751G.00/1–3153: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1
1519. Rptd info Paris, Hanoi unnumbered. I saw Bao Dai at Banmethuot yesterday. Director of Imperial Cabinet, Nguyen De, met me and said mysteriously that he was afraid I would find him in state of some “moral depression”. De observed it was necessary for French to make clear statement of their intentions here. Then he said, with some circumlocution, that it was also time for Bao Dai to “take hold of things”.
In effect, I found Bao Dai in a not very cheerful frame of mind. I referred to his request presented in [by] General Hinh to Auriol for support in increasing of both the size and the responsibilities of the Viet National Army. Bao Dai said he has asked that entire military command in the south be turned over to the Vietnamese but that he would not expect to assume such responsibilities until towards the end of the year, since the Vietnamese cadres were not yet ready. I remarked that General Hinh said he thought that they could take over in about six months. Bao Dai said no, that would be impossible before the end of the year. I inquired whether at the same time he would ask that the pacification of the interior of the northern delta be made the sole responsibility of Viet national army. Bao Dai said that would be some time in the future after completion of pacification of the south. He went on to say that until some such large area was turned over to his troops, the Vietnamese people would have no confidence in French promises of independence. He then embarked on long complaint about the delays of French in authorizing formation of Viet army and then, when that was finally decided upon, their hesitations and reluctance to allow it autonomous responsibility in any sectors. The French High Command had promised to form full division in the southern plateau region, but instead of ten battalions, he had been unable to have more than six or seven. He had urged on the French Command the necessity of sending in at least one extra battalion so that they could clean the Vietminh out of Qui Nhon. It could easily have been done year ago when Vietminh were poorly organized in that province. However, the failure to put enough troops in there had allowed the Vietminh organize and maintain attack on Anh Khe last week, which had been repulsed but only after losses of valuable equipment and 300 killed, [Page 375] including one Frenchman and seven Vietnamese officers. Thereupon the French had tardily sent insufficient battalions, but Vietminh had made good their escape. It was doubtful that French would be able to catch up with them in near future.
I observed that it seemed to me quite possible that French would agree to autonomous Viet responsibility in the south and particularly since the date of taking over was set some time in advance. Bao Dai answered that they would probably agree in principle but they would thereafter throw all kinds of “spokes in the wheel” to prevent its realization. Too many French interests were reluctant to see purely Vietnamese victory in the south. I argued against this attitude but Bao Dai preferred to remain pessimistic. He went on to say that he had obtained more concessions from French than Ho Chi Minh had and by patience and persistence had been successful in progressively extorting further concessions. He had been criticized for not taking over reins of authority and making appeal for national sacrifices, but he could not do so until some such action as taking over exclusive military responsibility in Cochin China would persuade people that sacrifices would really be for national independence.
He asked me what I thought of the elections. He made no comment on my opinion that they had had very good morale and political effect throughout Vietnam. I inquired how rapidly he would move on to having elections for the provincial legislatures and the National Assembly. Bao Dai replied that such steps should be taken only after very careful consideration. There was no point in electing National Assembly and then few months later dismissing it as King of Cambodia had done, because it was not acting in national interest. He observed with some signs of pleasure the King of Cambodia had been too precipitate. (Bao Dai was obviously rather glad over the recent difficulties of his brother Monarch who had been held up to him as an example.) Bao Dai told me that the selections had been practically forced on him by Tam. Tam on December 12 had given press interview stating that communal elections would be held without previous consultation with Bao Dai. Only on December 20 had Tam submitted election decrees for signature.
Bao Dai said that, since in his Tet speeches and in “editorials” on the Dalat Radio, he had announced elections would be held, he was in no position to refuse to sign the decrees, although he thought the matter was being too greatly hurried.
To my inquiry as to his health, he said that he had lost nine kilos as result of the severe treatment he had been undergoing and remarked treatment would last several months more. He said food available in Vietnam was not suitable to build back his strength. Vegetables lacked “quality” (calcium deficiency).
[Page 376]After taking leave of Bao Dai, Nguyen De cornered me and in great secrecy showed me the reply to Bao Dai’s letter to President Auriol, which General Hinh had brought back. The letter was couched in polite but not particularly cordial terms, indicated that French Government was disposed to consider increasing both size and responsibilities of Vietnamese army but that the matter could only be decided on ground with HICOM and the French High Command. (Nguyen De evidently took this statement as slap at Bao Dai’s action in going over head of HICOM and General Salan to President Auriol.) De then drew my attention to one of the concluding paragraphs which he characterized as bad blunder.
In effect, it said that, while they sympathized with Bao Dai’s wishing exercise local area military responsibilities, they suggested that he exercise greater national responsibility and to that end take up prolonged residence in Hanoi. De asserted that such a statement should never have been put in writing. The French of all people should realize the importance of “face” to the oriental. He agreed that Bao Dai should really go to work, but for him now to go Hanoi would seem like giving in to French orders. In effect, the paragraph was an unwise and untactful criticism of Bao Dai’s quiescence and was deeply resented by latter.
I agreed with De that it would have been wiser to have made the the suggestion orally. De went on to say, however, that Bao Dai must disregard such annoyances and really go to work. He made suggestion that I should see him more frequently and exhort him to that end.
- This telegram was transmitted in two parts.↩