751G.13/5–2153: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret

2273. Repeated information Paris 401, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. I called today on President Tam. He developed following points:

1.
Although to outward purposes officially displeased, Prime Minister was secretly elated at French unilateral devaluation of piaster without consultation Associated States. He said that although immediate economic and social consequences posed difficult problems Fr action had united Vietnamese public opinion behind government in solidarity which nation had never before known. In consequence he, Tam, could now move forward with greater assurance and daring in developing his program for an ever-increasing measure of independence until that time when Vietnam should be entirely free. Tam said that he was now in position to tell French that they had taken action without consultation and that he too could take action without consultation.
2.

On vital question of rice Tam seemed fully confident of his ability to deal with situation. He said that despite very strenuous pressure from French and others, he had resisted and would continue to resist demands that export of rice be permitted. With an embargo on rice exports Prime Minister said there were even surplus stocks in Vietnam and thus law of supply and demand would keep prices low. As for rumor spreading important rice exporters that unless this cereal were exported it would find its way into Viet Minh hands, Tam said this was a canard made up of whole cloth and that he was fully confident Vietnamese and French Union Forces could prevent rice from finding its way into enemy hands.

In view of Tam’s confidence that rice problem can be dealt with by internal measures, it now seems probable that contemplated STEM financing of requisitioning may not prove necessary.

3.
Tam said that popular outcry was great for measures of relief following devaluation but he was confident that if rice could be kept under control this clamor could successfully be dealt with. He said it would be easy to grant demands for Chamber of Commerce but that to create national bank was more thorny problem “since we have no money.” As for rumored transfer of Office des Changes to Vietnamese hands, he said he had this matter under study and favored it in principle since reason for Office des Changes existence had been removed with devaluation.
4.
Prime Minister said he had decided to proceed with complementary communal elections on June 28. This coupled with elections held last January would provide wide electoral base for future National Assembly. When asked what reaction of Bao Dai would be to June elections Tam smiled and said that Bao Dai had been opposed to elections in January and that subsequently he had been impressed by popular appeal those elections had exerted. Tam felt particularly in light of national solidarity engendered by French devaluation measure, that even Bao Dai could not successfully oppose his measures for next month and his eventual goal of National Assembly.
5.
On agrarian reform, Tam said that in his recent tour of provinces his program had proved popular and he was confident that in this realm as well pressure of public opinion would force some measure of reform. Bao Dai, however, thus far had withheld his assent to decree, as Chief of State was still waiting to assess pressures and opinions.
6.
I informed Tam in strictest confidence of my contemplated informal démarche tomorrow with Gautier (Embassy telegram 2230, Department telegram 2283).1 Prime Minister was effusively grateful for this information and support. I cautioned him, however, that our interest was a realistic one as we wished to see Vietnamese budget as much in balance as possible for effective support of war effort.
7.
Re Tam’s contemplated trip to US I said that in principle Department was in agreement but that timing of visit would require some study. Tam himself said that under present circumstances he could not stay more than three days away from his office and was quite content that scheduled visit would not take place in near future. He agreed (last paragraph Embassy telegram 2228, May 16)2 that no publicity should be given to contemplated journey at present.
8.
Re Lieberman’s interview which presumably has now been published in New York Times3 Tam said he did not propose to follow Cambodian examples. He said Cambodians were apt to fly off the handle but his plan was deeper, more subtle, and would be steadfastly pursued. In other words, Tam is consolidating gains made very quietly and is planning a long-range campaign to utilize forces of nationalism recently released by French devaluation measure to sustain his own program and, in proportion as it succeeds, to evolve complete independence from France.

McClintock
  1. In telegram 2230 from Saigon, May 16, not printed, McClintock expressed the intention to raise with High Commissioner Gautier the question of a surtax which affected Vietnamese firms but not French firms. (851G.11/5–1653) In telegram 2283 to Saigon, May 16, the Department of State concurred in that course of action. (851G.11/5–1653)
  2. In telegram 2228 from Saigon, May 16, not printed, McClintock reported having discussed the proposed Tam visit with Letourneau who pointed out that the matter was delicate because of Bao Dai’s extreme jealousy. (751G.13/5–1653)
  3. Presumably a reference to an article in the New York Times of May 20 (p. 4) by Henry R. Lieberman, “Indochina Issues Confront Navarre,” in which Premier Nguyen Van Tam was quoted with regard to devaluation of the piaster and other aspects of French-Vietnamese relations.