Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/7–3153: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

Paris, July 31, 1953—6 p.m.

409. Limit distribution strictly. From MacArthur and Dillon. We dined privately with Laniel last evening at his house. MacArthur presented President’s letter,¹ explaining he had come Paris at request of President and Secretary to express to Laniel our strong desire to assist French to reduce Indochina war to manageable proportions; to explain problems the United States faces in this connection; and to get first-hand account from Laniel of French plans and intentions. Laniel was very touched by President’s letter and said he would give MacArthur a reply before latter’s departure Friday night.

Laniel then went over much same ground he covered with Dillon (Embtel 370).² He emphasized his desire to implement rapidly essential elements of Navarre Plan and did not minimize fact that his position regarding Indochina is not shared by all members of his government and will not be popular. While not going into details, he said Bidault fully shared his view about holding in Indochina, but was not entirely happy about France’s offer of full independence to the Associated States. Laniel himself will conduct coming conversations with Bao Dai to make crystal clear France is not attaching any strings to offer of independence to Associated States. Laniel plans to take a number of forthright measures, including withdrawal of old line colonial officials, who, he said, are red flags to Indochinese and constant reminder of France’s colonial past. While not wishing criticize Indochina policies of past French Governments, Laniel said their military and political concepts had not been adequate to win victory or to engage the support of Associated States. His program was designed to do both. He had confidence in Navarre whom he would fully support with all the available means at his disposal.

Laniel did not go into the details of the differences of opinion between Bidault and Reynaud, but remarked significantly that, while he had high regard for Reynaud, latter’s thinking with respect to Indochina had not evolved with the times.

Laniel emphasized again entire question of what France can do in Indochina is integral part of larger problem of balancing French budget and placing France in position where she can again make a strong and real contribution to European and Atlantic communities. In final analysis, this will depend on whether the United States will be able to give necessary additional financial assistance amounting to approximately 150 billion additional francs for Indochina for calendar year 1954.

MacArthur then emphasized again President’s great interest in assisting France in Indochina and seeing France restored to role of great power. He pointed out from inauguration of new administration, President had made public references to Indochina which were designed to be helpful to France. The bipartite communiqué following Rene Mayer visit last March was for same purpose. United States action with respect to Seventh Fleet and strengthening of Formosa had been designed to create a deterrent threat along the Chinese mainland coast so as to lessen chance of introduction of Chinese “volunteers” into Indochina. Again, in Korean truce negotiations, one consideration had been to create conditions which would make it unlikely that Chinese would withdraw strength from Korea immediately following the armistice for possible use against Indochina. MacArthur explained background of Senate action cutting 100 million and emphasized President and entire United States administration was seeking the restoration of the 100 million in conference. He also explained Bidault’s presentation in Washington and fact we had not refused additional aid for Indochina.

Regarding United States administration’s presentation to Congress of aid for Indochina, MacArthur pointed out one great difficulty had been total ignorance of both nature and cost of the revised French program. United States was ready and willing to come to grips with the problem, but until it could evaluate the French program in terms of its military value and cost, it was impossible to make a beginning.

Therefore, essential for French to present United States soonest with information on all aspects of program.

Until the United States had this information, it could not even tackle the job of trying to see what assistance it could give. MacArthur indicated that while he could make no commitment, he could tell Laniel that the United States was much encouraged by General O’Daniel’s report of the aggressive spirit of the new French command in Indochina. The President and United States administration were also greatly encouraged by France’s forthright action of July 3 in offering full independence to the Associated States. He could also assure Laniel that the United States sincerely desired to assist financing added cost of an additional French effort under an approved program. MacArthur said he must tell Laniel we had not envisaged cost of program of magnitude suggested by Laniel, and he did not know what we could do. However, if French program were fully adequate and designed to achieve real success, and if resources were not now available, there was possibility that administration could seek supplementary Congressional appropriation when the Congress reconvenes next year.

Laniel expressed appreciation for MacArthur’s visit. He recognized that cost of French program very substantial, but did not think anything less would produce success. It was pointless to pour good money after bad or take steps which had no chance of achieving success. If United States could not provide necessary assistance, France would withdraw from Indochina. Laniel made it clear that as long as he is Premier, he would not agree to such a withdrawal, but if necessary United States aid was not forthcoming, he would be succeeded by a government which would withdraw. He said that the combination of Bidault’s report that the United States was not willing to finance an additional French effort, and Senate cut of 100 million had depressed him very deeply, and it had been largely on the basis of these two events that he had requested Navarre to prepare a fall back plan on the assumption that no additional resources would become available. He instructed Navarre that plan should be based on fact that safety of French expeditionary force had absolute priority. Navarre had replied that he would prepare such a plan, but if no substantial additional resources were available to build up native forces and temporarily increase French forces, long run situation was hopeless, and he could only plan a holding operation with eventual withdrawal.

In conclusion, Laniel re-emphasized the necessity for strict secrecy on this exchange of views. MacArthur told him he had asked to pay courtesy visit on Bidault³ and asked what he should say. Laniel suggested MacArthur tell Bidault that he had seen Laniel and had stressed the urgency of receiving complete French program for Indochina soonest and that Laniel agreed that plans with costing, et cetera, would be turned over to Ambassador Dillon soonest. To insure plans reach United States in comprehensible form, Dillon suggested that French go over them with Labouisse.

Laniel then mentioned to MacArthur his earnest desire to visit United States and confer with President if agreement could be reached on Indochina program. He recognized President very fully occupied, but said if United States and France reached agreement on additional effort in Indochina, such a visit would greatly strengthen his hand.

MacArthur and I both have the strong impression that Laniel sincerely and honestly wants to carry through his stepped up program for Indochina as a part of a major overall effort to put France’s house in order.⁴ If he receives necessary assistance from United States, we believe he will pursue Indochina effort vigorously. If he does not receive such assistance, his chances of lasting much beyond October are not bright, and he will probably be replaced by a government which will be willing to let Indochina go down the drain.

Dillon

1. President Eisenhower’s letter to Premier Laniel, dated July 28, read as follows:

   “I have asked Douglas MacArthur, II, who, as you know, is Counselor of the State Department, to proceed to Paris to convey to you my warm personal greetings and to discuss with you informally problems of common interest. One of these which is much on our mind these days is Indochina.

   “While I assume that Mr. MacArthur will seek an audience with you in company with our Ambassador, if you should want to give him any personal messages, I would be glad to receive them.

   “You will recall that Mr. MacArthur brought us together in Paris some two years ago and I hope that the acquaintance then begun can be renewed in the not too distant future.

   “With assurances of my continued respect,” etc. (Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459)

   In a letter of July 31, Premier Laniel informed the President that he had had a candid and complete discussion with MacArthur, whom he had asked to convey a full account. (Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459)

2. Dated July 29, p. 701.
3. MacArthur, Dillon, and Bidault met on the afternoon of July 31. The meeting was described in telegram 413 from Paris, July 31; for text, see volume vi.
4. On Aug. 4, Ambassador Dillon transmitted a letter to Under Secretary Smith enclosing a memorandum that commented in detail on Prime Minister Laniel’s economic and financial programs, including his efforts to address the problems posed by the war in Indochina; for text, see volume vi.