756D.58/5–1553
No. 247
The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Secretary of Defense
(Wilson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Ambassador of Indonesia has asked that the United States Government explore the possibility of sending a military training mission to Indonesia. He envisages a mission of “200 officers” (which in Indonesian usage probably includes non-commissioned officers) to train air, naval and ground forces at Indonesian expense.
The Ambassador first raised this question personally and informally on April 1. On May 15 he renewed his inquiry under “definite instructions” from his Government. On June 7, the Ambassador left for Indonesia to participate in talks preparatory to forming a new government to replace the Wilopo Government which resigned on June 3. Prior to his leaving, the Ambassador was informed on June 6 that we had not been able to explore fully his inquiry of May 15 and that we could not indicate what our answer would be to a formal request nor make any commitment, but that such a request would receive sympathetic consideration subject to conditions then prevailing. The Ambassador said that he was pleased to know we would not refuse to give a request consideration and that this would help him in the talks he was going to attend.
Indonesia has had, since the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands on December 27, 1949, a Dutch Military Mission of about 1,000 men. Largely because of persistent Indonesian public hostility to the presence of Dutch military personnel, the two countries have agreed to terminate the Dutch mission by 1954. That mission’s departure is viewed with silent but genuine regret by the Indonesian Chiefs of Staff who realistically appreciated its experienced help [Page 364] but recognized its political incompatibleness. Any return of the Dutch Military Mission seems out of the question. Indonesia desperately needs a replacement, however.
Prior to their approach to us, the Indonesians have informally approached several other non-communist countries, including Australia. From the Indonesian point of view, it appears that all but the latter are unable to provide what Indonesia wants. The Indonesians want one mission from the military forces of a country strong in all three service branches. In the most recent talks on this matter between Australian and Indonesian officials (held at a moment when internal political conditions were fluid in Indonesia), the Indonesians “backtracked” somewhat and after a preliminary study the Australian Defense Committee believes it would be “extremely difficult” to furnish the mission and would be inclined to recommend against it because of shortage of military personnel in Australia. Unless a further request is received, it is understood the Australians will take no further action.
Indonesia is faced with the immense problem of organizing former guerrillas into a modern army capable of dealing effectively with the dissident armed groups which continually weaken and threaten the existence of the non-communist Indonesian Government. She will need help in military training and it is in our interest that she get adequate assistance from some country in the free world.
If Indonesia were to select the United States as the source of a training mission for its armed services, this action would be widely interpreted as evidence that Indonesia considered its “independence” required alignment with the United States. The Ambassador’s inquiry is therefore a startling and crucial overture.
A successful American military mission to Indonesia, at the formal request and with the support of the Indonesian Government, could strengthen that Government and its ties with the United States and bring increased friendship and understanding between the American and Indonesian armed services. The presence of an American military mission in traditionally neutral Indonesia would also have a bracing psychological effect on other countries in Southeast Asia now faced with a critical period as a result of the invasion of Laos.
For the United States to rebuff or respond inadequately to any future request would risk paralyzing those groups within the Indonesian Government who prefer the free world and would likely strengthen those who wish to seek help elsewhere. If Indonesia’s need became sufficiently desperate, it is conceivable that an overture would be made to the Soviet Bloc which might be tempted with the prospect of sending a military mission to that large, [Page 365] wealthy and strategic area, as well as by the prospect of a propaganda victory. Conversely, a friendly and sympathetic reply could help Indonesia remain non-communist and draw it another step toward the free world.
Although there would undoubtedly be many difficulties, including political, which a United States military mission might encounter in Indonesia, American military training would not be entirely new to the Indonesian armed forces. A number of army and police officers have attended service schools in the United States. Some 60 Indonesian air cadets were successfully trained in the United States under a private contract in 1951. The Indonesian air force has depended almost entirely on a number of American pilots under private contract for the domestic training of its air cadets. On several occasions the Indonesian Chief of Staff for Navy has inquired about training in the United States for Indonesian naval officers.
A problem we would have to solve, before making response to a formal request, would be a possibly adverse Dutch attitude to a United States military mission to Indonesia, although the strengthening of the Indonesian Government’s ability to deal with dissidents and the greater security of the non-communist Indonesian Government would appear greatly to the Dutch advantage. Our Ambassador at The Hague, however, believes that there would be strong Dutch objections to an American military mission succeeding the Dutch. Before a final decision is made, the possibility of difficulties with the Dutch would have to be weighed against advantages to be gained from a United States military mission in Indonesia.
It is not likely that the Indonesian request will be formalized during the next several weeks pending the formation of a new government. The Indonesians want a replacement mission by the beginning of 1954. It is desirable, therefore, that we get a coordinated view within our own Government of the military and political aspects of the problem which would be posed by a formal request and that we be in a position to act promptly on any new approach.
I would be grateful if the Department of Defense would make a preparatory study of the feasibility, from the military viewpoint, of a military mission to Indonesia consisting of 200 United States officers and non-commissioned officers.
Sincerely yours,