751G.00/5–1453: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
5949. Rptd info Damascus 20 eyes only for Secretary. Department eyes only for Acting Secretary from Ambassador. Embassy’s telegram 5934, May 13 (Damascus 19). While we think Devinat’s views and those of Parliamentary mission have much to commend them and while he is well-regarded as an honest and able man, we should not forget that he is also a politician, member of National Assembly and there are political overtones in his approach to Indochina problem inasmuch as he is one of group highly critical of Letourneau. We believe that in assessing his suggestions we should keep in mind certain aspects of Indochina situation as outlined hereunder.
French have slowly come around to idea of building up lightly-armed Associated States units to meet Viet Minh on their own ground. De Lattre took first plunge by accepting, and selling to French Government, idea of creating regular national armies in Indochina. In doing so, he and French Government were aware of risk they were running of building up army which might either turn over to enemy or become sufficiently strong to enable Associated States present exorbitant demands to French Government or make deal with Ho Chi-Minh. French Government is also taking similar risk in creating commandotype battalions, which presumably would operate throughout countryside free from actual French control with attendant risk desertion or connivance with enemy. French have reached these decisions on their own and without pressure from us. While we have encouraged development national armies, we should keep in mind that decision create them was originally French decision without reference to us. We should, therefore, take heed that we not get so far out in front in urging French adoption military operations in Indochina that we get ourselves in position assuming responsibility for results flowing therefrom without attendant authority.
French authorities Indochina have apparently consistently resisted United States efforts have military observers in field and have exhibited undue sensitivity United States efforts deal directly with Associated States. If United States should now name forceful top-ranking Army or Marine officer experienced in jungle warfare with idea that he would sell French on new approach to military operations, it might lead to considerable friction unless such step were preceded by frank exchange views on this subject between top-ranking French and United States military commands and agreement reached on tactics [Page 566] to be followed. It is difficult to believe that French military command in IC would institute such far-reaching changes in conduct of military operations without approval at top in French Government, for such change would have far-reaching political as well as military implications. This problem appears, therefore, to be one to be discussed and worked out at high military levels and approved by heads French Government prior to any possible appointment of new United States chief of military mission.