751G.00/5–2353: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
6082. Repeated information Saigon 271, London unnumbered. Embassy is forwarding in immediately following telegram brief summary recent comment on French policy Indo China taken from non-Communist French press.1 Comment noteworthy in that it shows increasing volume and attention devoted to question of solution for IC problem with more stress than in past being laid by some non-Communist newspapers on negotiated settlements as means permit French withdrawal. Lead in this campaign is for moment in hands of neutralist organs, such as Le Monde, latter apparently endeavoring build up pressure for negotiated withdrawal. It is no longer case of fairly isolated voice of Mendes-France advancing his withdrawal theory but that of other voices calling for negotiations, such as Servan-Schreiber family and even Edgar Faure. Rightist Aurore joins in partially with editorial (said to have been written by chief shareholder) saying hour for “relief” has come and France should now think of herself. There is difference in views on negotiations. Mendes-France and Le Monde’s Servan-Schreiber look to negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh as means permitting French withdrawal while Edgar Faure calls for five-power negotiations, including Communist China, and does not mention withdrawal.
Other straws in wind come from newly published weekly L’Express (Embassy despatch 2580, May 22),2 product Servan-Schreiber family, [Page 580] whose first issue last week carried article by Mendes-France with usual appeal for negotiations and whose second issue today carries as lead article alleged portions Devinat parliamentary report on IC deleted from report, this section under title “reasons for failure of our policy.” Mitterand of UDSR has also recently commented publicly on IC and is one of chief interpellators and critics of government policy in IC in National Assembly.
Rumors of critical nature of Devinat parliamentary report, Viet Minh invasion Laos, recent difficulties with Cambodians, considerable publicity given “piastre scandal” ending in devaluation and accompanying protests from Associated States, recrudescence Viet Minh military activity in Delta Tonkin, rumors Letourneau resignation and continued delay in naming Commissioner General IC have all contributed to focusing attention anew on IC and to strengthening malaise re this ever present problem. Despite increased US aid and efforts build up Associated States Armies, French generally see no end in sight to IC conflict and view French effort there as drain and formidable obstacle to fulfillment French obligations and commitment in Europe.
At this juncture campaign to build up support for policy negotiated withdrawal may be expected to fall on more responsive ears than would have been case at any time since US aid programs began and Delattre initiated his redressment campaign. On other hand, despite aspects situation engendering malaise at this time, there are positive elements which should make for more rather than less optimism. In contrast with situation two years ago at time Delattre arrival IC, US aid has increased to considerable volume (leading to recent comment, for example, by Le Monde correspondent IC that US has furnished all materiel necessary and that “parks overflow with planes and tanks,” real problem being that of manpower); Associated States Armies have now been built up to sizable numbers and plans under way to create commando battalions; and position Associated States Governments internationally greatly augmented and internal powers increasingly turned over to them.
In this situation there is an important psychological problem both in IC and in France. Thus, US actions and words assume considerable importance in relation to French reactions to IC problem. There is no doubt that US aid is an essential element in continuation of French effort in IC and any indication we give of support for French position plays part in encouraging French to continue fight. For this reason, US furnishing of C–119 transport planes was timely contribution materially and psychologically, as was also in psychological sense US concern and outspoken denunciation Viet Minh aggression against Laos.
[Page 581]In light of foregoing, we conclude that while campaign described above appears directed toward change in French policy in IC, it has not reached dangerous proportions even though support for negotiated settlement now comes from new quarters. One of factors most conducive to sentiment for withdrawal has been and continues to be lack of basis for hope of real victory. Prospect has been one of indefinite struggle and effort in what has been regarded by many as at best a holding operation. This pessimistic view was dispelled by Delattre’s dynamism but events of past year, particularly recent weeks, have served to revive this feeling. If same sense of hope could again be established by change of command, both military and civil, coupled with US assistance and support, sentiment for withdrawal should again recede. With new French military command team just taking over, there should be lessening effectiveness of efforts of advocates of negotiation while a new look is taken by new commanders leading to possibilities greater offensive spirit. It should be kept in mind also that Devinat and his group did not, so far as we know, advocate negotiations or withdrawal; in conversations with us Devinat put emphasis on transfers of authority to Associated States and accelerated formation national armies. Debate on IC in National Assembly, if it comes after formation new government, should give some indication of extent to which supporters of negotiation have made headway. In interim, there should be lull in attention to IC problem and rainy season should provide similar lull in military operations, thus providing breathing spell for supporters of general outlines of present policy and taking heat off government for time being. In this interim, however, government must come to some decision with respect to its own long-range policy for IC, a decision which must carry with it hope for solution of IC problem, if it is to be able to face successfully its critics in the Assembly.