756D.11/2–2754: Telegram
No. 263
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
secret
Djakarta, February 27, 1954—1
p.m.
949. Deptel 653.1 I am fully aware in proposing Sukarno invitation to US that it has certain aspects of calculated risk inasmuch as his reaction difficult to weigh in advance, but my telegram 8282 assesses possibilities as nearly as we can forecast them. In further response to Department’s queries, I would say with respect to:
- a.
- That this additional recognition would probably increase his personal prestige and add to his stature in minds of Indonesian masses. In present delicate balances in Indonesia, person of President is one of greatest stabilizing influences, and I think it advantageous to us to try to increase possibility of his maintaining this hold. With respect to his relationship to party politics, we would hope that this visit might encourage him to take a more positive stand in facing Indonesian domestic Communist problem and resisting external Communist influences. Sukarno reacts to recognition, would be impressed favorably by US power, warmth, friendship, and it is entirely possible his visit and activities in US might invoke criticism of him by internal and external Communist sources, which, from our point of view, would be very helpful as he would resent any interference with what he would consider exercise of rightful prerogatives.
- b.
- Sukarno would undoubtedly express his opinion on New Guinea, especially if queried by press. He is, however, considerate by nature and following his own instincts and traditional Javanese courtesy would probably not willfully embarrass his hosts. So far as rubber, tin, economic aid concerned, it would be no more difficult to discuss these subjects with him there than with Indonesians here. As long as these issues are of vital importance to Indonesia they will have some prominence in our discussions at all levels.
- c.
- It difficult to see how Sukarno visit would have any effect on Indonesian elections, especially adverse ones. It would be inadvisable for Sukarno to be out of country immediately preceding, during or following elections. They now scheduled for early 1955.
In view fact Sukarno one of very few Asian leaders for one reason or other eligible for invitation to US, would hope that place could be found in crowded US calendar to make it possible.
Cumming