Office of the Historian

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Murphy)1

confidential
[Washington,] July 31, 1953.

Subject:

  • Visit of Ambassador Bonnet Regarding Korean Political Conference2

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Henri Bonnet (France)
  • Ambassador Lodge
  • Mr. Robert Murphy

Indo-China

The French Ambassador called and left with the Secretary an Aide-Mémoire of July 31,3 stating that it appears indispensable to the [Page 710] French Government that the exchange of views undertaken by the Foreign Ministers at Washington concerning the question of Indo-China be raised in the political negotiations following the Korean armistice.

The Secretary said that the formulae outlined in paragraph 3 of the Aide-Mémoire seemed to be impracticable, but that he thought the procedure described in paragraph 4 might be feasible.4 To the Secretary’s question whether the Ambassador expected a written reply to the Aide-Mémoire, Mr. Bonnet replied in the negative.

Ambassador Bonnet emphasized the urgency from the French point of view of prompt attention to this question. Urgent pressure is being generated in France for a solution of the Indo-Chinese problem now that a truce has been achieved in Korea. With the cessation of fighting in the North, the question of the Chinese attitude toward operations in the South [has] become front-page. In his opinion, the Political Conference offers a logical and ideal opportunity for informal, marginal discussion with the Chinese Communist representatives.

[Here follows discussion of the Political Conference on Korea.]

  1. Robert D. Murphy served as Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in addition to his duties as Assistant Secretary of State.↩
  2. For additional documentation on discussions following the Korean Armistice, see volume xv.↩
  3. The French aide-mémoire, discussing various procedural methods whereby political discussions pursuant to the Korean Armistice agreement could be employed to produce negotiations concerning Indochina, is not printed. (795.00/8–753)↩
  4. Paragraph 3 suggested means by which the political conference contemplated for Korea might take up the subject of Indochina. Paragraph 4 raised the possibility of two separate, parallel conferences.↩