751G.00/5–2953: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
[Received 9:08 p.m.]
6184. Repeated information Saigon 281, London unnumbered. Saigon telegram 2256, May 20 (Paris 394, London 45). We agree with Saigon’s suggestion re stock-taking at this juncture, particularly as French civil and military command changing and increasing attention being given here to IC, where, as Saigon says, end seems as far from sight as ever. At time when IC problem may be aired fully in National Assembly, and may play part in formation new government, and at time United States Congress on verge considering United States aid programs, we should take new and close look at IC problem.
Question is how to get across to French effectively our ideas of things they should do to turn tide in IC. If we were to sit down with French and give them list of particulars such as that outlined in reftel, they would probably conclude we were trying to “run the show” and net result would be French resentment and risk they might decide time [Page 585] had come let us do just that—i.e., “run the show” or take over. To suggest in piecemeal fashion measures such as those outlined would be to settle [unsettle] French and dissipate our influence and opportunity for pressure. What is required is overall review of entire picture with view to coming up with new ideas of what can be done to change overall situation. Measures would naturally have to be within limits capabilities France, Associated States and United States, materially, politically and psychologically. Important thing is to do utmost toward satisfying IC nationalist aspirations without at same time destroying or weakening French will and determination continue effort.
We think there should be at earliest possible appropriate moment high level discussion with French re where they are headed and what they expect to do, leaving details aside to extent possible on our side, unless we are asked for specific ideas of what should be done, and concentrating on broad aspects of problem. These should include basic concept of conduct of war in terms of strategy, training of native forces and uses of national armies and local militia. A beginning was made in this direction when Letourneau was asked in Washington present French plan for conduct of war. Coming military mission to IC should permit these discussions to be carried to conclusion. On political and economic side, we should explore situation with French to see what measures can and should be taken to obtain maximum political advantage in IC which would do most to undercut Viet Minh. It should be made clear to French in advance of such talks that we consider our aid program and interest in area warrantable thoroughly frank exchange of views re these matters and say our present concern arises from apparent continued stalemate in most fields despite increased effort on all sides, including, of course, United States aid programs.
Conversations along these lines would have to be at high level if we are to obtain from French authoritative statement their policy and aims. It would be essential to include Minister of Associated States, whoever he may be. If such talks were held here would suggest that they be with Foreign Minister and Minister Associated States and would hope that Heath and Bonsal could be present assist me in discussions. It would appear desirable to inform French in advance orally of fields of discussion we have in mind without, however, drawing up formal written agenda which would then probably become matter for Cabinet discussion and might precipitate wave of criticism United States interference leading to pressure for pulling out and letting United States have responsibility for IC. Whole matter is somewhat delicate and we must keep in mind, leaving aside degree of justification therefor, French sensitivity to what could be construed [Page 586] as outside interference in internal matters. Whole exercise should be intended to permit, or rather to require, French to take stock of where they are headed and what end they see in sight and to permit United States to offer suggestions or recommendations for action we believe helpful. To that end United States side will, of course, have to have clear idea of what it believes necessary. Saigon reftel and Saigon Despatch 528, May 21,1 furnished me excellent points for consideration by United States side in its approach to problem.
Timing is important element. We doubt that we could obtain French assent to political and economic talks until new government formed and National Assembly debate on IC is either ended or postponed indefinitely. To push for talks before these events might be to add to pressures on France to cut losses and unload IC burden on United States as such pressures might be augmented by French view that United States intervening more and more in IC affairs.
- Despatch 528 from Saigon, May 21, titled “A Political Action Program” and containing various suggestions for improving the situation in Indochina, is not printed. (751G.00/5–2153)↩