756D.58/8–2753
No. 264
The Acting Secretary
of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to my letter to you dated June 23, 1953,1 in which I asked that you make a preliminary study of the feasibility, from a military standpoint, of assigning a United States military mission to Indonesia. I refer further to your reply of August 27, 1953,2 which indicates that the assignment of such a mission would be feasible. Our interest in your views at that time was based on a request from the Ambassador of Indonesia that we explore the possibility of sending a military mission to his country.
The Ambassador subsequently returned to Indonesia where he is now head of the Cabinet which took office August 1, 1953. His Cabinet is supported in Parliament by Communists. Some of the Cabinet Ministers are known to have pro-Communist attitudes and to have acted in a pro-Communist manner. The Cabinet, however, contains no known members of the Communist Party and the Government has been extremely sensitive to allegations that it is Communist influenced.
One of the Cabinet members whom we consider subject to Communist influence is the Minister of Defense, Iwa Kusumasumantri. He has, since assuming office, (a) placed suspected Communists in the Ministry of Defense; (b) recommended arming the pro-Communist volunteer group PERBEPSI; and (c) sought the removal of non-Communist and pro-American officers from the Indonesian armed forces. His policies have been opposed by the stronger group of higher ranking Indonesian Army officers constituting the “professional” corps which is anti-Communist. His policies favoring PERBEPSI are reported to have been opposed also by the more responsible members of the present Cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister Ali.
Our Ambassador in Djakarta paid a routine call on the Minister of Defense on February 26. Minister Iwa told him at that time that the Indonesian Government has abandoned the idea of bringing any foreign military mission to Indonesia to train its defense forces but that “after further consultation with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, he might wish to get in touch with him (our Ambassador) to see if American instructors might be nominated by the United States for individual employment.” He went on to express [Page 416] his satisfaction with the training that Indonesian officers have received in the United States and stated his preference for American training over that obtained from other countries.
While the Department does not desire to support the present Minister of Defense nor endorse him in any way, the opportunity to introduce American Army officers into the Indonesian Army appears worthy of study and possibly, encouragement. In view of the advantages to the United States which could accrue, we do not believe that an adverse evaluation of Iwa or his motives should be decisive in determining the course of action for the United States. We believe that an opportunity to place carefully selected American Army officers in the Indonesian Army for training purposes would provide a means of exerting an influence against communism.…
The Department does not intend to show any eagerness in responding to the Indonesian Minister of Defense but believes there would be value in indicating to Prime Minister Ali and Foreign Minister Sunario that we would be cooperative if the Indonesian Government formalizes its position in this matter.
I would appreciate your exploring the question of whether the Department of Defense could nominate United States Army officers (or reserve or retired United States Army officers) if a firm request should be forthcoming from the Indonesian Government. I would also appreciate receiving your evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages, from a military standpoint, of giving Indonesia military training assistance under such an individual contract plan.
Sincerely,