751G.00/1–2953
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Allison ) to the Secretary of State 1
Subject:
- Certain Additional Considerations Regarding Indochina
This memorandum is designed to supplement the two memoranda2 already sent you regarding Indochina and to submit for your background, [Page 373] but not for use in conversation with the French, certain additional considerations.
Most recent information from Paris indicates that the French at the highest working level (Alphand of Foreign Office and Clermont-Tonnerre of Finance) are thinking in terms of urging that we give thought to a revision of our legislation which would make a much greater range of French expenditures in Indochina eligible for U.S. assistance than is possible under present legislation. The idea is to find a way in which the Indochina budget can be dealt with in a manner different from and presumably more liberal (from the point of view of U.S. aid) than is the case of France’s NATO commitments.
We in FE are increasingly concerned at the time element in relation to the military stalemate in Indochina. It is certain that the French people will not support indefinitely or indeed for perhaps more than another two or three years the current drain in treasure and manpower there. Furthermore, it may well be asked how long the power of decision as to continuing the struggle will remain in French hands. When present plans are carried out the total number of men under arms in Indochina will be well over 900,000 of whom only some 70,000 are French. There is considerable war-weariness there also, compounded with skepticism as to French intentions and abilities. Is it not conceivable that if the present stalemate continues for another couple of years, a “peace formula” might have such appeal to the armed natives on both sides that they would accept and impose a formula which would in effect result in the domination of Indochina by our enemies?
The French army leadership in Indochina is, it is believed, making maximum use of the offensive capabilities at its disposal within the limits of current French military thinking. Nevertheless, on the political side there are factors which perhaps influence adversely French thinking regarding the aggressive conduct of the war. Among these are:
- 1.
- The thought that if the Viet Minh were to be really threatened with serious defeat by Franco-Vietnamese successes, the Chinese Communists would invade in force to save their allies and that this would spell disaster for our side. It is difficult to pin the French down on this; we tried when M. Letourneau was here last summer with indifferent success. This thought is related also to the French fear of the effect of an armistice in Korea on Chinese Communist potentialities for action in Indochina and for assisting the Viet Minh.
- 2.
- There is a Micawberish feeling in some French circles that somehow “la situation mondiale” will be cleared up and that Indochina will benefit from this. Such a feeling that something will turn up is not conducive to a dynamic approach. This view should be sternly fought; there is no “situation mondiale” apart from the various specific tests of strength, military and political, in which we are engaged.
Any broad solution can only be a reflection of our success or lack of it in these specific contests.