751G.00/7–3053: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
196. Repeated information Paris 59, Hanoi unnumbered, Phnom Penh unnumbered. I had a long talk with DeJean yesterday evening. With regard to Cabinet discussions in Paris, he said that government had agreed to initiate “Navarre plan” but could not undertake to carry it through to completion until financing could be found. Navarre would receive a reinforcement of nine battalions from France plus the French battalion now in Korea if UN Command agrees to its departure. The new battalions would leave France—and Korea—on October 1. Navarre would also receive additional cadres, non-coms, and specialists he had demanded. Metropolitan Air Force would send 25 additional C–47s. Navarre had been very effective in pressing his demands against great deal of opposition which objected to further building-up French expeditionary forces in Indochina at expense of build-up of Metropolitan Forces. He, DeJean, thought insistence in France on danger of a Soviet invasion of Europe was unjustified. He did not believe Russia intended or could, in view of its internal difficulties and problems with its satellites, attack in Europe at present time.
DeJean said he was very pleased with Navarre whom he had known for a long time. He was not only an intelligent general but he had political sense as well. Even with reinforcements from France and formation of new Vietnamese battalions, Navarre would be unable to undertake all-out offensive operations in next few months, but there [Page 705] would be a stepping-up of limited offensive moves such as raid on Langson and action at Quang Tri, Annam, which started two days ago. Hitherto, Viet Minh had been able to put practically their entire force in battle lines leaving almost unguarded communications lines and supply centers. This, they would no longer be able to do.
DeJean indicated some belief that Korean armistice1 signified desire on part of Chinese Communist regime to break away from Russia. To his inquiry I replied that I did not share this opinion.
Comment: I took this as an indication that DeJean believes some sort of an arrangement can be made with China to cease its support of Viet Minh.
DeJean had just returned from seeing Bao Dai at Banmethuot. He spoke in praise of Bao Dai’s statesmanlike understanding and wholehearted acceptance of French offer of July 3. Bao Dai would leave about August 1 for Paris to be followed in a week or so by a delegation headed by President Tam.
I told DeJean I thought it very important for him to see Cambodian King as early as possible; that in my opinion King was more reasonable than his advisors. I told him of my conversation of July 25 with King who expressed appreciation and satisfaction with French reply to his note, taking exception only to French statement they intended to exercise temporary military command east of Mekong, instead of requesting Cambodian permission therefor, which King said he would gladly have given. I expressed personal hope that some amicable adjustment of this point would be found; French having gone as far as they had might go a little further and find a formula which would save King’s face. DeJean made no reply to this observation. He said he was going today to Phnom Penh to see Prime Minister Penn Nouth and call on Regent, King’s father. He would hand Penn Nouth a letter to King expressing hope that His Majesty would receive him and that he could renew pleasant relations which he had enjoyed with King during latter’s four weeks’ “exile” in Japan. DeJean said he had, in fact, enjoyed very friendly contacts with King during latter’s Japanese stay. He had transmitted to King agreement reached in Paris with Cambodian delegates, which King had assured him, since it made substantial concessions to his point of view, was acceptable. King had left immediately thereafter for Phnom Penh and it was great surprise to DeJean to hear that two or three days later he had gone into “exile” again in Bangkok. I remarked that was probably due to influence of King’s entourage plus possibly that of Buddhist priests. I remarked King had told me he intended to send delegation to Paris, but now it appeared that Penn Nouth had insisted that negotiations [Page 706] must begin at Phnom Penh. DeJean replied that in any case France intended to complete negotiations with Vietnam before attempting to come to agreement with Cambodia.
In conclusion, DeJean said he had named Offroy, whom he had known favorably for some years, as his deputy.
- The Korean Armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom on July 27.↩