751G.5/12–2952
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Deputy under Secretary of State (Matthews)1
Subject:
- Discussion of the Indochina Problem by a French—United States Working Group.
Problem
In Paris on December 18, Messrs. Schuman and Letourneau told the Secretary that they wished urgently to discuss with us the question of our assistance in furnishing additional arms and equipment for the use of additional indigenous troops in Indochina. The Secretary told Messrs. Schuman and Letourneau that, if the French approved, he would be glad to designate a working level group to assist in a thorough discussion of the Indochina situation with a similar French group. The French Government has now fallen. Nevertheless, a decision should be reached as to the agenda, composition of the US group and the place of meeting so as to be prepared in the event the French accept the Secretary’s offer. In any case, a discussion of the kind mentioned would appear essential at an early date.
Discussion
Put veiy briefly, the French are worried about their ability to carry their present share of the burden in Indochina while we are worried as to whether the total burden now being carried by the French and by us is sufficient to give a reasonable prospect of a favorable outcome.
There is increasing evidence of a growing belief in French governmental circles and in French public opinion generally that France cannot indefinitely or even for very much longer continue the present effort in Indochina. The French position is that, in a struggle which is mainly of interest in connection with the preservation of Southeast Asia for the free world and as a demonstration of free world determination to resist Communist aggression in that area, France can no longer be expected to continue to shoulder the entire burden of supplying nonindigenous fighting forces plus a very high share of the financial burden. (Nevertheless, sentiment in France, whether in the Government or among the Socialist opposition, for a true “internationalisation” of the conflict seems very slight; the French want more help without diminution of their responsibility.)
When the French Secretary of State for Defense, M. Chevigne, recently visited Indochina he told a number of Vietnamese that 1953 [Page 333] would be the last year during which French military support to Vietnam at its present level could be expected. The French have already slightly reduced the French Union forces in Indochina this year. They contemplate a further slight reduction next year. The French program involves an increasing transfer of military and security responsibilities in Indochina to the Vietnamese national army and Government and appears to be predicated on the assumption that the Vietnamese will be able within a definite if unstated period to cope with the enemy.
On the other hand, United States governmental and public opinion is becoming increasingly concerned with prospects in Indochina. The results of the military operations since October have destroyed whatever optimism may have existed regarding the possibility of a prompt settlement. There is a growing realization of the great strength of the Viet Minh military forces and of the importance attached to those forces by the Chinese Communists as evidenced by the aid being furnished by them. There is a full measure of appreciation of and admiration for the efforts and sacrifices being made by the French. Nevertheless it appears increasingly doubtful whether those efforts and sacrifices are being made in the framework of an over-all program which (short of a Chinese Communist invasion which would create an entirely different situation) affords a reasonable prospect of a successful termination of the struggle. We here simply do not know and have therefore had no opportunity to appraise such French plans as may exist for the defeat or at least the diminution of the enemy’s strength to a point where the non-Communist Vietnamese can really handle the situation as projected by the French. The gaps in our information are not so much in matters of detail as they are in the over-all appraisal of the situation and prospects by the highest French authorities.
It has, for example, been quite evident on the basis of operations so far this year, that the French military commanders in the field do not have available sufficient forces to maintain the initiative. The mobile forces available to the French commanders have been seriously decreased as a result of the siege of Na San. The fact that the French command is today favorably considering plans for both an important increase in the regular national army of Vietnam and the arming of militia troops at the village level is a clear indication of the French realization that unless more troops are put in the field on our side we can not hope to cope with the enemy or to maintain the initiative.
Thus we are confronted with (1) France’s unwillingness and perhaps inability to continue indefinitely to play her present vital part in the struggle in Indochina; (2) the probable absence of any program based on existing or immediately prospective resources and capabilities [Page 334] which gives reasonable promise of the destruction or at least an important reduction of enemy strength; and (3) the probability of an early formalization of a French appeal for added US aid in equipping increased numbers of indigenous troops. (M. Letourneau and others feel strongly that the aid commitments made last June have not been fully honored.)
We must, on the basis of the above, determine not only whether to give additional aid but also whether there is a reasonable prospect that the aid we are extending, particularly in weapons and equipment, is in fact contributing to a probable favorable solution and will not fall eventually into the hands of the enemy. The element of calculated risk cannot of course be absent from this problem. But we should and can avoid uncalculated risk.
Recommendations
These are divided between Questions for Discussion, Proposed Composition of the Working Group and The Location of the Talks.
Questions for Discussion
The current program in Indochina includes military, political and economic factors. Under present circumstances, the strengthening of the military effort on our side would appear to be the basic consideration to success in political or economic directions. Therefore, the military questions which it is recommended be explored in the proposed Franco-American working group discussions are listed first below with the reservation that a clear-cut distinction between military and political items is obviously impossible.
The questions which it is recommended be taken up are as follows (subject to refinement and restatement by the US working group when constituted):
- (a)
- Military
- (1)
- Has the course of operations so far this year modified the views of the French High Command as to the prospect, under present conditions, of defeating or at least considerably reducing the enemy?
- (2)
- If the answer to the above question is affirmative, what additional forces and other means including aircraft, infrastructure, etc., does the French High Command believe would be necessary to achieve the result desired, assuming of course that the enemy continues to be dependent entirely upon indigenous manpower?
- (3)
- In view of the course of operations this year and assuming a generally recognized need for additional forces, does the French High Command intend to modify whatever program may have existed for the gradual reduction of the French Union expeditionary corps?
- (4)
- Assuming the need for additional forces, where do the French believe they can be secured?
- (5)
- Pending the availability of additional native troops of good quality, and in view of the recent NATO resolution and of the fact that the US and possibly other countries are using draftees in Korea to fight the battle of the free world there, would it not be possible to contemplate at least a limited and temporary use of French conscripts in Indochina?
- (6)
- Do the French envisage that the forces of the French Union will remain in Vietnam until the Vietnamese forces are demonstrably in a position to cope with the situation? (Any increased US assistance would presumably involve at least some such commitment from the French. And the US may wish, after the problem has been fully studied, to insist on an increase in French Union forces in Indochina.)
- (7)
- Could a closer contact be established between our military authorities in Korea and the French military authorities in Indochina on such matters as training and exchange of intelligence regarding Chinese Communist activities?
- (8)
- What is the present French attitude toward the accreditation of a US liaison officer to the French General Staff in the Far East (particularly to the Plans and Operations Section of the General Staff)?
- (9)
- When do the French plan to create a Vietnamese National Air Force?
- (b)
- Political
- (1)
- Are both countries in full agreement that retention of all of Indochina as part of the free world is in fact essential militarily and politically if we are to prevent Communist domination of Southeast Asia?
- (2)
- Is the French Government therefore willing to study the Indochina problem not only on the basis of the US bearing a greater share of the present burden but also on the basis of an increase in the total effort to be made in Indochina by France and US?
- (3)
- In view of the necessity of obtaining a maximum of indigenous nationalist support for the struggle against Communist aggression, would the French be willing to explore with us and with the British the possibility of a tripartite statement setting forth the activities and aims of the three powers in Southeast Asia and expressing their conviction that peace and security in the area are obtainable, once Communist aggression has been defeated, only through the exercise of complete sovereignty by the peoples of the area? (Such a tripartite statement might have considerable political value, particularly in the framework of an increased military effort, while any further French unilateral statement would generally be interpreted as a sign of weakness.)
- (4)
- What are the French plans for the reorganization of French political representation in Indochina during the coming year? To what extent will these plans promote the Vietnamese sense of political responsibility by emphasizing France’s abandonment of the role of direct administration?
- (5)
- What is the present French view of the effect of a military victory for our side in Indochina on the prospects of Chinese Communist [Page 336] aggression? (Letourneau made quite a point of this last summer.)
- (6)
- In view of progress in the formation of the Vietnamese National Army and the increasing role in the military and political direction of the war to be assumed by the Vietnamese Government, would it not be desirable to plan for direct accreditation of a US supply mission to the Vietnamese Defense Ministry?
- (c)
- Economic
- (1)
- To what extent do the French believe financial contribution of the Associated States to the support of their own armies might be increased through increased taxation and tax reform?
- (2)
- Would it not be possible to draw up a program of public works and relief activities which would employ large numbers of persons in doubtful areas, without interfering with military recruiting, and hence make a real political contribution in addition to the obvious economic advantage? (MSA/Saigon has views on this point.)
Proposed Composition of the Working Group
When the French accept the offer made to them by the Secretary, we will presumably be hearing from them about the composition of their own group. On the assumption that this will be at the working rather than the ministerial level and assuming further that it is desirable to have the respective groups as small as possible, the following suggestions are submitted:
Defense—Maj. Gen. J. S. Bradley2 or someone designated by him; also someone designated by Gen. Trapnell who is Chief of MAAG, Saigon.
State—A representative of the Saigon Embassy, perhaps Al Wellborn; a representative of the Paris Embassy; a representative of EUR; a representative of FE; and a representative of S/P.
The Secretary indicated that Mr. Harriman’s office should also be represented.
The above adds up to eight members.
It is recommended that the US group be constituted and begin to study the definite formulation of just what we wish to obtain from the talks as soon as possible.
Location of Talks
It is believed important that the conversations take place in Paris rather than in Saigon. What is desired is the thinking in France at the highest working level rather than more information on the day-to-day tactical situation in Indochina. Furthermore, US–French bilateral talks in Saigon would immediately raise the question of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian participation; we are not yet at the stage where such participation would be valuable.