Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/5–2853

Report by the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council¹

top secret

[Pearl Harbor, T. H.?,] November 25, 1952.

In accordance with instructions from the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council, Staff Planners of Australia, New Zealand and the United States met at Pearl Harbor, T.H. on Thursday, November 6th, 1952, to determine possible courses of action to meet the current Communist threat in Southeast Asia and in the event of further Communist aggression in this area short of a general emergency.

The Report of the meeting of Staff Planners is attached.

It is recommended that the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council approve this report and recommend to their respective Chiefs of Staff or equivalent that:—

a. The courses of action contained therein should be the basis of ANZUS military policy.

b. Every endeavor be made to obtain the agreement of the United Kingdom and France to such policy over as wide a range as possible.

• R. G. Pollard
  Head of Australian Staff Planners
• H. E. Gilbert
  Head of New Zealand Staff Planners
• C. C. Smith
  Head of United States Staff Planners

[Attachment]

[Here follow a list of persons present (12), a summary of contents, and a distribution list.]

Report No. 1

i. task referred

At their meeting at Honolulu, September 22–25, 1952, the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council referred the following immediate planning tasks to the Staff Planners:

• “1. A review of the military situation in Southeast Asia. This is essentially an intelligence estimate to be used in planning procedures.
• “2. Develop a strategic estimate on Southeast Asia.
• “3. Determine possible courses of action to meet the current Communist threat in Southeast Asia and in the event of further Communist aggression in this area short of a general emergency.”²

ii. definitions and interpretations

It is interpreted:

A. That the phrases used in the above directive have meanings as stated hereunder:

“Short of a general emergency”—Short of global war, i.e., short of war with the U.S.S.R.

“Current Communist threat”—Existing cold war conditions, wherein overt Chinese Communist aggression is limited to Korea but tension is maintained throughout Southeast Asia.

“Further Communist aggression”—Further Chinese Communist aggression (outside Korea) without overt Soviet participation.

B. That the aim of measures taken in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression will be to force the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression.

iii. statement of position

A. The Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council are concerned with the threat in Southeast Asia to the security of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America and with the determination of possible courses of action to meet the threat.

B. It is considered that the determination of possible courses of action to meet the threat must include estimates of force requirements. Such estimates are included in broad terms in this report.

C. Any planning by the ANZUS powers will form only part of the overall planning by the Allies to contain Communist expansion and, therefore, before detailed supporting plans for a particular area can be prepared, consultation with the Allied nation responsible for that area will be necessary.

iv. assumptions

A. The U.S.S.R. will not intervene thereby causing global war unless and until it suits her so to do.^*

B. Weapons of mass destruction will not be employed by either side.

C. A resolute defense of the area where aggression has occurred is an essential prerequisite to any Allied supporting action.

v. intelligence estimate

The Intelligence Estimate on which the Strategic Estimate on Southeast Asia has been based is at Annex A.³

vi. strategic estimate on southeast asia

A. Importance of the Southeast Asia Region

1. In Southeast Asia the Chinese Communist regime, as the agent of the leaders of world Communism, is pursuing aggressive policies designed to eliminate Western influence therein and to bring the whole area under Communist control.

2. The maintenance of internal security and national independence in Southeast Asia is of great significance because:

a. The loss to the Communists of the Tonkin Delta in Indochina, which is presently the area most directly threatened, would greatly simplify continued Communist expansion in Southeast Asia while compounding the difficulties of friendly forces. It would probably lead to the collapse of Burma and Thailand, and to a dangerous weakening of internal security in Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines.

b. Communist domination of Southeast Asia would almost completely deny the Pacific littoral of Asia to the West, involving the loss of strategic materials (principally rubber and tin) of great importance to the whole non-Communist world.

c. Communist acquisition of the rice surplus areas—Burma, Indochina and Thailand—would enable the Communists to apply effective economic pressure against the non-Communist Asian countries in which rice is the principal food and which depend for their already low standard of living on importation from the rice surplus areas. The Western Powers would be forced to assume the burden of supplying food-stuffs to these rice deficit areas, or acquiesce in their reaching an accommodating agreement with the Communists.

d. Communist control of Southeast Asia would markedly increase the prestige of Communist China and the Soviet Union and would strengthen the international position and the internal stability of their regimes.

e. The loss of Southeast Asia, together with a deteriorating situation in the Middle East, which will almost certainly be exploited by the Soviet bloc, would have strong repercussions in India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

f. Should Southeast Asia be lost, the reestablishment of Western influence in the region would be a difficult, if not insurmountable, problem.

3. The loss of Hong Kong would have a markedly adverse psychological effect throughout Southeast Asia and would deprive the Allies of a valuable beachhead and point of contact with anti-Communist elements in Communist China.

4. It is concluded that a Communist dominated and controlled Southeast Asia would so increase the Communist threat to the ANZUS Countries that the existing and potential Communist threats in the area must be countered.

5. The strategic and current situation in specific areas of the Southeast Asia regions is examined hereunder:

a. Indochina

(1) The mainland communications between China and Southeast Asia are channeled through the Tonkin Delta, the retention of which in friendly hands would render aggression by Chinese Communist ground forces against Southern Indochina, Thailand and Malaya very difficult.

(2) Bases in Southern Indochina are suitably located for operations to secure the sea communications in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea.

(3) In Indochina the Communists already have an active native force seriously threatening the existing government. The effect of Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh has been plainly evident in their increased coordination of large scale unit action, their improved communications and the apparent adequacy of their logistic supply. Now because of the military assistance by the Chinese Communists to the Viet Minh on the one hand and by the United States to the French and Associated States on the other, Indochina has become a major battleground in the West’s struggle to contain Communism. French Union forces are currently considered capable of holding their positions in the Tonkin Delta against Viet Minh forces as presently constituted, but would be forced to withdraw if substantial Chinese forces were committed.

b. Burma

(1) Strategically, Burma is the land route from China for an invasion of the Indian sub-continent and is the back door entrance for a conquest of Thailand. It possesses potential bases for air and naval action directed against Allied sea communications in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the remainder of Southeast Asia.

(2) The Socialist dominated government of Burma is basically leftist, anti-foreign in attitude and sympathetic toward Asian “Nationalism”.

(3) Militarily, the Burmese Government faces serious problems. Its army is poorly trained, is equipped with old, worn-out equipment and includes groups of doubtful loyalty. Battles with the Karens and the problem of maintaining internal order have made it almost impossible to provide more than a token force to police the Northern and Northeastern Chinese border areas. As a result, these have been overrun by various bandits and outlaws and by Chinese Nationalist guerrilla groups.

c. Thailand

(1) Thailand is of strategic importance because it lies astride the communication routes to the South. It would provide useful base facilities in enemy hands for an invasion of Malaya and for operations against Allied sea communications in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea.

(2) The potentially weak spot in Thai security, aside from the internal tensions caused by political rivalry within the military oligarchy itself, is the existence of a large, commercially dominant, alien Chinese minority which may be sympathetic to the Chinese Peiping regime.

(3) The Thai government, although weakened by factional intrigue and strife, has taken a fairly strong stand against Communism. However, it could not be expected to resist Communist pressure if Indochina or Burma fell.

d. Malaya (Including Singapore)

(1) Malaya’s strategic importance derives from its geographical location commanding the Strait of Malacca, the natural sea route between the Indian Ocean and the Far East. It possesses naval and air bases suitable for use for the control of sea communications in these areas and for defense. Should Communism succeed in Indochina, Burma and Thailand, it would be the last Western foothold on the mainland.

(2) In Malaya, terrorism carried out by the Communist “Malay Racial Liberation Army” (MRLA), 95% of whom are Chinese, poses a serious security threat to the British. British and indigenous forces have been able to maintain internal security in all major urban areas and along main lines of communication, and to checkmate the Communist attempts to prevent operation of rubber plantations, tin mines, and other basic industries. While continued guerrilla activity can be expected, some improvement in the security situation by the end of 1952 appears probable.

e. Hong Kong

(1) Hong Kong is of strategic importance because it is the only remaining beachhead in friendly hands on the mainland of China and because it forms a useful point of contact with anti-Communist elements in Communist China. Its retention has a strong psychological effect on Asian opinion.

(2) Maximum exploitation of existing and potential air facilities at Hong Kong would contribute significantly to gaining control of the air in the Hong Kong-Canton area.

(3) The British garrison, comprising approximately two-thirds of a division, with the supporting police force is capable of maintaining internal security under present conditions and of forcing the Chinese Communists to embark on a substantial military operation should they decide to occupy the Colony. The garrison is, however, not strong enough to withstand a large-scale Communist attack which, should it occur, would be successful within a very short time.

f. Macao

Macao is of no strategic importance and is indefensible. Its very small garrison is not capable of putting up more than a token defense.

g. Formosa (Including the Pescadores)

(1) The existing naval bases in Formosa are of value for naval operations on the China Coast. There is scope for the development of air bases useful for attacks on the Chinese mainland and for support of maritime operations in the area. In enemy hands, Formosa would facilitate a Communist advance into the Philippines. In the hands of the Chinese Nationalists, it is a continuing threat to the Chinese Communists who find it necessary to retain substantial armed forces on the adjacent mainland.

(2) The Chinese Nationalists are in effective control of the whole of Formosa, the security of which is safeguarded by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

h. Philippines

(1) The base facilities in the Philippines are of great value to the Allies for any operations which may be conducted in Southeast Asia. Their geographical relation to sea routes leading to China make them of great importance for the support of maritime operations in those seas.

(2) In the Philippines the internal security situation has shown marked improvement during the past year and, unless political factors intervene, prospects point to an even greater improvement by the end of 1952.

i. Indonesia, Sarawak, British North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, Brunei, and Dutch New Guinea

(1) In enemy hands, these territories would provide bases for attacks to be developed against the mainland of Australia. Their geographical relation to the various sea routes in the area would make their potential base facilities valuable for the control of sea communications. They are a source of substantial quantities of strategic materials.

(2) The present political situation in Indonesia is unstable and internal security is precarious.

(3) In Sarawak, British North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, Brunei and Dutch New Guinea, the administering powers have at present no major security problems although there is a continuing possibility that such problems may arise from Communist, nationalist or bandit inspiration.

B. Development of the Enemy Threat

1. Current deployment of Chinese Communist ground forces in South China provides the enemy with the capability of simultaneously overrunning existing friendly defense forces in Indochina, Hong Kong, Macao and Burma. Deployment of air support for such offensive action is readily within Chinese Communist capabilities. An analysis of air facilities in South China indicates that close air support would have to be deployed, at least initially, through the Canton complex. The Chinese Communist Air Force has the capability of attacking targets in Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Hong Kong, Philippines and Formosa.

2. The enemy threat in specific areas of the Southeast Asia region is examined hereunder:

a. Indochina^†

The Tonkin Delta of Indochina represents the key to the defense of Southeast Asia. French Union forces are currently containing the Viet Minh rebellion and are holding a defensive position known as the Hanoi Perimeter. However, the introduction of Chinese Communist forces into this campaign could drive them into the Haiphong Redoubt. It is estimated that the existing French Union forces could hold this redoubt against a mass assault for thirty days only, after which they would need complete logistic support, plus significant air and naval support.

The French Union forces, given adequate material aid, are capable of continuing to hold the Hanoi Perimeter against the Viet Minh. However additional material aid alone would not enable them to retain these positions in the face of Chinese Communist aggression.

Loss of the Hanoi Perimeter would enable the enemy to control strategic terrain in Indochina and would permit an enemy drive into Laos and Cambodia. Strong Communist forces in these two states would then be in a position to launch flanking attacks against Burma and Thailand at comparatively low cost and to continue their march to Saigon. Loss of the Hanoi Perimeter would also constitute a serious threat to Malaya.

b. Burma

(1) Chinese Communist forces are now in a position to launch an effective attack against Burma irrespective of action in any other area. However, loss of the Tonkin Delta would greatly facilitate Communist seizure of Burma. Burma in enemy hands would represent a significant threat to the Allied positions elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The presence of Chinese Nationalist guerrilla groups in the Northeastern border areas of Burma provides a ready-made excuse for Chinese Communist intervention.

(2) The inaccessibility of Burma to friendly forces and the difficulties imposed by terrain on ground and air reinforcement are of such magnitude that Allied counter-action in Burma itself would present great difficulty.

c. Thailand

With Indochina and/or Burma in Communist hands, Thailand would be in a precarious position. Friendly capabilities for the defense of Thailand, in this situation, are meager. Communist possession of Thailand would result in a significant strengthening of their military position with respect to the remainder of Southeast Asia. In particular it would place them in the most advantageous position to support dissident elements in Malaya and would provide them with air base sites and facilities and a line of departure for invasion of Malaya. The Communists would also have control of the largest single source of rice in Southeast Asia.

d. Malaya

Communist possession of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand would inevitably result in the necessity for an all-out, last-ditch defense. In fact, Malaya represents the Allies’ final defense position in Southeast Asia. The strategic raw materials there would be a valuable addition to the enemy’s war making potential.

e. Hong Kong

(1) It is estimated that the Chinese Communists are capable of over-running the British Crown Colony under present conditions, in a very few days. The air complex at Canton, about 70 miles away, is ideally located to support an enemy attack. The Canton complex represents a vital installation for the support of Chinese Communist aggression against either Indochina or Burma. Supporting air deployed from the North to assist in such offensive action would initially have to be staged through Canton. Complete logistic support for a sustained offensive against Indochina and Burma would have to come through Canton. Hong Kong in friendly hands constitutes a potential threat to the Canton complex.

(2) Due to the enemy ability to overrun Hong Kong in a very few days reinforcement action must be initiated and completed before the enemy can react.

f. Formosa-Philippine Islands

The major existing threat against Formosa lies in the Chinese Communist capability to launch airborne and amphibious forces against the island. It is considered that existing friendly naval forces are sufficient to cope with this threat. This Chinese Communist capability does not now extend to the Philippines. However, with Formosa in Chinese Communist hands the Philippines would be similarly threatened.

g. Other Areas

While the Philippines and Malaya remain under friendly control it is considered that no significant external military threat exists against these areas. There is a current internal threat in these areas that would be aggravated by the loss to Communism of any of the directly threatened areas in Southeast Asia.

vii. allied courses of action to meet the current communist threat in southeast asia

A. In the light of this study of the importance of the Southeast Asia region and the development of the enemy threat, action to meet that threat appears essential. Possible courses include:

1. Continuation and Possible Increase of the Present Military Aid and Advisory Programs

This continued aid, while not committing military forces of nations other than those involved in the specific areas, would provide the means necessary to exploit to the fullest the strengthening of national forces in the region.

2. Strengthening of Military Forces in the Region

a. By the use of national and indigenous forces.

Owing to the strategic importance of Indochina and Hong Kong, the French and British should be encouraged to build up their forces and strengthen their defenses in those areas. In Indochina the French have embarked on a program to build up the French Union forces. With increased aid and advisory assistance this strengthening could be accelerated. In this and other areas of Southeast Asia there should be a strengthening of national forces sufficient to maintain internal stability and, in the longer term, to resist Chinese Communist aggression.

Reinforcement to meet the current threat must be by national and indigenous forces as the employment of forces from Allied nations would probably be open to misinterpretation throughout the world, particularly in Asia, as to the motive of the Allies, and might involve Chinese Communist reaction.

b. By reinforcement of existing Allied forces.

There are insufficient Allied forces presently in Southeast Asia for the requirements foreseen in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression. A general increase in the forces in Southeast Asia might provide the necessary deterrent. Additional forces within the region could constitute a strategic reserve available for assistance in threatened areas in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression.

3. Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare, if effective, would have beneficial military results in strengthening the will of the non-Communist countries of the region to resist Communism. It would also weaken the hold of the Chinese Communist government within China, thereby reducing Chinese capabilities to commit aggression.

4. Guerrilla Warfare

The assistance and encouragement by covert means of anti-Communist dissident elements in Communist China and the intensification of guerrilla activities, including sabotage, could weaken the Chinese Communist regime and thereby reduce the threat in Southeast Asia.

5. Use of Chinese Nationalists

An important source of unused military manpower in the Far East, favorably inclined towards the Allies, is represented by the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. If agreement for the use of these forces could be reached between the Chinese Nationalists and the governments of the areas directly threatened they could be employed to assist in the defense of those areas. A progressive increase in their capabilities is being developed with U.S. assistance and further increase is desirable.

6. Conduct a Blockade of the China Coast

A blockade of the China coast prior to further aggression by the Chinese Communists would have no immediate effect in the reduction of their military capabilities. It would require substantial naval and air forces to implement it. In any case there would be considerable leakage through Vladivostok. It would most likely provoke Chinese Communist reaction, particularly against Hong Kong.

7. Determine a Coordinated Agreed Military Policy With the United Kingdom and France Applicable to the Threatened Areas

The absence of an agreed military policy with the United Kingdom and France with regard to Southeast Asia complicates the problem of implementing possible military courses of action designed to meet the threat of further aggression in the region. The courses of action contained in this paper should be the basis of ANZUS military policy which, it is suggested, may form the basis for wider agreement with the United Kingdom and France. A coordinated expression of that military policy, therefore, is highly desirable for planning of action to counter the existing threat or to meet further aggression should it occur in the region.

8. Establish a Means of Coordinating Agreed Allied Military Policy

It is considered that the first step toward the accomplishment of this purpose should be a meeting of the following:

• Commander in Chief Pacific (U.S.)
• Representative of British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East)
• Commander in Chief, French Forces, Far East
• Representative of New Zealand Chiefs of Staff
• Representative of Australian Defence Committee

B. Conclusions

1. Each of the foregoing possible courses of action, with the exception of the blockade, would contribute towards meeting the current threat and should be encouraged.

2. A blockade of the China coast, under current conditions, would be uneconomical and would not have sufficient effect on Chinese Communist capabilities in Southeast Asia to warrant its imposition.

3. The courses of action which would contribute most are:

a. The build-up of national and indigenous forces in the directly threatened areas, backed by the continuation and possible increase of military aid and advisory programs.

b. An increase in Allied forces in the region to provide a deterrent to further Chinese Communist aggression.

4. The formulation of an agreed military policy with the United Kingdom and France with respect to Southeast Asia would greatly assist in the effective implementation of these courses. It would also facilitate planning to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. Failing complete agreement, every effort should be made to obtain such an agreed policy over as wide a range as possible.

viii. allied courses of action in event of further chinese communist aggression in southeast asia

A. The aim of Allied action in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression will be to force the Communists to cease such aggression. In the light of the examination of the enemy threat, consideration of courses of action has been restricted to those applicable to the areas directly threatened and to those more general measures against China which might be necessary.

Consideration has also been given to courses of action applicable to Malaya because of the particular strategic importance of that area. The detailed examination of the advantages and disadvantages of courses of action at Annex B⁴ is summarized hereunder:

1. Provide Naval and Air Support to Friendly Forces in Southeast Asia

Indochina

Provision of naval and air support to friendly forces in Indochina is feasible. It would contribute directly and with significant effect to the support of the French but would not, in itself, suffice to cause the enemy to cease his aggression.

Burma

Provision of naval and air support to friendly forces in Burma would be most uneconomical and, on military grounds, would not be worthwhile.

Hong Kong

Provision of naval and air support to friendly forces in Hong Kong is feasible. It would contribute directly and with significant effect to the support of the British but would not, in itself, afford sufficient assistance to enable the British to hold Hong Kong unless the Colony had received reinforcement of ground forces before a Chinese Communist attack.

2. Provide Ground Forces With Appropriate Naval and Air Support to Reinforce Friendly Forces in Indochina and Burma

Indochina

Provided the French Union forces hold the Hanoi Perimeter long enough to enable reinforcement by ground forces with appropriate naval and air support, such reinforcement would prevent the loss of the Tonkin Delta.

Burma

The provision of ground forces in support of friendly forces in Burma would not be profitable in view of its probable ineffectiveness and the effort involved.

3. Maintain the Security of Hong Kong by the Introduction of Appropriate Reinforcements

The defense of Hong Kong is feasible if adequate ground forces are in place prior to an attack by the Chinese Communists, if suitable land-based aircraft are in place to provide air defense and if an adequate naval task force is available to assist in air defense and provide air and gunfire support. The successful defense of Hong Kong, in addition to having psychological advantages, would have considerable effect on deterring Communist aggression elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

4. Conduct Air Attacks Against Selected Targets on the Chinese Mainland

Coordinated friendly attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland would progressively reduce the Chinese Communist ability to support large scale military operations based on South China and might well produce immediate results on the effectiveness of the CCAF. Such attacks would have the most gainful results when related to specific military operations.

5. Conduct a Blockade of the China Coast

A blockade as a separate course of action would have no immediate effect in the reduction of the Chinese Communist military capabilities. It would require substantial naval and air forces. In any case there would be considerable leakage through Vladivostok. It might provoke Russian reaction. In combination with other courses of action a blockade would be profitable.

6. Seize a Beachkead on the Chinese Mainland

No military advantage would be gained by seizure of a beach-head on the Chinese mainland other than the deployment of the enemy effort needed to contain it.

7. Seize and Hold a Beachhead on Hainan Island

The seizure of a beachhead on Hainan Island is a feasible operation with attractive strategic prospects. It would involve a continuing logistic and maintenance problem, at times under difficult seasonal weather conditions.

8. Provide Naval and Air Support to Friendly Forces in Malaya

Provision of naval and air support to friendly forces in Malaya is feasible and would contribute directly, and with significant effect, to the defense of Malaya but would not in itself suffice to cause the enemy to cease his aggression.

9. Provide Ground Forces With Appropriate Naval and Air Support in Support of Friendly Forces in Malaya

The provision of ground forces with appropriate naval and air support is feasible and would enable Malaya to be held.

B. Considerations Affecting the Selection of Courses of Action

Courses of action to meet the current Chinese Communist threat, which include the strengthening of military forces in the region, have been set out above. In the event of further aggression, the action to be taken to cause the Chinese Communists to cease such aggression will depend on the extent to which those courses have already been carried out, particularly those relating to the strengthening of the friendly forces in Hong Kong and Indochina. The probable effects of Chinese Communist aggression against specified areas are stated hereunder:

1. Hong Kong

Unless the Hong Kong garrison had been strengthened the Colony would fall in a matter of days. This would result in the loss of our only foothold on the mainland of China which provides the only available air facilities from which friendly land-based interceptors could operate. It would also remove the potential threat to the Canton complex, which is of special importance to the Chinese Communist offensive capabilities in Southeast Asia. A major effort, in particularly difficult circumstances, would be involved in the evacuation of Hong

2. Indochina

If a Chinese Communist attack is launched before the area has been strengthened, the French Union forces would be forced to withdraw within the Haiphong Redoubt. Successful defense of the redoubt would depend upon complete logistic and significant naval and air support from Allied sources within a few weeks. Defense of the redoubt, by itself, would have very little effect on the Chinese Communist capability to continue their advance to the South.

The absence of suitable landing beaches, the over-taxed port facilities, the limited space within the Haiphong Redoubt and the effects of enemy air action would make reinforcement sufficient to restore the Hanoi Perimeter extremely difficult. A major effort, in particularly difficult circumstances, would be involved if evacuation became necessary.

3. Burma

As no adequate strengthening of the Burmese forces is likely in the foreseeable future, and as Allied naval and air support limited to the area of aggression would be most uneconomical and, on military grounds, not worthwhile, the overrunning of Burma must be expected in the event of Chinese Communist aggression.

Consideration of Burma points to the conclusion that the best method of forcing the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression would be by offensive action elsewhere against China.

4. Malaya

In the event of the loss of the foregoing areas, the strategic value of Malaya, as the last foothold on the mainland of Southeast Asia, would be greatly enhanced. As soon as it appears that the loss of the Hanoi Perimeter to the Chinese Communists might be inevitable, steps would have to be taken to accelerate measures for the defense of Malaya.

C. Conclusions

1. The Chinese Communists have the capability of overrunning Hong Kong, Macao, Indochina and Burma, either separately or in any combination. The best courses of action in the event of any Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia are listed hereunder:

a. Provide naval and air support to friendly forces resisting aggression, except in Burma and Macao in the event of attacks against those areas.

b. Maintain the security of Hong Kong by the introduction of appropriate reinforcements, except when Hong Kong itself has been attacked before the garrison has been adequately strengthened.

c. Conduct air attacks against selected targets on the Chinese mainland.

d. Conduct a blockade of the China coast.

e. Provide ground forces with appropriate naval and air support in Indochina, except when Indochina itself has been attacked before the French Union forces have been adequately strengthened.

f. Seize and hold a beachhead on Hainan Island.

2. While each of the courses outlined above is of value, no single one will suffice to cause the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression. A combination of all the courses applicable to a given situation offers the best prospect of doing so.

3. The effects of undertaking an appropriate combination of courses of action would be:

a. In the event of Chinese Communist aggression occurring before the French Union forces in Indochina and/or the garrison in Hong Kong had been adequately strengthened, the action taken would not cause the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression immediately but would progressively reduce their capability to continue the aggression.

b. If the forces in Indochina and Hong Kong had been sufficiently strengthened before a Chinese Communist attack a successful defense of these areas could not be expected. Thereby the prospects of success of Allied action within a reasonable period would be considerably increased.

4. If Allied weakness in Southeast Asia were such that the above courses of action could not be successfully implemented and the major portion of the area should fall to Chinese Communist aggression, then a firm defense of Malaya would have to be conducted. This would necessitate reinforcement of Malaya by ground forces with appropriate naval and air support.

5. It is clear that failure to strengthen Indochina before aggression occurs and to provide adequate naval and air support in the event of aggression could lead to the loss of the Southeast Asia region to the Chinese Communists. It is also evident that if similar action is not taken with respect to Hong Kong the Colony would be lost. It would be a most difficult, if not insurmountable, task to regain those areas.

ix. force requirements

Until detailed planning has been undertaken, force requirements can be stated only in general terms. Forces of the order of those shown in Annex C⁵ will be required to carry out the various courses of action. No estimate has been made of logistic support forces required as these would vary considerably with the area of aggression, the courses of action selected and the location of available bases.

1. The file copy is an enclosure to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, May 15, 1953, p. 315.
2. The quotation is from section B of the Military Representatives’ Agreed Record of Proceedings, p. 224.
3. The possibility of Soviet reaction, however, has been noted in consideration of the courses of action. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not printed.
4. See Chart, Appendix I to Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix I is not printed.]
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed.