751G.5/3–1452: Telegram
The Consul General at Singapore (Baldwin) to the Department of State
989. Rptd info London 87, Paris 7, Saigon 40. Pouched Bangkok, Manila and Djakarta.
Single agenda item for meeting Mar 13 British Defense Coordination Comite FE was development in Singapore of support base for French Forces Indochina.
MacDonald1 expressed view that original proposal by De Lattre was “very ambitious” and probably materially changed by agreement at Washington tri-lateral military talks that US shipments would proceed direct to Indochina. Comite agreed ask French what revised requirements are in light of Wash talks. While awaiting answer comite will develop more precise plan logistics facilities which can be made available Singapore with some additional expenditure, after UK Govt [Page 68] authorizes expenditure. Agreed also discuss political economic aspects of matter with Singapore auths but foresaw no difficulties there.
Comite working paper2 containing estimate assistance which cld be offered French with existing facilities airpouched to Dept.
MacDonald gave résumé recent visit to Thai Indochina and talk with Letourneau. Fol are highlights: Letourneau professed to be reassured about military situation in Indochina. Believed withdrawal French Forces from Hoa Binh will strengthen over-all French military position by providing 19 additional battalions to “wipe out” infiltrating Viet Minh Forces and hold defense perimeter. Brigadier Field (Brit MilAtt Saigon) believes Letourneau over-optimistic and underestimating seriousness Viet Minh infiltration. Field also believes any major offensive by French Forces unlikely for considerable time.
Letourneau admitted polit situation Indochina much weaker and requires more vigorous French efforts. Said Bao Dai, while better than is generally believed is not doing proper leadership job. Letourneau encountered difficulties in attempting convince Bao Dai to take necessary action.
Believed serious weakness is inferiority Bao Dai’s subordinates and said present govt is “not governing”. Emphasized that Indochina must have “govt of natl concentration”. Bao Dai agreed but asked Letourneau take initiative. Letourneau declined and referred to Vietnam independence and importance of asserting it.
Letourneau intended recommend to French Govt that job of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief be divided, that French send best man available to be High Comm.
Letourneau assured MacDonald that French “wld finish job” in Indochina and not negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. He admitted existence of strong feeling in France favoring liquidation of Indochinese affair but believed if Bao Dai organizes effective govt, French people would be willing finish job. Otherwise French resentment against “wasting Fr lives in hopeless cause” likely assume more serious proportions.
MacDonald recognized latter remark may have been partly designed influence UK Govt but he generally agrees with Letourneau’s political assessment. Said “we must pray for good French High Comm”.
MacDonald said progress still being made in developing Vietnam Army but that strong hand of De Lattre greatly missed, particularly in view increased “petty and self-interested” Vietnam objections to Fr influence in military matters.
Summing up views re Indochina MacDonald described situation as dangerous, critical but not hopeless. He still believes Union Forces [Page 69] capable resisting Viet Minh if latter unassisted by Chinese Commie volunteers.
[Here follows a brief account of MacDonald’s remarks with respect to Thailand.]