751G.5/8–452: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
secret
Saigon, August 4, 1952—8
p.m.
290. Deptel 241, Aug 1.
- 1.
- We are much reassured at Dept’s decision to urge offensive on Fr. Letourneau seems to be wavering toward a favorable decision and our bolstering may be just what he needs to argue case with Fr Cabinet. We reiterate our belief that Fr are unlikely to take such action unless they are pressed. In recent months Fr leaders have made more statements musing on mirage of negots than they have pledging all-out attack. While world and war still mark time at Panmunjon Fr seems frozen in wait-and-see attitude, altho Korean armistice cld unleash new threats against which their passive posture wld have ill prepared them.
- 2.
- Unless they are determined to push VM at every chance, policy of Fr lacks any clear goal. It now seems dominated by idea of the “releve” which will see Viet troops substituted for Fr. But Letourneau himself admits full turnover impossible now or in one or two years [Page 234] without debacle. If native troops are ever to take over from Eurs they must face a disheartened enemy and they must have behind them a confident and popular native govt. While Fr policy works for latter, Fr forces must strike hard blows to achieve the former. If this is not done Fr position is increasingly one of not being able to hang on or to let go, while US and Fr taxpayer foot bill.
- 3.
- Fr offensive has actually been in abeyance since before Caobang reverse which spoiled Alessandri’s1 plans. De Lattre infused an offensive spirit but chief achievement was halting disintegration and preparing delta strong point. The Hoabinh “offensive” caught no VM‘s and failed its objectives although heavy losses were inflicted on enemy. Since then army has nursed its attacking edge by keeping up small scale cleaning operations during rainy season although these chiefly against VM who have infiltrated the stockade.
- 4.
- Now however army is massively equipped with US aid, it claims to know VM morale is faltering and it has available VM [VN] troops which wld be useful at least for occupation duty. There are some risks in Salan‘s proposed operations but even if it failed over-all, position wld not have been threatened and enemy seems bound to suffer losses.
- 5.
- Gen Trapnell has seen reftel. He is immed proceeding to a personal estimate of Fr airlift capabilities and will make reconnaissance visit to Tonkin. I have expressed belief estimate shld be based on peak need for limited operation and not on normal supply and org tables for year round operations. Of course recommendation includes loan of Fr pilots and maintenance facilities from Fr Metropolitan forces. I hope Gen Ridgway2 will have opportunity to discuss entire Indochina operation with Gen Salan.
Heath