751G.5/12–552: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State
3315. Rptd info Saigon 117, London unnumbered. De Margerie1 indicated today that uncertain military situations such as that now prevailing in Na San always caused public and parliamentary heart-searching here on Indochina problem and that at present moment this was particularly acute. There was an unusual amount of questioning as to what if anything could be done to bring about an ultimate satisfactory solution, whether France should continue struggle and if so, where. He said there was universal agreement in France on only one point: namely, that if France were to continue struggle, she could not do it “alone.”
He recognized that US could not possibly make any basic decisions on such questions as this until new administration had gotten into saddle but he felt it important that US, UK and French Govts begin [Page 311] intensive and realistic political and military studies now with view to reaching decisions at next tripartite meeting, presumably in March or April. As indicative of type of questions to be considered, he mentioned whether Indochina was in fact essential either militarily or politically to preventing Communist domination of Southeast Asia? Could western strategic interests be adequately met by holding offshore island chain? What would be effect of French withdrawal from north and center to concentrate on holding only the south? Would it be possible to make major short-term military effort to wipe out Viet-Minh pocket between northern and central strongpoints and establish single front between them? Would there be any possibility of “borrowing” US and UK planes, carriers and naval vessels from Korea or elsewhere in connection with that or similar operations?
There was no element whatever of blackmail in his discussions; it was simply expression of conviction that three govts would have to do some very serious thinking individually and collectively and face up to difficult decisions few months hence. He did express hope that tripartite staff organization could be gotten under way as quickly as possible (see Embtel 3314).2