751G.00/5–1353: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1
5934. Repeated information Damascus 19 for Secretary’s eyes only. Washington eyes only [Acting] Secretary from Ambassador. In private conversation with Devinat today, he passed on to me certain feelings regarding Indochina which he said were shared unanimously by [Page 564] the other members of the Parliamentary Commission on Indochina, but which, for obvious reasons, could not be made public. These thoughts concerned the role the United States has played and is playing in the Indochina conflict. Devinat had hoped to have the opportunity to outline these views personally to the Secretary when he was here for NATO, but as he did not get the opportunity, he passed them on to me personally to be used in strictest confidence.
Begin Devinat’s views:
- First: American political effort in Indochina has been and continues to be very helpful and on right track. US prodding of French Government to make clearer fact that decision to give full independence to Associated States had been taken and is irrevocable is required and should continue. He had particularly high personal praise for role that has been played by Ambassador Heath.
- Second: Feeling that time had come for full frankness and without questioning generous motives of US military aid, Devinat and committee unanimously felt US military assistance in Indochina had not been as helpful as it should have been, had been misdirected and must share equally with French military command the blame for present situation. The US alone had experience in jungle warfare against Japan during World War II. US must have able officers experienced in this type of warfare. French military command had little experience this type warfare and mistakenly tried to import continental European warfare based on heavy equipment to Indochina. When US offered military help, they merely asked French command for what they needed. French command, because of lack of experience or mere desire for equipment, requested large quantities of heavy equipment of one sort or another which was, in effect, useless in Indochina. US military in Indochina accepted requests without any real question. As a result, there now is substantial quantity US equipment in Saigon which is useless in present type of warfare. What was needed in Indochina was money to pay lightly armed native troops and not quantities of expensive military hardware. Although present official attitude was to favor new lightly armed native units, Devinat feared French military would give this relatively low priority unless strongly urged by US military advisors. Present US advisors in Indochina seem incapable of giving necessary prodding either (1) because personal capacity not up to job which Devinat said he believed to be the case; or (2) because being held back by lack of proper instructions from top military quarters in Washington. The greatest thing we could do to help shorten Indochina war would be to send as chief of military mission to Indochina a forceful top ranking army or marine officer experienced in jungle warfare, and to make it evident that this officer had full confidence of and direct access to top level military and civilian officials in Washington. Some relaxation our policy of limiting aid for military hardware also required. He hoped we would not take this criticism amiss, but situation so serious that time had come for complete frankness, and this was area in which US could, if it wished, be of major help in shortening the war.
The source text is accompanied by the following memorandum of transmittal by William J. McWilliams of the Executive Secretariat to Acting Secretary Smith: “General Smith: The attached Eyes Only cable from Ambassador Dillon contains the views of Devinat on Indo-China. Devinat is a Radical Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies who headed the Parliamentary Group which went to Indo-China some weeks ago.
“I recommend that you authorize me to forward the telegram to Mr. Robertson for his information and action.”
Smith wrote “OK” beside the above recommendation and added the following handwritten notation: “Robertson—You should know that for two years we have been pressing the French by all channels to take C.I.A. and other competent technical assistance and guidance.”
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