Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 6, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

May 6, 1953

[Extracts]

Present at the 143rd meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary’of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

2. The Situation in Indochina and Thailand²

The Director of Central Intelligence stated that the latest reports on the situation in Laos were slightly more optimistic, though the situation was far from clear. The rainy season would commence within a week or ten days, and would probably put an end to the fighting until next autumn.

On the political side, continued Mr. Dulles, the recent statements and actions of the King of Cambodia were the most significant developments. The King had bluntly stated that the French must give Cambodia virtually complete independence if they expected the Cambodians to assist in resisting the Vietminh invaders.

. . . . . . .

The President asked for a clear statement as to the position being taken by the French on this whole business. What, exactly, he asked, does France have in store for the Associated States of Indochina in the future?

Mr. Dulles answered that the French were offering these States independence within the French Union after internal security had been established. Unfortunately, the governments of the Associated States had little confidence in the sincerity of the French commitment.

The President expressed the firm belief that two, and only two, developments would really save the situation in French Indochina. The first of these was a firm official statement by France as to the future independence of the Associated States when the internal conflict was over. Even if the French were obliged to contemplate losing political control of Indochina in these circumstances, the President believed that they would continue to secure considerable economic advantage. The second requirement, said the President, was simply for a leader. Most of the French Generals sent out to Indochina struck the President as a poor lot, and he had already told Secretary Dulles to apply what pressure he could to secure the appointment of General Guillaume. The President then added that General³ had visited him the other day, and that he had been well impressed with the General’s realistic appraisal of the situation in Indochina, as well as with his apparent capacity for real leadership. He therefore planned to write Ambassador Dillon to urge support for the appointment of³ to head the military effort of the French in Indochina.

Secretary Humphrey observed that he and his colleagues had discussed this whole problem of Indochina with Bidault and the other French leaders at the NATO conference. The French leaders seemed straightforward in their assertion of France’s ultimate intention to free the Associated States. But Secretary Humphrey said that he detected among officials in the lower echelons a desire to perpetuate the colonial status of French Indochina.

The President replied that unless something could be done to change this latter feeling, nothing could possibly save Indochina, and that continued United States assistance would amount to pouring our money down a rathole.

The Vice President remarked that he had met the King of Cambodia during the latter’s recent visit to Washington. The King had made the point that in China, Communism had secured a foothold because of its appeal to the poor against the great landholders. In Cambodia, however, the appeal of the Communists was not economic but nationalist. The dilemma which confronts us in Indochina seemed to the Vice President to boil down to the fact that the native peoples were unwilling to fight Communism in order to perpetuate French colonialism.

As on other occasions, the President reminded the Council of the touchiness of France in any matter, such as this, which affected her prestige as a world power. The President sympathized with and understood France’s sensitivity, but believed that if the French really desired to cut the best figure before the world, the obvious course to pursue was first to defeat the Vietminh forces and then magnanimously to offer independence to the Associated States. The great question was how we can make the French see the wisdom of such a course of action.

Secretaries Smith and Humphrey both noted that the French were frightened lest, after granting full political independence to these States, they would switch their trade patterns from France to Japan.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out to the Council that existing policy with respect to Indochina was not responsive to the actual situation which had developed. Our existing policy on Indochina contemplated intervention by the United States only in the event of overt or covert Chinese intervention to assist the rebels. In point of fact, such Chinese intervention had not occurred, and the deteriorating situation had been brought about by civil war. Mr. Cutler also pointed out that in NSC 149/2⁴ intervention in Southeast Asia had been contemplated if “a basic change” in the situation occurred. Therefore, he added, the question before the Council was whether recent developments in Laos amounted to basic change, and therefore whether the United States was prepared to contemplate military intervention.

. . . . . . .

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in Laos and Thailand.

b. Agreed that it was essential that the French make clear that they intend to give the people of the Associated States maximum freedom to choose their own form of government, as soon as internal security can be established in Indochina.

c. Agreed to recommend to the President:

(1) The provision, as a matter of urgency, of a military mission to Thailand, headed by a high-ranking U.S. officer, to give training and operational advice to the Thai armed forces along the lines of the Van Fleet mission to Greece.

(2) Acceleration of military assistance to Thailand to furnish all feasible matériel aid to the Thai armed forces.

d. Agreed that Mr. C. D. Jackson should report at the next Council meeting on the possibilities for psychological operations based on Thailand.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on May 7.
2. For the text of the portion of this memorandum which deals with Thailand, see volume xii.
3. The following omission in the source text.
3. The following omission in the source text.
4. For text of NSC 149/2, “Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to Their Costs,” Apr. 29, 1953, and related documentation, see volume II.
5. Points a-d and the note below constituted NSC Action No. 780, May 6, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D95, “NSC Actions”)