751G.5/7–2752: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy at Saigon1
241. Eyes only Amb. Embtel 220 July 27 arrived at time when Dept giving particular thought to disturbing question of growing evidences of absence Fr offensive attitude in mil field in IC as a result indications given in Wash by Letourneau himself in June and [Page 232] urtel 131 July 17, which was only slightly alleviated by Singapore’s 74 July 17.2
You will recall our original concern with this subj during Letourneau conversations here when Dept contested thesis that offensive action on part of Franco-Viet forces was unwise on the grounds that it wld only provoke further intervention from Chi on behalf Viet Minh. We found Letourneau‘s statement that he was not prepared to sacrifice more Fr lives in operations for purpose seizing land from Viet Minh until such time as Viet Govt and Natl army were capable of assuring control after liberation understandable but not excuse for not carrying out offensive operations purpose of which was strike at enemy in areas outside present Fr perimeter even if land were not gained thereby and important result of which would be to develop supremely important feeling of confidence in eventual victory our side.
Dept agrees with Saigon that any furtherance of impression that Fr are disinclined push war against Viet Minh wld have grave psychological effect on Vietnamese populace as a whole, serve to encourage rather than reduce fence-sitting and otherwise benefit the enemy. Impression cld gather momentum at such a rate as to jeopardize effort into which so much manpower and money have been poured and which is key to overall program for defense of SEA.
Departmental officer discussed subj including details ur 220 July 27 with responsible officers in Pentagon today. We found considerable degree of agreement on necessity maintain offensive psychology and present continued evidences of will to win in form, for example, airborne operations in enemy territory. Pentagon appreciates difficulties in administering liberated territory but impressed by Salan theory that Viet Minh now vulnerable and must be hit soon wherever it is to be found. Object is to annihilate enemy not gain land. Pentagon disagrees however with Gen Salan‘s statements made to you as reported reftel re ability Fr air force airlift sufficient troops for offensive airborne operations (which Pentagon agrees most practical and effective form offensive action). Without detailing differences of opinion (to be done separately) their conviction, which is based largely if not entirely on MAAG reports, is that Fr are not now obtaining maximum potential troop lift with existing aircraft. Trouble lies in lack of pilots, crews, maintenance facilities and airfields. They believe for instance that Salan can now airlift two battalions at a time rather than one They think it is useless to discuss more equipment until the Fr agree to provide the necessary pilots and maintenance crews. There [Page 233] was some talk of possibility of creating a supply and rehabilitation depot in Phils.
Pentagon reported that Trapnell had been delayed in Paris in order make it possible discuss subj with Salan and that they wld anxiously await his first report after arriving in Saigon.
Dept suggests matter be pursued actively with Trapnell who is airborne officer himself and shld have ready understanding situation, to the end that an agreed interpretation of needs can be reached between Fr and MAAG and specific recommendations made to Pentagon.
Pentagon understands fully danger in allowing sit-tight attitude to be cultivated and is anxious contribute whatever they can within realm of possibility. Dept anxious impress upon Fr folly of giving up offensive strategy so brilliantly launched and carried out by de Lattre in favor of a mere holding operation.
Aside from using every opportunity to impress imperative need for continued offensive action upon Fr auths in both Paris and Saigon next step wld appear to be to press for ironing out differences between Gen Salan‘s and MAAG‘s analysis of what is needed to deal with problem if Salan‘s recommendations are accepted in Paris. Paris shld make every effort support Salan‘s cause and Saigon urge prompt action upon Trapnell after his arrival while continuing impress Letourneau our conviction that offensive must be pursued.
- Drafted by William M. Gibson, Deputy Director of PSA. Also sent to Paris as telegram 623.↩
- In telegram 74 from Singapore, July 17, not printed, Consul General Baldwin reported on the visit of Minister Letourneau to Singapore, July 11–13, referring to British sources. Letourneau was reported to have emphasized his satisfaction with his conversations in Washington in June. (601.5151G/7–1752)↩