Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “French Military Operations in Indochina”

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 6, 1953.

Subject:

• Negotiated Settlement in Indochina

In accordance with your request at a recent Director’s meeting, I am putting down some preliminary thoughts concerning a negotiated settlement in Indochina.

First, and even though this is not the point to which I wish to address myself, mention should be made of the difficulties which we will encounter in seeking to bring the “other side” to the conference table. Quite obviously Ho Chi Minh would not fully represent the “other side”, but the Chinese Communists as well as the Soviets can, without doubt, be expected to disclaim any knowledge of or responsibility for the situation in Indochina, “a purely internal affair.”

Quite aside, however, from the above difficulties and assuming for the purpose of the argument that they have been overcome, it is difficult to visualize what would be the terms of reference which we would suggest for the political discussion of Indochina. From the start we should realize that the Communists would insist on at least the withdrawal of foreign forces and a plebiscite thereafter.

1. A plebiscite under present conditions could with certainty be predicted as giving a thumping majority to the Viet-minh in Viet Nam. Under normal conditions it could be expected that Laos and Cambodia would vote anti-communist with a large margin. However, both these people have been long known for their peaceful characteristics bordering on timorousness. What with the recent aggression in Laos by the Communists from Viet Nam on top of a general current of victory running for the Viet Minh, it is to be feared that a plebiscite in these two other countries would also result in Communist victories.

2. Another possibility which presents itself would be a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the military status quo with both sides resting on their positions and negotiations between the Ho Chi Minh–Bao Dai Governments. As we all know, the situation is radically different from that prevailing in Korea where there exists a continuous battle line with both sides in effective control of all the territory on their side of the line. In Indochina, on the contrary, the picture is one of an infinite series of pockets and pockets within pockets. Because of this complex and confused situation it is difficult to imagine that the Viet Minh would refrain from political consolidation and expansion during the talks.

The probable outcome of these negotiations would be the creation of two Viet Namese states—one Communist and the other non-Communist. After complicated exchanges of territories there would result in all probability a Communist Viet Nam in the North and a Bao Dai Viet Nam in the South. This state of affairs, however, could not be expected long to endure what with the greater dynamics of the Communist elements in Viet Nam coupled with the half-heartedness of Bao Dai and his Government. It is believed that it would not be long until the Southern Viet Nam state would have been subverted by the Communists with the result that all of Viet Nam would be Communist. A chain of events leading to Communist domination over most of Southeast Asia could well have been thus set in motion.

After having given some thought to the above possibilities and variations thereof (obviously it would be a loss of time to consider a return to the status quo ante-bellum, because of public opinion in the Associated States, as well as because of the Viet Minh’s inflexible opposition thereto), I am tentatively tempted to conclude that the following would offer us something which might be accepted by both sides and yet not lead inevitably to eventual Communist control over all of Indochina.

3. Essentially this suggested situation is a variation of the second hypothesis above. There would be two Viet Nam states with this important proviso that most of the French forces in Indochina would remain for a long period in the Southern state. At the same time, the French would have to agree to encouraging and fostering to a greater extent than heretofore the full autonomy of this state so that it would acquire in a matter of years enough national consistency to resist subversion from the North. To make this solution politically acceptable to the French, such a state could remain within the French Union but this should be much more on the basis of British Dominion status than has been contemplated so far. While the Indochina war is unpopular in France, it is believed that stationing of forces there for a long period of time should be politically possible as long as the drain in blood would have been stopped and the financial burden greatly decreased. A similar arrangement could be worked out for Cambodia. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how the same could be done for Laos not only because it is now in part overrun by the Communists but also because of its exposed strategic position and weak defense potential, which might make it a permanent liability. At best it would seem that we could only hope for a divided Laotian state or else for the integration of southern Laos into Cambodia. While thus Siam would have a rather long common border with the northern Indo-Chinese Communist state or states, it is believed that as long as a solid non-Communist entity would remain to the east of Siam, Communist intervention therein would not be inevitable.

We should have no illusion that anything much better than the foregoing could be developed in negotiations with the Communists concerning a “political settlement” in the Far East unless a vast improvement in the situation in Indochina is achieved through military operations exceeding those presently envisaged. Whether the foregoing would be acceptable would also depend to a large extent upon what might be considered an acceptable settlement for Korea.

1. On May 6, Knight transmitted copies of this memorandum to Counselor Douglas MacArthur II and to Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA, with the following note:

   “I am sending to you herewith some preliminary thoughts concerning the difficult problem of a political solution to the Indochina war.

   “This is a very rough memorandum for which I request your indulgence. Any and all comments will be deeply appreciated.” (PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “French Military Operations in Indochina”)