Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 388

¹

Memorandum Presented by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Churchill) to President-Elect Eisenhower²

[London.]

ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) and ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya)

Mr. Churchill discussed this matter with Mr. Menzies and Mr. Holland, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, during their visit to London in December. He said that he was anxious to find a solution of the problem caused by the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact. He and Mr. Eden had been disturbed by reports of the proceedings of the ANZUS Staff Planners, which seemed to show that ANZUS was seeking to extend its scope throughout the Pacific area including South East Asia. It was not reasonable that such planning should go forward without the direct assistance of the United Kingdom, whose, interests were closely involved. ANZAM, a proposed planning organization, at a Service level, which would be limited to a closely defined geographical area and would not include the United States, was no sort of substitute.

Mr. Menzies emphasized that Australia had a close and intimate interest in the problems both of the South West Pacific and South East Asia. His country had of course an equal interest in security against a resurgence of Japanese power, and that was the reason why they had welcomed the ANZUS Pact. However Australia, like the United Kingdom, would welcome some machinery for comprehensive military planning throughout the Far East and South East Asia. The security of Malaya was of the utmost consequence to Australia. If the United States Government found it impossible to agree immediately to a solution which was entirely satisfactory to the United Kingdom, Mr. Menzies thought that it should be perfectly possible to proceed by stages. The first step would be to give reality to ANZAM, and to make sure that its significance was fully understood. After that there should be a system of liaison on a high military level between ANZUS and ANZAM. It would then follow as a natural consequence that the planning performed separately by the ANZUS and ANZAM organizations should fall into the hands of a joint ANZUS–ANZAM Committee.

Mr. Holland endorsed these proposals which could, he thought, be a prelude to joint machinery for the control of the whole Pacific area including South East Asia. He thought it quite insufficient to suggest that the United Kingdom should be admitted as an observer in ANZUS and said that, in New Zealand’s view, the United Kingdom should be a full partner in Far Eastern planning. Mr. Holland and Mr. Menzies both made it clear that in any approach which Mr. Churchill made to the United States Government on these lines, he could take it for granted that he had the full support of Australia and New Zealand.

January 1953.

1. Office files of the Assistant Secretaries of State for Far Eastern Affairs during 1953. (Walter S. Robertson succeeded Allison in this position on Apr. 8, 1953.)
2. Churchill was in New York Jan. 5–8. He met with the President-elect on Jan. 5 and again on Jan. 7, when this memorandum was apparently presented to Eisenhower. The source text is attached to a covering memorandum of Jan. 16 from Allison to Foster, not printed.