainly questionable if the Chinese Communists would sit back and allow us to eliminate the Vietnamese Communists (if we could) and carry the American flag to the southern border of China. The Chinese Communists’ reaction to the appearance of American forces on the Yalu does not, however, necessarily indicate how they would respond to a similar development in Indochina; the power centers of China are much closer to Korea than to Tonkin, and, in addition, Chinese Communist supply lines to South China are much longer and more vulnerable than those to Korea. On the other hand, the attitude of the local population in Vietnam would be much more favorable from the point of view of Communist China than the attitude of the Koreans. An important question that would arise in connection with the deployment of American forces in Indochina would concern the nature of our objective. What would we be seeking to bring about? We are accustomed to going to war to save other peoples from subjugation by foreign tyranny, that is, in defense of the principle of self-determination. Presumably, if we sent armed forces to Indochina, it would not be for the purpose of restoring French control (the American people could not be expected to accept our turning Indochina back to a foreign army after thousands of Americans had been killed in liberating it from the Communists) or to convert Vietnam into an American colony on the pattern of the Philippines in 1900, even if American control were exercised through a Vietnamese regime maintained by American troops. If the objective of our intervention would in fact be Vietnamese self-determination, that fact would have a bearing upon the third alternative.

3. The third possibility would be an international solution with perhaps the following elements:

1. Submission of Indochina by France to the UN on a complaint of aggression by Communist China.

2. Decision by the UN to have case settled on the basis of Vietnamese self-determination.

3. A cease-fire and the withdrawal of opposing forces behind demilitarized zones.

4. The institution of a neutral commission (India, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines) to prepare the country for a plebiscite.

5. The replacement of the armed forces of the two sides with an indigenous police force recruited and commanded by the neutral commission, supplemented as necessary by troops from the nations composing the commission.

6. A period of free electioneering under the supervision of the neutral commission.

7. The election of an all-Vietnamese government and the neutralization of Vietnam.

For such a solution to have any chance of success from our point of view, it would have to be proposed by our side from a position of strength, that is, the French would have to raise the question of Indochina in the United Nations after having achieved at least a limited military success, with the U. S. demonstrating a strong and determined military position with respect to Indochina.

The Soviet Union, speaking also for Communist China and the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam”, might reject the proposed solution. In that case a moral advantage that might bring decisive Vietnamese and other Asian support might well accrue to the Associated States and France. On the other hand, the Communists might well accept the proposal in anticipation that it would lead to a Communist victory in Indochina. It might of course do so.

However, I believe we should study very carefully the possibilities inherent in a solution of this kind. If the French are going to be looking for a way out of the Indochina impasse, certainly a plebiscite under the most favorable supervision we could obtain would be much more advantageous to us than any kind of negotiations from which Ho Chi-minh would emerge victorious. We should bear in mind that the countries that would be on the supervisory commission have no desire whatsoever to see Indochina brought within the Communists’ sphere and could be expected to exert themselves (just as they have within their own borders) to make sure that the Communists would not prevail. It is also worth recalling that never in history have the Communists anywhere been voted into power. In any case, in considering what an international solution might have to offer, we should not judge it in comparison with a theoretically ideal solution but in comparison with the alternatives that are actually likely to offer.

There would seem to be some danger in our waiting until we find out whether the Navarre Plan is going to succeed before considering where we shall stand if it does not. If it fails and we have not developed any alternative course of action for ourselves, the result may be that it will be too late to save Indochina. It would certainly be too late to attempt an international solution with any very great hope of a favorable outcome. If at that stage it should seem imperative to send American troops, I would think that the national leadership should have taken measures in advance to prepare the American people for such a decision. The ground, that is, should be prepared now.

Otherwise, the crisis when it comes, to judge by present trends, might find the country in a mood of such relaxation as to make it difficult to obtain Congressional acquiescence in the despatch of Americans to a new Korea. Moreover, if it seems likely that in the end we shall have to send American troops, I wonder if we should not begin sending them now. Surely a quicker and a more economical military victory would be obtainable by joining our strength to that of the French than by waiting until the French are exhausted and ready to pull out. The concentration of forces in the attack is always to be preferred to their piecemeal commitment. No doubt it would be politically easier to send American troops to Indochina in the face of a threatened catastrophe than to do so now, but this argument would appear to be of doubtful validity if in fact the objective could be achieved with half the loss of American lives by sending American troops now rather than waiting until the situation is next to irretrievable.

Barring overt Chinese Communist intervention (and it may be significant that when Ho Chi-minh’s forces seemed likely to overrun Laos, there were no voices in Congress calling for the despatch of American forces), there is the problem of considering what we could do in the anticipation of a failure of the Navarre Plan. What, for instance, can be done to strengthen Thailand and Burma? Are we to accept the fatalistic view that Thailand will inevitably accommodate itself to a Communist Indochina to the extent, in effect, of joining the Communist bloc? I suspect that the PSB paper on Thailand³ was written on the assumption (theoretical, at least) that the Communists were going to come out on top in Indochina. On such a basis the paper made a good deal of sense which it did not do on any other basis. However, that assumption was nowhere admitted and thus the discussion about the paper was fruitless. Perhaps the strategy proposed in the PSB Paper should be re-examined for its possibilities in the event of a failure of the French effort in Indochina.

Alternatively, I believe we should examine the possibility of an international solution to be attempted after a major effort to put the free world in the strongest possible bargaining position. It would be a tragedy if the French persist in being too lofty, too preoccupied with the “mystique” of the French Union, to consider placing Indochina before the UN until nothing is left for them but to get out from under at any cost in prestige and dump a catastrophe in the lap of the free world.

So far our policy on Indochina has been based on an article of faith which has been considered not subject to question: the French cannot and must not fail. With evidence accumulating, however, that the French can and may fail, is not the time at hand when we ought to consider what we can do in anticipation of such a failure? Should not this issue be faced in the Solarium paper?

1. This memorandum was directed to U. Alexis Johnson. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. For documentation on Project Solarium, a National Security Council exercise involving the study of alternative forms of broad national strategy with respect to the Communist nations, see volume ii. The Bonsal redraft cited here has not been specifically identified.
3. For partial text of PSB D–23, “U.S. Psychological Strategy Based on Thailand,” Sept. 14, 1953, a paper prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board, see volume xii.