Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 133

Memorandum of Conversation, by Armistead M. Lee of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs

secret

[New York,] November 11, 1952.

Subject:

• ANZUS Treaty Council: British and Philippine Reaction Thereto: Status of Forces in Japan.

Participants:

• Mr. R.G. Casey, Australian Minister of External Affairs
• Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador
• Mr. T. Clifton Webb, N.Z. Minister of External Affairs
• Mr. J.K. Munro, N.Z. Ambassador
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Ward Allen, EUR
• Mr. A. M. Lee, BNA

British Demands for Link With ANZUS

Mr. Casey, who had requested the meeting with the Secretary and Mr. Webb, opened the discussion by saying that he would be meeting with Mr. Eden tomorrow and thought it probable that the latter might wish to discuss the UK claim for inclusion in ANZUS. The Secretary said that he too was seeing Mr. Eden tomorrow but that ANZUS had not been included in the list he had been given by the British of subjects which Mr. Eden would wish to discuss. Mr. Casey said that Mr. Eden had already told him that he did not feel very strongly on the subject but did think that he did feel that, in the global picture, some sort of U.K. association with ANZUS was desirable.

Sir Percy suggested, and Mr. Munro concurred, that since it was already agreed that this issue would be discussed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in London, it would be best to wait until Mr. Churchill has talked to Mr. Menzies. Mr. Webb remarked that it was necessary, however, to have an agreed position in case Mr. Eden raises the issue here in New York.

The Secretary mentioned that he had found Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, whom he had talked to recently,¹ did not feel at all strongly on the ANZUS issue. He said that he had told Mr. Lloyd that we were just getting started in this field of Pacific security arrangements and that it would be disastrous to this fledgling creature to load it down with purely prestige questions. Substantively, the British were being kept fully informed and would be tied in anyway through the existing Commonwealth defense mechanisms. The British seemed really concerned from the point of view of public reactions, and as he had told Mr. Lloyd, what they were asking is precisely “what would make our tripartite lives impossible.” (There was no indication of dissent from the Australians and New Zealanders.)

Philippine Attitude

The Secretary said that the Filipinos were very sensitive over their exclusion from ANZUS, and that when the word got out about the 5–power military conversations on Indochina, they were doubly distressed. He had tried to placate General Romulo on this issue by suggesting that the Philippines should make the most of the Manila meeting with Allison, Nash and Radford.² Romulo and Quirino had complied with the suggestion with a bit too much enthusiasm, and the resulting publicity buildup of the Manila meeting reached embarrassing proportions. Mr. Casey remarked that President Quirino had urged him to support Philippine claims for inclusion in ANZUS and that he had responded by suggesting that the Indonesians might then want to be cut in. He asked Quirino whether the Philippines were prepared to extend a security guarantee, of the ANZUS type, to Indonesia. Quirino had answered no, emphatically. Sir Percy recalled that the Filipinos had been cool to his own advocacy of a Pacific Pact in 1950. It was only after ANZUS that they suddenly became enthusiastic.

Summing up, the Secretary said that both the Philippines and France would deeply resent their exclusion from any enlargement of ANZUS to include the UK.

Domestic Political Aspect of UK Demands

Mr. Casey said that he had been talking to Mr. Henry Hopkinson³ of the UK on the background for the British campaign for inclusion in ANZUS. Hopkinson explained that when they, the Conservatives, had been in opposition, they had made great capital out of the Labor Government’s having condoned the “snub” to the UK involved in British exclusion from ANZUS. The issue had been most effective during the campaign, and the Conservatives had promised that they would set matters right. Now they were under the double pressure of the Labor Party and their own back benchers to carry out their promises.

Mr. Webb observed wryly that the UK Government seemed to be caught in a web of their own making while in opposition. He and Mr. Casey recalled with amusement that it was an experience which both of their Governments had known only too well, with their campaign promises to “make the pound go further”.⁴

[Here follows discussion of the status of Commonwealth forces in Japan.]

1. Acheson’s memorandum of his conversation with Lloyd, Oct. 28, is not printed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 133)
2. A report of the meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in circular telegram 38 from Manila, Oct. 29. (796.5/10–2952)
3. Minister of State in the Colonial Office.
4. On Nov. 18, the Embassy in London reported that the ANZUS question had been “scarcely mentioned” during the 1951 electoral campaign, nor had recent Parliamentary pressure from back benchers of both parties been serious. The telegram continued: “In our view govt, if it wishes, can easily meet such pressure as exists. As Dept aware, we believe Churchill himself prime source of Brit dissatisfaction.” (790.5/11–852)