751G.00/10–152: Circular airgram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices1
The Department is aware that recent developments with respect to the Governments of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are not known or understood by many governments, including those of nearby Asian States. In order to facilitate your task in discussing Indochina with the Governments to which you are accredited, Saigon’s telegram No. 652 of September 24th is reproduced in full,2 which contains an excellent summary of recent and current developments in the three Associated States.
It is stated that many former dependent areas which now enjoy independent status are reluctant to extend diplomatic recognition to the Governments of the three States because of the continuing presence on their soil of French Union troops. It has been similarly stated that although western governments having had adequate experience with world Communism, can appreciate the position of the Governments of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam in requesting French military assistance to protect their territories against Communist aggression, Asian and Arab States are less concerned with the threat of Communism than they are with western intervention in their affairs. It is hoped that Saigon’s telegram will prove useful to our Missions in dealing with these difficult questions.
Saigon telegram No. 652 (Section 1 of 2).
“We agree that Ambassador Bowles’ interview3 was generally excellent and most helpful apart from misleading statement that ‘foreign powers are still in control of Indochina’ which fortunately not printed in local press. It hoped that Ambassador Bowles may find appropriate opportunity make additional statement making clear that Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are independent, sovereign states. Impressive recognition their independence was furnished by recent unanimous vote of non-Soviet members of Security Council (including Pakistan) for their admission into UN.4
“I suggest however that it might still be useful if Department would send to our diplomatic missions, particularly those in Asian [Page 262] countries, study or memorandum instruction addressed to clearing up widely held and sedulously propagated misconceptions that Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia are neither (a) juridically nor (b) in fact independent, sovereign states.
“As regards (a), provisions in basic accords looking toward harmonizing their foreign policy and foreign treaties with those of France do not, according to accepted international law (e.g. Hackworth Digest International Law, PP47 Seq.), impair status of three countries as fully independent states.
“Neither, with one possible exception, do the extensive preferences, privileges and safeguards conceded French Union interests and nationals in basic accords detract from juridical position of three countries as internally sovereign states.
“Possible exception to above statement is provision whereby cases involving non-Viet French Union citizens and (owing to as yet unabrogated treaty with Chinese Nationalist Government) Chinese nationals shall be tried by mixed French-Viet tribunals. Since French judges are appointed (with approval of chief of state) and paid by French Government, it may be argued that certain extra territorial rights exist. However French judges actually regarded by French as French representatives in French Union courts. French informed Cambodia (only one of three Associated States which has so far raised question) that they were ready to accord Cambodian nationals privilege of mixed courts in other parts of French Union if Cambodia desired. French defense of such privileges is that Associated States had no functioning judicial systems of own when full independence given and the new systems are not yet ready to assume full burden of disbursing justice particularly given the state of war and enemy terrorism. In Viet-Nam, mandarinal courts had been abolished. Further, neither Viet-Nam nor other states have yet completed own codes of law, and for many questions French laws still in force. This limited sharing of judicial powers also defended as temporary measure by argument international Communism aggression and cannot fulfill responsibility without some shared power to assure lawful order and security in regions behind battle lines. It is noteworthy that, in bills of complaint made by extreme Viet nationalists against French policy and influence, mixed courts are rarely mentioned.
“There is in addition the temporary circumstance that supreme military command in this war vested in French and that French command, in order meet its responsibilities, enjoys certain emergency limited powers in certain areas. Thus, port of Haiphong, principal military port, under French control. To assist in maintaining military security and public order behind battle lines, French security police still allowed function along with national security police systems [Page 263] of three states. French activities, however exercised in coordination and cooperation with security police of three governments. In general, it can be said that emergency limited and local authority of French High Command is comparable to that exercised by UN forces in Korea, is exercised with restraint and does not abate sovereignty of three countries.
“In brief, legal position of three countries as independent sovereign states cannot I believe be controverted.
“This remains fact that France by virtue of circumstance that it both defending and financing three governments, enjoys position of very great influence. Question arises whether by its influential position France does or can exercise super-sovereign powers in three countries.”
Saigon telegram No. 652 (Section 2 of 2).
“In fact, during past year or more French have not attempted exert direct governing authority. They have limited their complaints and representations even where serious governmental errors of commission and omission have impaired military effort and administration for which France paying major cost. Thus, during last six months Huu‘s Premiership, inaction of regime, Huu‘s increasing antagonism to Letourneau, and his refusal to publish budget or increase tax revenues were harming military and political situation, and French might well then have felt justified in requesting Bao Dai dissolve or change government. Bao Dai, who wanted to get rid of Huu, would probably have complied instantly with direct request (doubt he is placing ‘blame’ for his action on French). Nevertheless, no such request made. Again, in case of Cambodia, where government sympathetic to Son Ngoc Thanh anti-French agitator and former collaborator of Japanese, was steadily fomenting rebellion and anti-French manifestations, French let matters proceed with no action other than mild remonstrance to King. As situation developed to point of endangering internal order, thus favoring guerrilla activities of Viet Minh Communist forces, French stepped up their remonstrances but only to point of warning King they could no longer be militarily responsible for defense and internal security of kingdom unless corrective action taken. King finally acted on own initiative to dissolve government and personally assumed premiership.
“Restraint shown by French in above circumstances noteworthy—and very wise.
“French representatives, particularly in matters affecting their financial and military responsibilities and sacrifices, bound to be given respectful consideration by responsible governments of three states. Any attempt, however, by France to force its will on three governments or to exert powers of internal government could not, in my [Page 264] opinion, succeed in view of nationalist feelings of both governments and the governed. French exert influence, but not governing authority.
“Apart from national aspirations for independence acting as brake to possible French intentions interference, there is fact of growing national armies. They are indeed at this stage of their development necessarily subject to French High Command, but already Viet national army consists of some 120,000 regulars, figure which compares with 138,000 first-line troops of Viet Minh, against which French Union forces, with increasing assistance of national armies, still making only slow progress.
“Apart from these facts, there is circumstance that US now supporting, if to lesser degree than France, development of governments and military forces of three states. Our policy is to protect and foster independence of three states. I recall about year and half ago Maréchal de Lattre, objecting to press references to him as French ‘proconsul’ remarked to me that he had come to perfect independence of states, adding ‘even if France wished move back toward colonial authority, it would be unable to do so—US would not let us do it’. I believe that moral authority of US would be sufficient to thwart any misguided effort on part of France to resubject national will of these peoples and their governments to colonial control.
“Our sympathy with aspirations these peoples for independence implies no opposition to their remaining within French Union. As matter of fact, they have no other choice at present. Were it not for French Union forces, the three states would be in effect vassal members of Soviet Union.
“Whether, when peace comes, all or any of three states will desire to stay in French Union remains to be seen. It is hardly to be doubted that at that time there would be renegotiation of certain terms, of the extensive and, in Viet opinion, excessive privileges and concessions granted in basic accords and implementing conventions. French realization that basic accords cannot be considered as ironbound documents preserving French ascendancy and privilege in Associated States was shown in Letourneau‘s public admission in Washington last June that French Union was not prison, but a voluntary association of free states.”
- Drafted by Robert E. Hoey, Officer in Charge, Vietnam—Laos—Cambodia Affairs. Sent to Manila, Bangkok, Rangoon, Djakarta, Colombo, New Delhi, and Karachi; also sent for information to Saigon, Singapore, Moscow, London, and Paris.↩
- The file copy of telegram 652 is in file 751G.00/9–2452.↩
- The New York Times of Sept. 7 contained an interview with Chester Bowles, Ambassador in India, regarding the Ambassador’s recently concluded tour of Southeast Asia.↩
- For information on the vote of the Security Council, Sept. 19, see editorial note, p. 254.↩