Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/11–1852: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, November 18, 1952—6 p.m.

1028. Rptd info Paris unn, Hanoi unn. At Bao Dai‘s request I flew to Ban Me Thuot yesterday.

1. Nguyen De, Bao Dai‘s delegate, saw me first and, obviously acting under instructions, expressed resentment at Letourneau‘s observations to Bao Dai concerning the active leadership and mil tours of the King of Cambodia. I take it there was at least an insinuation on Letourneau‘s part that Bao Dai shld imitate his royal neighbor’s activity. Nguyen De went into a long explanation of Vietnamese attitudes towards such royal performances. Said Vietnamese had a keen intelligence and wld see through any theatrically-arranged mil campaign appearances such as the Camb King was making. Such acts did not meet their traditional canons of royal deportment. Bao Dai wld lose face thereby. Bao Dai‘s value was that of being a “symbol” and he must not impair that role by unconvincing public tours and occasional graspings of the reins of govt. Anyway, he, Nguyen De, had heard that Camb “intellectuals” were very critical of their King’s activities.

I replied I was willing to concede that conditions might be different in Vietnam, but that I felt certain that the King of Camb was doing the right thing in assuming active leadership in view of the troubled conditions that had developed in his country, that he was being successful, and his public appearances were appreciated by his subjects. I took little stock in any criticisms of unnamed Camb “intellectuals”. If those intellectuals were members of the preceding govt which the King had been obliged to dissolve, their criticisms had little standing for that govt had brought conditions in Camb to a very sorry pass. I remarked that one result of King Norodom‘s present campaign was an increase in self-confidence and interest in his country’s problems. I also remarked that I had understood Bao Dai‘s visit to the Phanthiet typhoon area had been very well received by the people. Nguyen De agreed and said that the people particularly liked Bao Dai‘s touring around informally in a jeep and his personally passing out decorations and relief to the typhoon sufferers.

When I saw Bao Dai, he also brought up the question of comparison of his performance with that of the King of Cambodia, which had apparently been not too subtly drawn by Letourneau and which evidently rankled. I talked to Bao Dai in exactly the same language I had used with Nguyen De. Evidently to show me that he was mindful of his responsibilities, Bao Dai told me that he wld visit in the next few days the typhoon area of Bienhoa near Saigon and that he wld shortly visit the Vietnamese sector of the Tonkin front. He added that he wld be quite prepared to make a prolonged stay in Tonkin and actually direct and encourage the effort there if the Vietnamese army were given full responsibility for the protection of the delta.

Comment: I think that Letourneau was well advised to cite the Camb King’s activity to Bao Dai, but I am not too sanguine that it will have immediate effect in stirring Bao Dai to greater activity.

2. Bao Dai said he had received De Chevigne, Secy of State for Fr Def Min, who had told him that Vietnam cld not count on present scale of Fr mil support beyond 1953. I said I hoped De Chevigne was wrong, that I thought it wld be very bad for the long-term interest and standing of France if there were any substantial withdrawal of Fr support and troops, as long as the battle against the Viet Minh was not won and the Chinese Communist menace remained. It wld not be possible for us to replace Fr troops and no matter what progress was made in developing Vietnamese National Army, it cld not, in the early future, hope to cope with a full-scale Chinese invasion.

Bao Dai then said that he would shortly discuss with Salan and the Fr the necessity of both increasing the size of the Viet Army and effecting economies by reducing present excessive pay scales. To make any real progress in pacification, the present schedule shld be revised to permit the addition of from 25 to 30 more Vietnamese battalions. The extra cost of this wld have to be borne by France, but it wld be an economy since it wld shorten the war and the term of necessary Fr support. I said that I agreed heartily that there shld be an increased force actually in the field against the Viet Minh. I disagreed, however, that France or others must bear all the additional cost. I was certain that by good administration and by economies throughout the govt, Vietnam cld contribute something additional. Bao Dai expressed doubt as to the possibility of an increased Viet contribution. I repeated my statement and observed that particularly in a war against the Commies, it was necessary for the Vietnamese Govt to insist on official honesty and economy. I thought that Tam had already made a beginning effort at economical administration. I also suggested, although I was not prepared to make a recommendation to that effect, that reduction of the over-valuation of the piaster might reduce cost of the Fr mil operations and thereby allow an increase in budgetary help to the Viet Govt.

3. I observed that the present govt was more efficient than the preceding one and that Tam seemed loyal to Bao Dai. I hoped that he wld remain honest. I understood his predecessor had received a rake-off from the gambling concession of Cholon which he was rumored to have put in his own pocket. I supposed that Tam was now receiving the same rake-off and I trusted that he was putting it into the budget and not in his pocket. There were no objections to his paying himself a salary sufficient to live in a manner befitting the Prime Min and to allow him to save something, but graft wld not be tolerated particularly in this national emergency. I thought Bao Dai blinked a little at my reference to the gambling concession rake-off since he receives one himself. He made no reply to this observation but went on to say that, while Tam had his confidence and he believed him loyal to date, he thought that he was a little subject to bad advice and bad influences.²

4. Thus there was a crowd around Tam, including certain Fr elements, who believed in the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by a republic. He feared that Letourneau himself had republican preferences. Bao Dai said that it was all one to him what the form of govt was. He was willing to get out as he had in 1945. All he sought was the good and the will of the country. I remarked that I felt certain that Letourneau was not trying to do away with the monarchy. When I last talked to him, he had stated with evident sincerity his conviction that the monarchy was necessary to hold Vietnam, with its sectional divisions, together.

5. As luncheJon was announced, I was unable to take up the question of the election of a National Assembly, but discussed the matter later with Nguyen De who revealed himself as frankly opposed to any early election in contrast with Tam‘s plans. Nguyen De stated that, while it was necessary to have a public forum and a legislative check on the administration, elections were too dangerous under present circumstances. What Tam shld do, he insisted, was to broaden the Provisional Assembly by including bona-fide peasants and workers and small shopkeepers. The present National Assembly was too small and composed of big landowners or former mandarins.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.

2. Telegram 1046 to Saigon, Nov. 21, read as follows: “From Allison and Bonsal. Urtel 1028. Dept agrees completely with views you so ably expounded to Bao Dai especially those in numbered paras 2 and 3.

   “We are pleased that you took opportunity of making views known in so clear and forceful a manner.” (751G.00/11–1852)