Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

JCS Records, CCS.092 Asia (6–25–48), sec. 36

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
JCS 1992/192

[Washington,] 5 December 1952.

The Current Situation in Indochina

Reference: J.C.S. 1992 series

the problem

1. In the light of current events to evaluate the situation in Indochina.

discussion

2. See Enclosure.

conclusions

3. The forces of Viet Minh continue to hold the initiative.

4. Present military operations in northwestern Tonkin have little strategic effect on the over-all situation in Indochina.

5. The French airlift appears capable of adequately supplying the French Union Forces in Northwest Tonkin provided it is not interrupted by weather or enemy action. Even though the airlift fails a sizable portion of the forces could probably escape.

6. If the French should lose all the forces now in Northwest Tonkin the loss of personnel and equipment would be significant, although not critical.

7. The loss of Northwest Tonkin to the Communists would be of great potential propaganda value to the Viet Minh. If this loss of Northwest Tonkin should also include large numbers of French forces there would be an appreciable drop in the morale of the French Union Forces and the peoples of Indochina. Moreover, in this latter case there probably would be political repercussions in France.

8. Despite the development of the Associated States Armies no significant change in the relative strengths of the opposing forces is foreseen.

9. It is believed that the Chinese Communists will not invade Indo-china during the period from now through mid-1953.

10. The outlook in Indochina through April 1953 is for a continued stalemate.

11. A French withdrawal from Indochina is not likely in the foreseeable future.

12. It appears unlikely that France will increase its present commitments to Indochina. At present United States aid to France in Indochina is not sufficient to resolve the situation.

13. Native Vietnamese forces are not capable of becoming self-sufficient in the foreseeable future, even with aid very much greater than at present available or presumably forthcoming. Without substantial French support in training and in the field and without French forces in active operations, the native armed forces cannot be expected to offer effective resistance to the Viet Minh.

recommendation

14. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions contained in paragraphs 3 through 13 above and the discussion contained in the Enclosure hereto.

[Here follows the Enclosure, 18 pages of discussion.]

1. On Dec. 12, 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the conclusions contained in paragraphs 3 through 13 and the discussion contained in the enclosure to this document. The enclosure is not printed here.