751G.00/12–1552

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1

top secret

Recent Developments in Indochina

During the past few weeks there has been little change in the military situation. Some 10,000 French Union troops are still beleaguered at Na San but enemy pressure is light and there have been no recent heavy attacks. The French airlift is functioning normally. We are completing arrangements to expedite deliveries of certain much needed planes and also to arrange for maintenance of transport planes which have been under unexpectedly heavy use. Nevertheless, the initiative appears to remain with the enemy instead of with our side as we had hoped when this year’s campaign opened. The prospects for any real military progress are dim. There are in addition reports of enemy movements toward Laos. These, taken in conjunction with reported Communist activities in Thailand, open disagreeable possibilities which we are carefully investigating.

The Vietnamese Government is showing increasing political vitality. The new Governor of North Vietnam is taking energetic means to clean up the administration. He has proposed a substantial increase in [Page 318] Home Guards and there is some evidence that the French are abandoning their previous negative attitude toward arming any but professional soldiers. Prime Minister Tam is proceeding with a project, not yet publicly announced, to hold local elections where possible at the end of January 1953.

Proposals for an increase of 40 battalions in the National Army have been advanced by General Alessandri who is Bao Dai’s military adviser. These plans have been favorably reported on by General Salan. There is general agreement as to the necessity for increasing the armed forces available on the Franco-Vietnamese side if military progress is to be made.

It has become increasingly clear in recent weeks that a careful reexamination of the Indochina situation is called for. On the one hand, the prospects of an early defeat of the Vietminh have become dimmer. On the other, the French will probably indicate to the Secretary in Paris2 that they do not feel able to continue to bear their present share of the burden in Indochina. There is rising uneasiness in French governmental and political circles.

Such discussions as we have had with the Pentagon indicate that we have no clear idea of French views as to the military situation. There is a serious gap in our current information. The existing assumption that the French would, at the same time that they were creating indigenous Vietnamese forces and gradually diminishing their own forces, be able to destroy or at least seriously reduce the potential of the enemy is unsupported by currently available information, nor is it by any means clear that the indigenous Vietnamese forces being created would be able alone to maintain even the unsatisfactory present stalemate.

The Secretary at Paris can obviously make no commitments regarding future American aid. It has, however, been suggested to him that he reiterate our appreciation of what the Franco-Vietnamese forces are doing in this fight against Communist aggression in Indochina and that he state his belief in the necessity for a thorough re-examination of the current and prospective military, political and economic situation in order that the new administration in Washington may have a firm base on which to formulate decisions. If Mr. Schuman agrees the Secretary would express his willingness to explore the possibility of setting up a working level group to meet with a similar French group for this purpose.

There is attached a copy of London’s telegram No. 3336 of December 153 giving conclusions and recommendations regarding Indochina [Page 319] reached at a conference of British representatives in Southeast Asia held under the chairmanship of Malcolm MacDonald. FE finds this analysis to run very close to the lines of its own thinking. Ambassador Heath has been asked for his comments thereon.4

The Secretary in Paris will also be approached by the French regarding the implementation of a recommendation by the recent Five-Power Military Conference for the establishment of a liaison staff organization for Southeast Asia. The Secretary will be able to reply along lines which, while not entirely responsive to the French request for an immediate meeting of representatives of the five Commanders in the area, will, we hope, indicate to them a willingness on our part to set up liaison facilities.

  1. A copy of this memorandum was transmitted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, to John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, with a brief covering note dated Dec. 17, which indicated that the memorandum had been prepared for Under Secretary David Κ. E. Bruce. (PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Bonsal Memos”)
  2. Secretary of State Acheson attended the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 15–18.
  3. Supra.
  4. Comments by Ambassador Heath are contained in telegram 1248 from Saigon, Dec. 20, p. 325.