Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/11–1852

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1952.

Subject:

• Report on my visit to Indochina.

Itinerary

I was in Indochina from October 5 to October 17, both dates inclusive. I spent two days in Cambodia, three in Hanoi, had lunch Vientiane (Laos) and was in Saigon the rest of the time.

List of People Seen

I saw most of our own people including especially the Ambassador and Fred Bartlett¹ who were with me on most of my trips. I was staying with Ambassador and Mrs. Heath on the occasion of the most recent plot to assassinate the Ambassador. I have only the highest praise for the calm and unruffled manner in which they went through this disagreeable experience. The Ambassador took me to Phnom Penh and Hanoi. I spent a day with Fred Bartlett visiting MSA projects in two provinces south of Saigon. Mr. Pickering² gave me a briefing on USIS activities. I also had a MAAG briefing by Col. Whisner³ in the absence of General Trapnell. This briefing included presentations from the Army, Navy and Air Corps representatives in MAAG.

Vietnamese Officials—I saw the Prime Minister (Nguyen Van Tam) and the Defense Minister (Nghiem Van Tri) on several occasions. I also saw the Foreign Minister (Truong Vinh Tong) and a number of other cabinet members. I saw two Chefs de Province in Cochinchina.

In the north I spent a day with the then Governor Pham Van Binh. He took us to see emergency relief work (with American aid) in a number of villages. We also visited a village in which the Gamo was completing its task and witnessed the transfer of a fort from the French Expeditionary Force to the Vietnamese military and civil authorities. I saw many local officials and notables, including two Chefs de Province.

French Civil Authorities—M. Letourneau returned a couple of days before my departure. I had lunch with him and he joined a discussion which I had later that afternoon with his assistant, Janot, and his diplomatic adviser, Offroy, whom I saw several times. I also saw something of Gautier, the Governor General, as well as Cheysson who is currently a special adviser to Prime Minister Tam. I also saw the French Commissioner in Cambodia (M. Risterucci) and in Laos (M. Pereyra). In Hanoi I had dinner with Lamarque who is civil adviser to General Linares.

French Military Authorities—I had a long and most interesting visit with Gen. Salan whom I saw on a number of other occasions. His chief of staff, Gen. Allard, was most helpful. Allard’s G–2, Col. Boussary, gave the Ambassador and myself a thorough military briefing. Thanks to Allard I met a number of subordinate officers under informal circumstances.

In the north Gen. Linares and his chief of staff, Gen. Berchoux, were most helpful. Gen. Berchoux flew our party around the Hanoi defense perimeter. That afternoon Gen. Linares took us with him on a visit to a current military operation between Nam Dinh and Phat Diem. We drove around by jeep and walked a certain amount. We flew close enough to the operation to get a good bouncing from a couple of projectiles which I thought at first were hostile but which I was later told were probably from French artillery. We also saw a good deal of Gen. Cogny who was Gen. Delattre’s aide; he is now in command at Haiduong.

Other persons I saw—Thanks to Al Wellborn I met a half dozen of the leading “attentistes” of Saigon. I had a lengthy dinner meeting with them. Thanks to Paul Sturm in Hanoi, I dined with Nguyen Huu Tri who has since become governor of North Vietnam.

My Impressions

My impressions are summarized below; they represent my personal views.

1. The enemy is extremely powerful.

The courage, leadership and initiative which the Viet Minh has been able to mobilize over the past eight years under often adverse conditions is truly amazing. This is a war involving literally hundreds of thousands of regular soldiers on both sides. The Viet Minh is said to have nearly 400,000 men under arms of whom perhaps 160,000 are “regulars”. The remainder are divided between regional troops and so-called “populaires”. The latter are peasants by day and snipers, guerrilla fighters and saboteurs by night. It is hard to estimate the number of militant sympathizers on the enemy side but it is very considerable. The enemy also terrorizes large numbers into collaboration.

A glance at the latest intelligence map showing the zones of influence of the two sides indicates that the French claim complete control over only a few small areas outside of the principal cities of Saigon and Hanoi. The largest of those areas is the Province of Bentre south of Saigon. The French are, of course, able to move over large areas and in convoy, to utilize most of the principal roads or railroads in the most important parts of the country. Yet even in areas where the French do control major activities, guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism are prevalent. There are large areas of the country completely controlled by the Viet Minh. Some of these areas such as Than Hoa are rich in rice and constitute important support areas for the carrying on of the war. The enemy has been in relatively undisputed control of these for some years now.

In these latter areas, the enemy must possess a very considerable military, economic and political administrative headquarters. Certainly his activities show every evidence of coordination of a high order yet his “capital” presents no vulnerable target; it is believed to be spread out over thirty kilometers of caves, dug-outs and camouflaged structures northwest of Hanoi (perhaps near Thai Nguyen).

In summary, the enemy remains a formidable going concern.

2. Franco-Vietnamese resistance to the Viet Minh constitutes a remarkable performance.

It is reasonable to suppose that, when Peking and presumably Moscow decided to arm and train the Viet Minh on the present scale, they hoped and believed that the Viet Minh would drive the French Expeditionary force into the sea. Indeed, there was a moment two years ago when it appeared that this might be possible. The magnificent Franco-Vietnamese reaction under Gen. Delattre’s inspiring leadership is too well known to require retelling. The rebuilding of the French fortifications in the Hanoi perimeter, where the former posts were rendered obsolete as a result of the enemy’s acquisition of bazookas, mortars and light artillery, was a truly remarkable feat.

I was tremendously impressed at what I saw of the French Army from such leaders as Generals Salan, Linares, Boussary, Allard and Cogny down to the commissioned and noncommissioned officers whom I saw in the field. Their morale and their physical appearance are excellent. As you know, they spend twenty-seven months at a time in Indochina. Some of them are on their third stay in that country.

I am convinced that the Indochina experience, although it has cost the French army the loss of hundreds of badly needed officers, has also greatly strengthened their army by subjecting it to the most trying combat conditions and that the army has come out of this severe test with flying colors.

I found throughout the most grateful appreciation of the quality, quantity and significance of our assistance.

3. The war is currently progressing favorably from our point of view.

Without going into a detailed analysis of current military operations, it can be said that generally speaking the tide of war is running in our direction. The enemy losses, particularly in trained officers, were extremely heavy during last year’s campaign. The enemy’s attempt through offensive operations to jeopardize the position of the French in the Hanoi delta failed significantly. The rebuilding of the French fortifications, referred to above, has presumably precluded any possibility of a successful enemy assault on Hanoi—in the absence of a radical change in the enemy’s armament or of a Chinese Communist invasion.

The French claim considerable success in destroying the supply roads to China through aerial bombardment. Photographs which I have seen of these bombardments do indicate remarkable results. Some French officers claim that shipments from China were suspended for several months last summer and may be still suspended owing to the damage done to roads and to the inability of the Viet Minh to receive, protect and distribute supplies. I don’t know to what extent these views may be over optimistic.

The French have also bombarded and destroyed certain irrigation works in the Thanh Hoa district south of the delta and have thereby considerably reduced the rice supply available to the enemy.

These bombardments of roads and dams make it necessary for the Viet Minh to mobilize the peasants to make repairs. This work of course is extremely hazardous and difficult owing both to the continuance of French bombardments and also owing to the dropping of delayed-action missiles, timed so as to explode at night when repair work is in progress. It is understood that the enemy is encountering considerable difficulty in recruiting labor and that his political prestige has sunk considerably in the eyes of the local population. (Governor Binh told me that the last time the Viet Minh‘s General Giap was in Thanh Hoa an attempt was made to assassinate him and in fact seven of his staff officers were killed.)

Similarly the enemy is having trouble in recruiting soldiers; prisoners taken recently have, according to French accounts, included boys of sixteen. The number of prisoners has increased of late, indicating lowered enemy morale. Furthermore, deserters from the enemy’s armed forces have recently been running at the rate of about fifty per month, a novel development.

Nevertheless, these favorable developments do not in my opinion add up to any real change in the relative strength of the adversaries or indicate any significant decrease in the enemy’s potential. The French military authorities, however, speak with some optimism and considerable mystery, of favorable prospects during the current fighting season. Several mentioned to me the possibility of “un tournant favorable” in April. They are counting upon making effective use in parachute operations of the important increment of transport planes recently arranged, but I do not get the impression that anyone really expects a decisive development.

4. The organization of the Vietnamese National Army is proceeding according to schedule but there are officer morale problems.

According to present plans a Vietnamese National Army of eight divisions should be in being by the first of January 1955. These plans are to date being executed according to schedule. There are over 5,000 French officers and noncommissioned officers serving with the Vietnamese forces for purposes of training and leadership. These forces have, I was told, given a good account of themselves in battle especially when led by French officers. They are furthermore performing important duties in connection with internal security.

Concurrently an important increase is being made in the number of home guard troops. Villagers are being supplied with rifles and are being given the responsibility of guarding their villages against Viet Minh attack.

A slow decrease in the number of French or French Union troops in Indochina has been initiated. This may involve as many as 3,000 this year out of a total of 120,000. Vietnamese troops formerly serving with the French army are being transferred quite rapidly to the Vietnamese National Army in spite of a certain reluctance on the part of some of the Vietnamese involved. At the present time on the Franco-Vietnamese side, for every French or French Union soldier there are nearly two and one-half Vietnamese soldiers.

General Salan expressed to me general satisfaction with the progress being made in the creation of the Vietnamese National Army. He said that from the technical point of view there was little difficulty. Manpower both for officers and enlisted personnel is available with suitable physical and mental attainments. The problem, however, in his judgment is one of indoctrinating the Vietnamese officers, who are quick and intelligent, with the spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice which distinguishes the French professional soldier. General Salan told me that the losses of French officers killed were running at the rate of about one per day during the first six months of this year. There was a decrease in this rate of loss during the rainy season but with the resumption of active fighting, it is going up again. These losses make apparent the difficult role which an officer must play in this type of warfare if he is to give his men effective leadership. On the other hand, during the first nine months of this year only nine Vietnamese officers were killed. Salan stressed that this was not a fair statistical comparison but he did consider it to be an indication of relative morale at the present time.

I am sure that, with our help and with the continuance of the present French training and operations program, the Vietnamese National Army will come into being as scheduled. It will be a political-military force of some importance in the general situation. I am convinced, however, that it will not be able to cope with the Viet Minh unless the force of the Viet Minh is considerably diminished before the date indicated. In fact, if the Viet Minh remains at its present strength, the pull of political magnetism will be in the direction of an absorption of the new national army through some sort of political formula which will in fact reflect a communist victory. There is thus a serious risk that the arms which we have furnished will be turned against us and will contribute to the strength of a new enemy state.

5. Vietnamese political vitality is improving but remains weak.

There is no question that Prime Minister Tam is an improvement over his predecessor Huu. Tam is a real leader. The present Minister of Defense is also able and energetic. The Minister of Information, Giao, is also said to be a man of ability but his relationships with Tam are said to be such as to greatly curtail his usefulness.

Other members of the cabinet did not make a first-rate impression. They seemed deficient in energy or in the qualities of political leadership so necessary in the present situation. Some are said to be professionally competent.

Generally speaking the Vietnamese Government is very strongly oriented toward France. Four of the cabinet members have European wives. Most of them have had close connections with the French Administration prior to the present war. People with a true nationalist background, i.e., people who may be expected to take a definite role in the new Vietnamese state after the present war are a distinct minority. Symptomatic in this respect is the Chief of the Province of Mytho whom I saw. He has had twenty-eight years of service in the civil administration, was taken over by the Vietnamese Government from the French civil service and looks forward to an early retirement. He is I am sure an able and competent administrator but not a dynamic political force.

The Vietnamese officials with whom I spoke were unanimous in their desire for the complete independence of their country and they expressed-confidence that as soon as the war was over the French would depart leaving the question of Franco-Vietnamese relations to be settled in accordance with the will of the Vietnamese people. They all recognized that without the French army the independence of the country from communism would be unattainable. Yet all these officials stated that they would not have participated in the Vietnamese Government unless they had been sure that the French would leave after the war. (The conversation which I had with former Prime Minister Huu was most disillusioning. He expressed great bitterness over the form of his dismissal and is doing everything he can to draw himself away from the present situation and from the French whom he denounces in the harshest terms. He is also extremely anti-Bao Dai. The fact that this former Prime Minister feels it possible to divorce himself so entirely from the cause with which he was identified is revealing.)

There is a considerable amount of good work being done by the Vietnamese Government. I was impressed with the health and agriculture officials whom I met. I was told that the Gamos are doing an aggressive and intelligent job, but there are not enough of them. The Gamos are groups of generally young Vietnamese men and women who go into liberated villages in order to attend to emergency political, military and administrative requirements. They feed the villagers, root out communists, locate arms caches, set up reliable local administration and home guards and then turn the village over to the regular authorities.

But there is not enough faith and energy on our side. One cannot help feeling that at present the major part of the energy and leadership of Vietnam is either in the enemy camp or waiting on the sidelines to see who is going to win.

The Vietnamese Government has failed, I believe, to draw in a very large number of people from the sidelines. My meeting with the “attentistes” was most discouraging in this respect. These people, mostly intelligent and able members of that bourgeoisie which would be presumably destroyed by the Viet Minh, spoke most emphatically of their distrust of France and of their feeling that France does not intend to relinquish political control of the country after the present emergency. Since France is certainly arming the Vietnamese at an increasing pace and contemplates the early constitution of a wholly Vietnamese officered force and since it should be evident that France is incapable for a much longer period of maintaining the military effort required to hold Indochina, these allegations of lack of confidence in France are really an expression, in my judgment, of doubt as to who is going to win the war.

In summary, at present the Vietnamese political struggle does not have sufficient vitality to promote or to give hope of an acceptable, i.e., a non-communist political solution of the present situation. Such leadership and energy as it displays can often be traced to French sources. The widespread corruption believed to exist at most echelons in the regime contrasts markedly with the reputation for austerity which the Viet Minh has achieved.

It is surprising how easy it is to discuss the political situation in Vietnam without mentioning Bao Dai. Bao Dai‘s failure to take a truly active role in the situation is distressing. Perhaps he may change his tactics on his return to Vietnam after several months in France but no one is very optimistic. The only bright spot politically is the removal of Bao Dai‘s close friend Binh as governor of North Vietnam and his replacement by Tri who is a leader of a party which was formerly of considerable importance from a nationalistic point of view. But even there Tam is said to have been the main architect of the change rather than Bao Dai. I believe that Bao Dai continues to be potentially an important factor but that he is losing ground as a result of his own inactivity and indolence. Is it possible, as someone remarked to me, that the Emperor is the leading “attentiste” in the country?

In summary, the present Vietnamese Government depends for its existence on French armed strength. It will have no effective strength if the French depart leaving the Viet Minh militarily as strong as it is at present.

6. Doubt as to the ultimate military outcome is the principal factor in the current situation.

At every turn in my examination of the situation in Indochina, I was struck by the degree to which doubt as to the ultimate military outcome exercises a paralyzing effect on developments in the political field which might be favorable to us. The large number of “attentistes” who spoke of lack of confidence in France’s ultimate intentions really lack confidence in the ability of the Franco-Vietnamese forces to defeat the Viet Minh. No reasonable man can have any illusions as to the ability of the French to continue to maintain a colonial relationship with Indochina; they are through and they know it. All this talk about lack of confidence in France’s political intentions really shows lack of confidence in Franco-Vietnamese military capabilities.

I do not claim to know whether in the long run stable non-communist governments can exist on the perimeter of a dynamic Communist China in the absence of clear-cut Western guarantees that external invasion of or internal aggression supported from abroad against these non-communist countries will be met with force. I am confident, however, that a defeat of the present communist forces in Indochina affords the only prospect for the constitution of a really viable and dependable non-communist government in Vietnam. Such a government could be constituted if and when the Viet Minh is militarily diminished to a point where the Vietnamese National Army could match it in the field. Such a government would have to draw upon the talents available in the ranks of the present “attentistes”; it would probably have to throw overboard a number of politicians and officials too closely identified with France. It would in the long run, if it showed political sagacity, draw to itself a number of the non-communist elements which may have been misled or coerced into support of the Viet Minh. It would eventually aspire to become a government of national union; but unless the Viet Minh is defeated in the field the prospect is one of Communist domination of Indochina as soon as the French pull out.

7. The French approach to the military situation gives ground for apprehension.

I cannot state too emphatically my admiration for the fight which is being waged by the French army and by their Vietnamese allies under most difficult and arduous conditions. I have a very clear impression that the military leaders on our side are using the resources available to them in the most aggressive and combative manner consistent with sound strategy and tactics. They are definitely not resting on their oars.

Nevertheless, from a political point of view there are a number of factors in the thinking of the French civilian element both in Saigon and Paris which seem to me definitely disquieting. These factors may be briefly enumerated as follows:

a) Opposition to continued expenditure of French manpower and resources in Indochina is growing in France. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the French Assembly may refuse to vote any more funds to carry on the struggle in Indochina after 1954 or at most 1955. (Chevigne, a member of the French cabinet, is reported to have told Bao Dai that after 1953, France would not continue to support the defense of Vietnam at the present level.) The Assembly may demand the termination of the conflict on a basis which will permit the withdrawal of France’s military and civilian elements from the country. If this is the prospect, and I am afraid that it is, many Frenchmen will argue against conducting military operations other than as holding operations. Why increase the cost in blood and treasure? would be their argument.

b) The feeling generated among French politicians and officials due to Franco-American exchanges on American aid are not calculated to produce a dynamic approach to military operations in Indochina. When Letourneau arrived in Saigon about October 15, I found him in a petulant and discouraged mood on this score.

c) It is sometimes argued particularly in French civilian circles that if the French are too successful against the Viet Minh the result will be a Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina. I think this is probably fallacious under present circumstances but I do think that it influences some thinking and perhaps some action.

d) Then there is a vague Micawberish feeling about a possible improvement in “la situation mondiale”. This improvement would magically change the face of things in Indochina; therefore, why struggle in such a costly fashion there? This argument is indeed a false and dangerous one. It should be obvious that “la situation mondiale”, if there is such a thing, will be influenced only by the political and military progress or lack of it in the various theaters of actual conflict which make up “la situation mondiale”.

e) It is also alleged from time to time that it is useless for the French army to expand the territory it controls in Indochina as long as the Vietnamese are unable to supply the necessary administrative cadres and security forces to hold this territory against reinfiltration and subversion by the Viet Minh. This argument I think confuses cause and effect. The Vietnamese administrative cadres and security forces will be effective in carrying out their tasks and in securing the cooperation of the local population only to the degree that a confidence in ultimate victory on their side exists. It is doubt on this score which causes the major difficulties with which both the French and Vietnamese are confronted. Under present circumstances, of course, the success of any military operation should be judged not in terms of territory liberated and occupied but in terms of the extent to which it is possible to bring the enemy to combat and to inflict losses upon him.

8. Recommendation for a bilateral or possibly trilateral re-examination of the military situation in Indochina.

On the basis of the above I believe that improvement in the military situation is the only key to a real improvement of our position in Indochina. In spite of the magnificent work of the French Union Forces I do not believe that that improvement is taking place sufficiently rapidly enough to guarantee us an acceptable position when the French Union Forces withdraw. I believe that unless military progress is accelerated we run the serious risk of finding that a large part of our aid to the Vietnamese Government will fall into the hands of our Communist enemies.

I therefore recommend that as soon as the French raise with us the question of Indochina, presumably in the context of a request for further aid, we propose an immediate high level examination of the military situation with a view to answering the following questions:

a) Are the military resources and capabilities available or scheduled for our side sufficient to warrant a reasonable hope of a military decision or at least of a situation which the Vietnamese army can handle within the next two years assuming Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh remains on the present scale?

b) If the answer to (a) is negative, what additional military resources and capabilities would have to be supplied in order to assure a reasonable expectation of a decision or of a marked decrease in Viet Minh strength within the next two years under the conditions stated.

c) How could the additional capabilities and resources set forth in answer to question (b) be supplied?

I am sure that a great deal of work has been done in Saigon and Paris—and presumably also in the Pentagon—on the above questions. ButI am not aware that there has been any high level bilateral coordination of views.

It is possible that the above study might produce a negative result. If it did, we would at least know where we were and would be able to make plans accordingly; but I should think there would be a strong probability that we might get some sort of a practical answer from the military. It seems clear that if large numbers of additional ground forces are required, the US would not be in a position politically or perhaps militarily to furnish them. They would have to come from France. This would present a grave political problem for the French Government. We would have to step up our assistance heavily in all types of equipment and perhaps help transport troops to Indochina. SHAPE would probably yell its head off. But I can hardly believe that the forces needed to secure a military decision in Indochina would, for the limited time they would have to be absent from Europe, be a decisive factor in the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet invasion or that during the time contemplated a German army of any size or effectiveness would be created. Furthermore, the reaching of a military decision in Indochina would immediately relieve the French army of a great burden and permit it to play its part in Western Europe. I recognize, however, that a requirement for further ground troops in an amount of, say, more than two divisions, would raise very serious problems.

It is possible, however, that the military examination which has been suggested would reveal that the striking power and mobility of the forces presently in Indochina could be greatly stepped up through increased air power and perhaps the provision of special weapons not currently used there. I know that it is the feeling of some elements of our MAAG in Saigon that the French have not provided adequate aircraft personnel (both crews and maintenance people) to get the best possible use of the aircraft already in the country. The provision of additional transport planes which was arranged for this fall has very greatly increased the mobility of the French forces and their ability to conduct parachute operations without any very important increment of manpower. It may well be that the military will come up with some new constructive ideas of this kind.

The question arises whether the British should be invited to the proposed military discussions between ourselves and the French. I am of the opinion that they should be invited because of their interest in the general area and because of the possibility that they could contribute constructive ideas and perhaps even make certain arms and equipment available to the French. The Australians and the New Zealanders should presumably also be invited for the same reasons. I do not think that we should contemplate any qualitative change in the forces currently engaged in Indochina, i.e., the introduction of British, American or Chinese Nationalist troops.

In addition, I recommend that consideration be given to having the incoming President make a statement as soon as possible regarding the importance of the Indochina struggle. (I have already addressed a memorandum to Mr. Allison on this subject)⁴ We should also give further consideration to the French proposal of a tripartite statement regarding the intentions and objectives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in Southeast Asia. Such a statement might have distinct possibilities of usefulness.

But the major requirement of the present situation is a serious reexamination of the military situation and prospects. It is probable that the results of such a re-examination could not be available and implemented in time to influence the conduct of operations during the current fighting season which will end in May of 1953, but they should be of definite value in the next season beginning in October, 1983.

A failure to secure a clear military view of prospects and possibilities for our side and to reach decisions in consequence would be most unfortunate in view of the fact that time is definitely not on our side.

1. Frederic P. Bartlett, First Secretary of the Embassy at Saigon; Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission.
2. John E. Pickering, Information Attaché at Saigon.
3. Col. Emons B. Whisner, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group at Saigon.
4. Not identified.