Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751J.00/12–3052

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

secret

[Washington,] December 30, 1952.

Subject:

• Viet Minh Capabilities and the Threat to Laos

1. In reply to a telegram from the Department, we have had replies from Saigon, Hanoi, and Vientiane concerning the seriousness of the Viet Minh threat to Laos in view of recent military operations. The replies cover talks with French civil and military authorities as well as indigenous sources where appropriate.

2. All sources believe that the Viet Minh possess the capability of taking the Lao town of Sam Neua, about 30 miles into Northeast Laos from the Tonkinese border, but all agree that further action in Laos is unlikely in the near future. It was generally felt that a drive into Laos would be more for the propaganda value than for the intention of gaining and holding more ground.

3. General de Linares thinks that the Viet Minh campaign in the Thai country is drawing to a close (based on troop movements), but a success at Sam Neua might take the sting out of the Viet Minh failure at Nasan.

4. In discounting a drive into Laos, the lack of strong pressure for some time and the movement of major troop units are immediate factors. More fundamental are the factors of terrain, supply over a long distance, and an unfriendly population.

5. While generally optimistic, none of the sources would expressly deny the capability of the Viet Minh to undertake such a drive, difficult as it would be. The French commander in Laos recalled that the Japanese during the Second World War had unexpectedly made just such a march, from Sam Neua southeast to Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang.

6. Although Vientiane reports general confidence in not only the ability of the defending forces, in the event of a continued Viet Minh drive, but in the willingness of the local population to resist, Hanoi states that Lao troops (2 battalions) at Dien Bien Phu deserted to their homes when the French abandoned the post. A French archeologist recently returned from Laos also believes that the Lao cannot be counted on for support should the tide turn against the French Union forces. These reports, it should be added, are the first to deprecate the Lao troops and populations. Previously the French had praised their attitude and spirit, within the limits of a natural indolence.

7. Elsewhere in the Thai country of northwest Tonkin, the posts of Lai Chau and Nasan have not been threatened for over two weeks. Major action in Tonkin has been confined to Franco-Vietnamese efforts to clean out infiltrated Viet Minh units in the southeast corner of the Red River Delta.

1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director, and John I. Getz of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs. An attached map of Viet Minh dispositions is not printed.