Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/11–1452

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, November 14, 1952.

Subject:

• Report of the Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia

1. In a memorandum for you, subject, “Proposed Tripartite Conference on the Defense of Southeast Asia,” dated 11 July 1952,¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that a joint high-level conference of Heads of State, or their representatives, and the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Great Britain, and France, which would permit the simultaneous resolution of political-military questions appears to offer the greatest promise of achieving the agreements believed necessary for the successful defense of Southeast Asia and the prevention of limited war.

2. As a prelude thereto it was suggested that every effort should be made to obtain tripartite agreement on at least the minimum military courses of action referred to in subparagraphs 7e and 10c of NSC 124/2² which include a blockade, resolute defense of area of aggression, interdiction of lines of communication, and provision of major forces. Thereafter the United States would agree to the holding of a military conference under the conditions prescribed.

3. Subsequently, in a memorandum for you, subject, “Proposed United States Position for Five Power Military Representatives Conference on Actions to be Taken in the Event of Chinese Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia,” dated 5 August 1952,³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the conditions stated therein, concluded that the possible advantages of a Five Power Military Conference justified its being held regardless of the fact that firmly agreed joint political guidance had not been obtained.

4. Pursuant to instructions the Military Representatives of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Washington, D.C. on 6 October 1952, to consider the purely military aspects of the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of a Communist aggression.

5. In compliance with your memorandum, subject as above, dated 7 November 1952,⁴ the Report of the Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia⁵ and the memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Five Power Conference,⁶ which summarizes the results of the conference, are attached as Enclosures “A” and “B” respectively.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the position established by the U.S. Delegation at the Five Power Military Conference which is embodied in the conclusions of the Report. Comments on certain of these conclusions are made in succeeding paragraphs in order to emphasize the U.S. military position which should be maintained in future discussions between the Governments of the Five Powers.

7. The Military Representatives concluded in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Conference Report that Tonkin is of essential present interest in the defense of Southeast Asia, and the forces at present available in that area are not sufficient to halt a major Chinese Communist aggression.

8. The circumstances surrounding the timing and military situation under which the French might call for reinforcements for Tonkin are unpredictable. Without major development of port and airfield facilities prior to aggression the logistical support of U.S. ground and air force reinforcements on the order of magnitude visualized by the French would be impracticable. The further commitment of major U.S. ground and air forces to localized actions after aggression occurs would be inadvisable in view of the foregoing limitations and the indecisive nature of defensive operations within a limited perimeter. The immobilization of U.S. military forces in defense pockets around the perimeter of China would seriously limit the capability for direct action against China.

9. It is, therefore, advisable from the military view to assist and encourage the French in carrying out their responsibilities for the defense of Indochina. To this end France should be aided and urged to speed the development of indigenous combat forces and the improvement of supporting logistical and operational facilities to the extent considered necessary to meet the existing threat. This is within the framework of current U.S. national policy.

10. The conclusions in paragraphs 40 and 42 of the Conference Report are considered to have special significance in relation to the objectives of NSC 124/2 as regards expanded action against Communist China. In addition, they should serve as a basis for negotiating further political agreements on the issuance of a joint warning to Communist China.

11. The foreign delegations emphasized the need for deterrent action to forestall aggression. This subject was outside the terms of reference of the delegates to the Military Conference, and hence was not included in the conclusions of the main report. The subject will probably be pressed by foreign delegations in any government level discussions on Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subscribe in general to the logic of deterrent action. Visible reinforcements in the area might, so far as U.S. forces are concerned, consist of a periodic show of force by naval and air units, but participation by U.S. ground forces is not contemplated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to setting up combined liaison or planning agencies prior to concerted retaliatory action. Coordination of plans for operations against Communist China may be effected by the Commander in Chief, Pacific with other designated military commanders in the area.

12. Based on an analysis of the Report of the Conference and the Report of the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that without expanded jointly agreed political guidance, additional meetings of military representatives would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Action be initiated to amend NSC 124/2 to provide for securing agreement, under the auspices of the United Nations or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly government, to undertake the military courses of action set forth in paragraph 42 (combination of all coercive measures) of the Five Power Conference Report in the event of Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

b. The Five Power Military Conference Report be used as the basis for securing international agreement at governmental level to the military courses of action set forth in paragraph 42 of the Report.

c. Action be initiated to encourage the French at every opportunity to increase and speed the development of indigenous combat forces and supporting facilities in Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Not printed, but see Allison’s memorandum of July 15 to Matthews, p. 145.
2. Dated June 25, p. 125.
3. Ante, p. 184.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Dated Oct. 17, p. 230.
6. Dated Oct. 23, p. 234.