751G.5/12–1152: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1179. Rptd info Paris 184, London 17. We can appreciate that current difficult military situation in which French find themselves in North Vietnam gives rise to heart searchings mentioned by De Margerie (Paris tel 3315, Dec 5 to Dept rptd Saigon) which are susceptible to provoke comments with pessimistic overtones.
We believe, however, that it is dangerous for French to even toy with idea that strategic interest cld be met by holding only South Vietnam or in any way cutting commitments in IC. Not only is Tonkin key to SEA from military point of view, but withdrawal to South Vietnam wld be politically disastrous. Rumors to effect French prepared abandon north which considered region of virulent nationalism and of secondary economic importance to French, to hold south where bulk of French wealth located, has been one of most persistent rumors bruited by Viets. Such an alleged plan has often been linked with rumors of French negotiations with Commies for settlement which wld leave French considerable measure of control in south. Withdrawal wld go long way to reinforcing Vietnamese suspicions of essential trickiness of French policy.
We are also somewhat concerned over French readiness to assert they struggling “alone” in IC and their tendency to pose question of IC as primarily one for solution through French, British, US joint action. This approach tends to overlook substantial contribution US is making and role which peoples Associated States must play in arriving at solution.
[Page 314]At present there is urgent need to get more active participation of Vietnamese in affairs their country and to get more Vietnamese manpower into the fight. General Alessandri has been working on plan to increase number of Vietnamese under arms (Embtel 1086, Nov 26);1 plan which has been approved in principle by Letourneau and Salan. General Trapnell has been thinking along same lines and had evolved plan somewhat along lines that formulated by General Alessandri.2 General Hinh in conversation with US ARMA stressed urgency developing native forces and outlined plan therefor. One of main objectives Governor Tri is development and expansion of militia in North Vietnam (Embtel 1153, Dec 5).
At this time when difficulties of military campaign may induce pessimism among French and tendency to resort to US for help we suggest that endeavour on our part to channel French and Viet attention to constructive programs designed to utilize Viet potential and to make Viet shoulder their share of responsibility wld be more to point. Programs for increasing Viet armed forces which raise such ancillary problems as psychological warfare for development of proper morale in such forces, increase of taxation to support increased army and the betterment of govt administration, provide fertile field for joint efforts by France, ourselves and Associated States govts.