Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

511.51G/9–2052: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

confidential
priority

Saigon, September 20, 1952—3 p.m.

633. For Ben Crosby I/R.² Topics listed in Depcirtel 208, August 23³ developed as follows:

1. Info goals.

Primary objective of US policy in Indochina is to prevent this critical area SEA from falling under Commie domination. Forces in being which prevent Commies from achieving military and political victory are (1) armed forces Fr Union and (2) the developing armies of three AS. Only continued effective presence of these forces can prevent Commie pressure from exploiting power vacuum created by existing weakness of AS. Corollary with this objective is to aid govts of these newly independent states to develop an effective progressive program and appeal to counterpersuasive Commie propaganda which exploits nationalist and racial feeling.

Info program must conform to and serve to foster these objectives. Program should contain nothing which would give support to certain extremist elements advocating present withdrawal Fr Union forces from Indochina. It should deliberately soft-pedal suggestions which may be expected to foster anti-Fr attitudes or to stimulate unbridled nationalism. It should be sufficiently imaginative to appeal to peoples of AS without jeopardizing essential basis upon which military effort rests. There are themes which, by positive treatment, may be used to appeal to national aspirations of peoples AS without antagonizing the Fr. Major emphasis should be focussed on positive results accomplished by AS in developing nationhood and on their place as active partners in anti-Commie struggle in which US is powerful, determined ally. Program should endeavor channel nationalistic feelings into productive accomplishments rather than futile obstructionism. Moreover info program should be directed to arousing people AS to consciousness their own imminent peril in face Commie danger and to inform them of need for active cooperation with nations free world in order to overcome this peril.

2. Effectiveness of info devices in achieving goals.

Given wide-spread hostilities and disturbed conditions limiting scope of contacts with Indochinese, most effective measurable device is publications program chiefly designed for leader groups. This evidenced by heavy first returns of recently launched post cards questionnaire. Preliminary examination shows interest far beyond expectation. Greatest impact is film program which now geared to showing to audience total 75 to 100,000 weekly. Since many new customs FE can be traced to Amer films, must be assumed that films is effective program though difficult to determine degree. Library attendance now approximately 200,000 annually which in some cases is due to limited facilities. Heavy demand for English lessons being met with about 40 classes weekly with more than 1,000 on waiting list as well as lessons weekly on five of seven radio stations. Such demand can only be construed as intense interest in US by educated groups. All factors recited must be viewed as effective though degree cannot be accurately measured.

3. Comparative value of various parts of program; should emphasis be changed.

Under present policy of concentrating on leader groups as defined by country plan press and publications program has greatest value since this output can be skillfully tailored. Library, film, radio and exchange of persons can be regarded as valuable auxiliary forces. Some shift of emphasis certainly should be discussed even if eventually rejected. Rural and village populations which make up as much as 80 percent of the 12 million in the non-VM zone are not a primary target group. Yet they are primary target for VM propaganda which follows Soviet line of giving masses saturation treatment. In addition approx 10 million in VM zone not reached by program effort. Daily VM broadcasts maligning US effort AS go unanswered except for sporadic efforts by VOA which not timely nor too effective because of difficulty of reception with average type of radio receiver used here.

4. Caliber of personnel operating program. Of 21 Amers, all but one are serving first assignment and are carrying heavy work load since 9 vacancies exist. As team, caliber of performance is high and what is lacking in experience is more than made up for by intense interest in challenging job, firm belief in program, industry, imagination, ingenuity and intelligence. Further they get things done. Work load serious problem since in past 6 months 4 hospitalized with tropical diseases and 2 classified as no longer fit for duty tropical countries. Two more appear on verge of similar classification. Efficient operation of info program in critical area cannot be sustained on basis of chronic personnel shortage regardless of over-all general high caliber of personnel.

5. Acceptability of info program idea to other mission personnel. Mission personnel are in agreement with the need for an Indo program and fully appreciate its importance as valuable adjunct to furthering US policy in IC. USIS has worked in close coordination with political and economic sections of Emb, and there is general agreement on over-all objective. Excellent personal relationships between USIS and other Emb personnel have been conducive to a free exchange of ideas and a general spirit of mutual cooperativeness.

6. Suggestions for improving program. Most critical and continuing problem is distribution which is lifeline of publication program. At present approx 800,000 publications all types being distributed monthly under supervision 1 Amer officer and with extremely limited transport facilities. Heavy backlog of publications being warehoused at high cost. This cld be remedied with 1 additional Amer officer and as little as 1 or 2 trucks being made available and without any further additional operating costs. Reduction of VOA broadcast to 15 minutes of news daily and additional local programming shld also be seriously considered.

7. Comparison of US info program with that of other countries. USIS efforts are directed primarily toward target groups: (1) leaders, which include intellectuals, professional people and govt officials, (2) teachers and students, and (3) key figures in villages and rural areas. USIS material disseminated primarily through local press, schools, AS Govt orgs including AS info services and Fr info services; other available channel also used. STEM info program useful auxiliary to USIS in publicizing Amer economic aid.

VM propaganda service, which is by far most important “opposition” propaganda org, carries out its program through publications, radio, but especially by means cadre operations, and concentrates on reaching masses. Police state conditions which prevail in VM controlled zones practically eliminate competing propaganda and foster proliferation of Commie indoctrination agencies and programs. In non-VM zones, masses reached largely by clandestine operations Commie cells and cadres and to lesser degree through VM broadcast.

Moscow and Peiping broadcast in Vietnamese to Vietnam but these efforts are greatly overshadowed by VM propaganda and are relatively minor auxiliaries to latter.

Vietnamese info service has in theory one of largest info orgs in SEA—there are about 1,000 info halls. However, because of lack of funds and shortage trained personnel Vietnamese info service relatively ineffective. Depends largely on USIS for films and published materials; to considerable degree on STEM for financial support. Info Min and key personnel of Min have so far not made impressive showing. Through exercise of strict censorship can control material appearing in press.

Info services Cambodia fairly well-developed; Laotian service rudimentary.

Fr info service designed almost wholly to reach intellectuals and to foster appreciation for Fr culture. 95 percent of Fr info service publications are in French whereas almost all USIS publications are in AS languages. Fr info service has done some work along psychological warfare lines in conjunction with USIS.

Fr army has well-developed psychological warfare program directed to distributing anti-VM propaganda and developing of morale AS national armies. Stresses cohesiveness national armies and Fr Union forces.

Fr info service is token service publishing monthly news magazine. Maintains local reading room.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. Director, Congressional and Public Information, U.S. International Information Administration.
3. Circular telegram 208 of Aug. 23, requested chiefs of missions at major posts to summarize the information objectives and comment on the effectiveness of the information programs being carried out in their respective countries, for the use of a Senate committee investigating the U.S. foreign information program. (511.00/8–2352) For documentation on the U.S. information program, see volume ii.