Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.5 MSP/4–854

No. 265
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Indonesian and Pacific Island Affairs (Galbraith) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)

top secret

Washington, April 8, 1954.

Subject:

• Military Training Assistance for Indonesia

The attached telegram (Djakarta’s 1142—Tab A)¹ raises a number of difficult questions, the most potent of which are the following:

1. Can we provide Indonesia army and air force officers to serve as instructors, without formal agreement?

2. Can present training in the U.S. for Indonesian Army officers, due to cut by two-thirds because of dollar shortages, be continued?

3. Can Filipino officers be utilized for training in Indonesia?

4. Can the dollar cost of the above training be borne by the U.S.?

5. Can the above arrangements be handled discreetly, if not secretly, with Prime Minister Ali and perhaps one or two other Cabinet officials at most?

These questions raise, in turn, the important policy question: would the U.S. by providing military training to the present Government strengthen that Government and prolong its life (NSC 171/1, paragraph 19)?² Almost equally important is the question: would the U.S. in providing military instructors through secret negotiations with the Prime Minister, risk precipitating another Cabinet crisis, which like the “MSA crisis” of February 1952, would create a “setback” to U.S.-Indonesian relations and contribute to the establishment of a cabinet less amenable to cooperation with the U.S.? It is not impossible that Iwa, acting on instructions from the Communist Party, is setting a trap for the U.S. and for the Indonesian Government.

I believe we can and should continue to explore this subject with the present Government. I believe the most desirable initial step would be the assignment at the Indonesian Government’s request of a qualified officer whose principal initial task would be to establish contacts with Indonesian Army leadership, survey the situation and draw up recommendations for training (he would best be under individual contract to the Indonesian Government). We should also explore on a confidential basis with the Philippine Government an arrangement under which qualified Philippine officers could be provided Indonesia on contract or loan. If the officer assigned to make the initial survey were successful in his contacts, and if his recommendations warranted it, a request by the Indonesian Government should be stimulated to which the U.S. could respond favorably. Such a request should have:

1) broad backing from Indonesian Army leadership,

2) endorsement by the Indonesian Government and approval by the President and Vice President,

3) acceptability to non-Communist elements in the major political parties both in and out of the government.

Such a development would warrant a request for OCB action approving the extension of assistance to Indonesia for military assistance and, if necessary, an NSC decision.

I recommend that we now:

1) Explore with Defense the selection of an officer to make a survey;

2) Authorize the Ambassador to discuss with Prime Minister Ali the assignment of an officer, on individual contract basis, to survey Indonesia’s training needs and recommend a training plan;

3) Authorize our Embassy in Manila to explore, on a confidential basis, the availability of experienced officers who might serve, on an individual contract or loan basis, as instructors to the Indonesian Army.

4) Explore with Defense the feasibility of providing MATS transportation from Manila for Indonesian Army officers assigned for training in the U.S. (the Indonesian Garuda Airways can be utilized for the trip to Manila).

Note: Mr. Radius told me this afternoon that the Under Secretary has expressed keen interest in this matter, is anxious that we do not miss the opportunity it offers to get our people into Indonesia and wants to be kept informed of our progress on it.…

1. Telegram 1142, Apr. 6, dealt primarily with a conversation of the previous day between Ambassador Cumming and Prime Minister Ali on the question of Indonesia’s hiring U.S. military instructors. (711.56356D/4–654)
2. Document 255.