751G.13/5–2953: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State

secret

784. Department pass Saigon, Paris; repeated information Saigon 627, Paris 376. Reference Consulate telegram 779.1 In course of long conversation describing steps leading to his appointment as Minister of National Defense, Phan-Huy-Quat2 spoke with great frankness of Bao Dai, his character, weaknesses, strategy, how he is considered by the people, his entourage and Emperor’s evaluation of French and US policy toward Indochina.

Quat said that in judging Bao Dai, one must remember he is an oriental prince whose life has been spent under surveillance by the French or persons acceptable to the French. He is accordingly mistrustful of everyone, in varying degrees, never speaks his whole mind to anyone, and confides, up to a point, only in those he considers devoted to himself and the nation’s independence. Although possessed of quick native intelligence, Bao Dai is ill-informed on most subjects, afflicted with “Royal laziness” and given to self-indulgence. He knows [Page 587] he is harshly judged for his inactivity not only by French and Americans but also by many of his own people whose good opinion he would value. Until he feels, however, that on adopting a policy of action he can be sure of serving the national interest with no risk of being used as a French cat’s-paw, Bao Dai will remain aloof. Quat says that if the French and the US receive his military plan favorably, Bao Dai will interpret that reception as the signal to abandon his reserve and gradually re-enter public life. Bao Dai, he says, is purely concerned with the military establishment and cares nothing for the external trappings of sovereignty; he is aware that Tam is working against him, but with a shrug he said to Quat “I shall take care of Tam at the proper moment”.

With regard to Bao Dai’s transfers of funds abroad, Quat said these are not inspired by personal greed, but have an important policy aspect. To have money outside the control of French in Indochina gives Bao Dai a degree of independence not enjoyed by his imperial predecessors, many of whom ended their days deposed and impoverished. Quat reported hearing a Frenchman, whom he did not identify, say the French were obliged handle Bao Dai with care since he has large holdings outside Vietnam. Quat said also that although Bao Dai has profited from Empress absence from country, fact that she and Royal children are absent is only another aspect of this same policy, objective of which is to prevent Bao Dai and his family from becoming French hostages.

Bao Dai has always been suspicious of French intentions toward Vietnam, said Quat, and has been slapped down so often that his mistrust in power army indelible. He has been moved to present his military plan at this time “as a last effort” because he believes France to be so weak and so greatly in need of a formula capable of providing an acceptable solution to the problem of Vietnam, that a responsible French Government can hardly turn him down. If he meets with friendly reception in Paris, Vietnam’s relations with France will enter a new and promising phase. If his plan is rejected, however, Bao Dai “will take other dispositions” a phrase Quat would not undertake to define but which he feels would bode ill not only for Vietnam but also for the stake that the West has in Indochina.

With regard to the US, Quat said that Bao Dai has been unable determine in his own mind exactly what American policy is toward Vietnam. While he appreciates and accepts American reliance on French aid in the defense of Western Europe, he is puzzled by what he considers failure of US fully to support Vietnam’s aspirations to more nearly complete independence precisely in those spheres, particularly the military, where a strong Vietnam would be invaluable not only to France but to the Western cause generally. In this connection Bao Dai is especially anxious to know what will be the American reaction [Page 588] to his military plan. A timely gesture of encouragement by the US, said Quat, may mark the turning point in this year.

Sturm
  1. Telegram 779 from Hanoi, May 28, which reported on Bao Dai’s plans for the development of the Vietnamese National Army, is not printed. (751G.13/5–2853)
  2. The appointment of Dr. Phan Huy Quat, a leader of the Dai Viet Party, as Minister of Defense was announced on June 4.