751G.5/3–1552: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State
[Received 3:28 p.m.]
5623. Rptd info London 1552, Saigon 325. London tel 3988, Mar 12 (rptd Paris 1898 Saigon 29 [18]).1
While US–UK review IC situation may be desirable at this time Emb of opinion that Brit FonOff tel as outlined in reftel poses problem prematurely and gives undue emphasis or erroneous interpretation to certain aspects of the Fr scene in relation to IC Brit Emb here with whom we discussed problem without ref to FonOff tel holds generally similar views to ours which are at variance with reftel.
While new Fr Govt may be short lived Emb has no reason to believe that it is likely to be replaced with leftist govt much less one committed to “détente in IC“. Emb continues to believe as it stated in its tel 3796 Dec 26, ’51 (rptd Saigon 220 London unn)2 that no Fr Govt in foreseeable future cld for reasons stated therein propose voluntary withdrawal from IC except thru forced milit evacuation. Those reasons remain valid and with present prospects increased US aid, proposals for which by Secy Lovett to Congressional comites given prominence in yesterday’s press,3 there seems less likelihood that under existing circumstances Fr Govt wld decide on withdrawal. However there remains ever present danger of financial difficulties which unless solution is found wld increase pressures on govt to cut losses in IC.
With respect series ambiguous public statements by Fr officials mentioned in reftel Emb assumes ref is to statements such as that by Mendes-France who was recently quoted by Combat as advocating [Page 70] negots with Ho Chi Minh to end IC conflict. This is his oft repeated thesis and not new. We are reliably informed that Letourneau has recently told him that if he (Mendes-France) were PriMin it wld be as impossible for him as for any other PriMin to withdraw from IC since to do so wld mean the end of the Fr Union and the crack up of France’s alliances particularly with US. Letourneau himself has certainly given impression since his return from IC that there can be no thought of Fr withdrawal from IC, a view similar to that said to be held by recent Nat Assembly mission to IC.
Devinat,4 whose views were reported in Embtel 3796 is quoted in recent interview published by provincial paper as saying that time had come to face IC problem squarely, that several tens of billions of francs cld be lopped off by strict control milit affairs energetic reorgan civil affairs and making Vietnamese Govt face its own duties. He called for internatl aid to accompany such econ and proposed Pacific Pact saying pact wld come into play automatically in event danger and wld permit mutual aid. MRP comite in recent mtg as reported Embtel 4555 Mar 105 called for increased US aid and for UN internatl forces in event Chi Commie intervention but made no mention possibility withdrawal.
We have no reason to believe that withdrawal from Indochina is price for Socialist support of any future govt. As matter of fact this is subj into which we have looked recently because of press rumors during the last crisis that Pinay had attempted to obtain Socialist support by offering to put govt on record in favor of Fr withdrawal from IC. What Pinay apparently did was to sound out Socialists on this point. Mollet SYG of Socialists told us that he immed and with indignation rejected the imputation that Socialists wanted withdrawal, stressing that what they want is substantially increased “internatl” assistance to Fr and Vietnamese forces in which as Dept aware they do not differ from other parties.…6
Despite rumors reported by Leg Saigon Fr making feelers toward negot with Ho Chi Minh Emb has not been able obtain any confirmations such action here and notes Letourneau’s latest statement his subj in which he said time had not come for such negot (Embtel 5537 Mar. 13).5
Dept will recall statements in Embtel 3796 that “French are becoming increasingly sensitive to the possibility of a situation in which the Fr Govt might be confronted either with the necessity for rapid withdrawal or a milit disaster” and that “public sentiment for withdrawal [Page 71] in the absence of adoption of some course of action envisaging either internalization [internationalization] of IC problem or Fr receipt of massive additional aid will gain steadily and perhaps at accelerated rate”. Under impulse of increasing Fr financial difficulties sentiment for withdrawal from IC or some, solution which wld appreciably ease the Fr burden has grown in polit and Natl Assembly circles since desp of Embtel 3796. Hoa Binh evacuation served to heighten Fr fears and make evident end of conflict contemplated by De Lattre was mirage for foreseeable future. Offsetting unfavorable factors such as financial crisis and Hoa Binh evacuation were on other hand favorable developments such as optimistic appraisal of IC situation made by Nat Assembly mission and Letourneau both of which wld be expected to have influence on Nat Assembly. Fact remains however that Fr Govt still has to face problem of finding funds and troops for IC effort.
In Emb’s opinion immed Anglo-Amer problem is to continue seeking ways and means to keep French in IC and encourage and help them build strong Vietnamese fighting force which is French policy objective also Barring open Chinese intervention latter continues to hold best promise of permitting gradual transfer center of gravity Fr milit efforts from IC to Eur.
- Ante, p. 66.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 573.↩
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On Mar. 13, 1952, administration leaders delivered general statements in support of the Mutual Security Program before a joint session of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate. The statement of Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, addressed itself in part to Indochina, urging an increased appropriation of funds for that area. For the text of Lovett’s remarks on Indochina, see Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (82d Cong., 2d sess.), p. 24.
For documentation on the Mutual Security Program in general, see volume i. Documentation on the Mutual Security Program as it operated in the Far East is included in material on general U.S. policies with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii.
↩ - Paul Devinat, a leader of the Radical Socialist party; former minister.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- Not printed.↩